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Executive Summary 
 
Aims. 
 
CCTV is undoubtedly one of the most renowned weapons in the fight against crime. Funded by Allianz 
Ireland, Cork Chamber of Commerce and the Faculty of Law, University College, Cork, this research 
sought to examine the emergence of CCTV as a crime prevention strategy and the effectiveness it 
displays in this role. To do this, a literature review was undertaken to uncover the theoretical rationale 
underpinning the use of CCTV and explore the rise of surveillance as mechanism of social control. 
Numerous evaluations and studies, particularly from Britain, but also Ireland, were reviewed to 
investigate the impact of CCTV on crime, to assess the nature and value of those evaluations and 
consequently, to formulate a number of recommendations. It is hoped that this work will prove useful 
to those contemplating the future deployment of CCTV as a crime prevention strategy. 
 
 
Theoretical Underpinnings: Rational Choice Theory & Routine Activity Theory: 
 
Before engaging in an analysis of the rise of CCTV and its impact on crime, it is first necessary to examine 
the rationale behind the use of CCTV as a crime prevention strategy. Rational Choice and Routine Activity 
Theories provide the theoretical basis for CCTV. 
 
Originally, the offender was seen as an aberration and crime was a plague, which needed to be 
eliminated from society. Early strains of criminology worked from this premise and sought to come to 
terms with what triggered criminality in the hopes of addressing the causes of crime and banishing it. 
Classicism, Neo-classicism and Positivism focussed on the offender, but all failed to provide a realistic 
solution to the crime problem. By the 1970s, widespread disillusionment with established theories 
primed the stage for Environmental Criminology, which drew the focus away from the offender and 
concentrated on the locus of the offence. This was a significant step, which paved the way for the 
emergence of Rational Choice and Routine Activity Theories. These more recent theories take in broader 
view of crime and are centred on the rational decision-making process of the would-be offender in the 
spatio-temporal context of the offence. 
 
Routine Activity Theory asserts that crime occurs when three elements converge in time and space. 
Those elements are a likely offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Rational 
Choice Theory assumes offenders are rational beings, who engage in a cost/benefit analysis in a given 
situation to assess whether there is an opportunity to offend to their advantage. In essence, these 
theories focus on the situations and routines of everyday life and of potential victims, which are liable 
to foster criminal opportunities, and contend that by identifying and modifying these, it is possible to 
reduce the opportunity to offend. 
 
 
Crime Prevention Strategies designed to combat Rational Choice Offenders. 
 
Centuries of armchair theorising about how to eliminate crime had failed to produce any practical 
solution and the realisation dawned that crime is nothing but an inevitable fact of life. A more pragmatic 
approach took hold and that was to control and manage the problem of crime so as to limit its impact 
on society. Responsibility for this approach percolated down from the State to its citizenry. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention is one of the main categories of crime prevention and is the practical sibling 
of Routine Activity and Rational Choice Theories. It operates by manipulating the criminogenic 
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environment to avoid the spatio-temporal convergence of the willing offender, the likely target and the 
absence of a capable guardian, thereby defusing the opportunity to offend. From the potential 
offender’s point of view, Situational Crime Prevention measures increase the effort required to 
successfully perpetrate the offence (target-hardening, i.e. steering column locks), increase the risk of 
being detected and/or apprehended (CCTV, burglar alarms) and reduce the rewards entailed 
(immobilisers), thereby titling the scales in the rational decision-making process against offending. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention encapsulates a vast array of measures to minimise the opportunity for 
offending and this approach fits comfortably with the dispersal of responsibility for crime control. Such 
preventative measures vary from the use of plastic drink containers instead of glass, the removal of coin-
fed metres, the fitting of steering column locks, improved street-lighting and the installation of CCTV. 
 
One of the main criticisms of Situational Crime Prevention is that it is limited in its application. It does 
not impact upon domestic or white collar crimes, but nor does it claim to. Situational Crime Prevention 
does not purport to be a panacea or silver bullet for all crime. Rather, it advocates deploying 
preventative measures specifically targeted to specific crimes. 
 
Another criticism of Situational Crime Prevention is that its measures merely displace or move crime 
around as opposed to actually preventing or minimising it. To a large extent, whether an offender desists 
altogether or just moves on to a more amenable criminal opportunity, depends on whether he is simply 
opportunistic or in fact determined to commit the offence. Displacement is not inevitable and in fact, 
when it does occur, it is not always a negative side-effect of Situational Crime Prevention. An offender 
may be displaced to commit a lesser offence or may be displaced to an area more capable of coping with 
the crime. 
 
A further and quite strong criticism of Situational Crime Prevention measures is that they encourage a 
‘fortress mentality’ and a mistrust of others, particularly strangers. The decentralisation of responsibility 
for crime control has seen individuals battening down the hatches to shield themselves from the threats 
posed by potential wrong-doers. In this way, Situational Crime Prevention can be seen as fuelling what 
has become known as the ‘Stranger’ Society and CCTV has been identified as a particular culprit in this. 
 
 
CCTV: Its Use – Success or Failure from a Comparative Perspective. 
 
With the realisation that crime could never be eliminated, the agenda shifted to containing and 
controlling the problem of crime. Risk assessment and management became the order of the day, giving 
rise to the emergence of the ‘Risk’ Society.  Mass surveillance became a particularly useful tool in this 
Risk Society. It facilitated the assessment of risk through the accumulation of information on potential 
malefactors. Similarly, it contributed strongly to the management of risks in that interventions could be 
launched to intercept and apprehend those posing a risk or even the threat of such a mobilisation of 
authority could be enough to discourage the risk. 
 
Similarly, when crime control became a shared task between the State and its citizens, individuals 
became increasingly sensitive to perceived threats posed to their security and safety by ‘others’. 
Difference, once celebrated, became a cause for concern and even fear. This saw the emergence of what 
is known as the Stranger Society. This atmosphere involved individuals closing ranks to exclude those 
who did not conform – others, strangers. Gated residential communities, private security firms and CCTV 
are typical symptoms of such a ‘Stranger’ Society. CCTV, in particular, allows for the identification and 
subsequent exclusion of non-conformists. As well as exiling non-conformity, CCTV encapsulated the 
essence of Bentham’s Panopticon. This never-realised architectural structure was conceived to exploit 
the potential of surveillance as a social control mechanism. The rationale underlying it was that constant 
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observation reinforced by the threat of an authoritative force would secure conformity by way of 
coercion, encouragement or conditioning. CCTV is thought to be the modern physical embodiment of 
this architectural vision. 
 
Arguably, CCTV has perpetuated its own necessity. It can be said to underline the preoccupation with 
risk and encourage the heightening of suspicion and distrust of others by accentuating the visibility of 
non-conformity, thereby feeding into and off the Risk/Stranger Society. Consequently, what has 
occurred is the mass proliferation of CCTV. 
 
The emergence of the Risk/Stranger Society coincided and arguably caused urban decline. Out-of-town 
malls became increasingly commonplace and to emulate the perceived security of such facilities, urban 
renewal groups sought to bring one of their signature features – CCTV – to city and town centres in the 
hopes of encouraging business back into decimated urban centres. Consecutive increases in crime rates 
and watershed events such as the killing of Jamie Bulger increased public receptiveness to the use of 
CCTV in public areas. What followed was mass investment by the British central government and 
interested parties alike, which culminated in Britain becoming the most surveilled society by far. 
 
Initial evaluations of CCTV schemes yielded mixed results regarding their effectiveness as a crime 
prevention strategy. Many such studies were based upon the overly simplistic and uninstructive 
evaluation question – ‘does CCTV work?’ With time, a much more enlightening evaluation was posed – 
‘how/why does CCTV work, when it does work?’ This method of evaluation is known as the 
Tilley/realistic evaluation model and involves the identification of the contexts and mechanisms in which 
CCTV factors into the thought-process of the potential offender, causing them to desist and realising the 
crime control capabilities of surveillance. Evaluations premised on this approach possess a much greater 
potential to inform the subsequent deployment of situational crime prevention strategies such as CCTV 
so as to achieve their optimal efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
 
CCTV in Ireland – The Story so Far. 
 
Since its arrival in the 1990s, the level of public area CCTV has been increasing particularly more recently. 
Tralee, Dublin and Cork are home to the most established and extensive systems. February, 2007 saw 
an announcement of the extension of Garda CCTV systems, bringing the total to 26. Garda CCTV systems, 
as well as being deployed for crime prevention purpose, have proven exceedingly useful in the efficient 
allocation of limited Garda resources, investigation of incidents and complaints and also traffic 
management. 
 
While An Garda Síochána had been the driving force behind the roll-out of CCTV in Ireland, the institution 
of the Community-Based CCTV Scheme in June, 2005 has injected increased fervour into the expansion 
of CCTV surveillance in Ireland. This scheme sees local communities financially supported in the 
installation of CCTV systems. As a result, communities in the likes of Blackpool in Cork, Clonmel and 
Tallaght have received various levels of funding to assist in the installation of CCTV. 
 
As well as providing support and structure for local communities, this scheme together with the Garda 
Síochána Act 2005 provides a certain level of formal regulation, which is to a large extent absent in 
Britain. The provision of funding is dependent on a successful application under the scheme, which 
necessitates compliance with various terms of the Garda Síochána Act 2005, including the observance 
of technical specifications and code of practice as set out in the Act. 
 
Other forms of regulation herding the use of CCTV include the right to privacy as recognised by the 
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights. While the Irish courts have not had many 
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occasions to deal with the impact of CCTV on the right to privacy, there have been quite a few European 
cases, which have seen an expansive view of privacy even in public spaces. Data protection legislation 
also provides another avenue of protection to privacy rights and CCTV systems must adhere to data 
protection principles, such as secure storage or and limited access to recordings, fair obtaining 
requirements and proper signage. 
 
The rules of evidence govern how footage is to be stored, handled and used as evidence according to 
the principles of fair procedure. However, as with data protection, the rules of evidence offer no 
guidance on how surveillance is to be executed. The main form of such guidance would be codes of 
practice. This is arguable the most common form of ‘regulation’, though informal in Britain. Often codes 
of practice are inconsistent and fail to deal with important issues such as ‘suspicious behaviour’ and 
subject-targeting. There have been improvements in this regard in Britain. In Ireland, An Garda Síochána 
operates in accordance with The Declaration of Professional Values and Ethical Standards, while 
community based schemes will have to abide by the code of practice contained in the 2005 legislation. 
 
As regards the impact of CCTV in Ireland, a significant number of evaluations have been undertaken by 
or in association with An Garda Síochána. Similar to Britain, Ireland’s accessible evaluations to date have 
displayed mixed results and have experience some difficulties in obtaining sufficient data of an 
appropriate nature. The arrival of the community-based CCTV scheme poses a golden opportunity to 
allocate proper resources and engage in appropriate data collection so as to accurately assess the impact 
of CCTV on crime in Ireland and thereby ensure efficient and effective future deployment. 
 
 
Summary of Recommendations: 
 
1. CCTV is not a panacea for the predicament of crime control and should not be treated as such. 
However, it seems to be most effective on vehicle-related offences in enclosed areas such as car 
parks. 
2. Serious consideration should be given when selecting the areas to which CCTV is deployed to 
ensure it is the most appropriate form of crime prevention measure for the area. 
3. The impact of existing CCTV systems should be assessed and reviewed in such a manner as to 
inform on best practice for the future deployment of CCTV. This would involve assessing why and 
how CCTV effects its impact on crime. 
4. In undertaking evaluations of CCTV systems, it should be determined what exactly constitutes 
success. As well as affecting crime rates, CCTV may be used for investigation purposes, to ensure 
the efficient deployment of resources, to increase economic activity in an area and so on. 
5. Appropriate data should be collected to investigate whether CCTV succeeds in achieving the 
identified objectives. The method of evaluation and data collected should be tailored to assess 
whether the objectives of CCTV installation have been met. 
6. Data should be assembled in a timely fashion in such a way as to shed light on the way in which 
CCTV operates. Data should be collected in advance of the installation of CCTV to give an 
impression of the situation prior to CCTV deployment and the collection of data should be of a 
sufficient timespan to give a more accurate indication of the impact of CCTV. 
7. The type of data assembled should be of a nature appropriate to ascertain the tangible and less 
tangible effects of CCTV. Interviews and surveys would cast a sharper light on the incidence of 
displacement and diffusion of benefits, as well as fear of crime and privacy concerns.  
8. With the introduction of the Community-Based CCTV Scheme, the opportunity should be taken to 
audit the impact of CCTV in accordance with the methodology lessons learned in previous 
evaluations. Ideally, following a sufficient number of localised studies, a meta-analysis would be 
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undertaken on a national level to instruct on the best practice of CCTV deployment. This should 
employ the realistic evaluation model to determine how CCTV works, when it does work. 
9. Any codes of practice used should be of a uniform standard and should be reviewed periodically 
to ensure they remain relevant. Ideally, observance of codes of practice should be monitored. As 
well as the technical and operational specifications, codes of practice should direct also how 
subjects are to be selected for surveillance. 
10. Training and guidelines should be issued to those operating CCTV systems. To avoid discriminatory 
targeting, what constitutes ‘suspicious behaviour’ should be explored and should not be left to 
the absolute discretion of the monitor. 
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Chapter 1: 
 
Introduction. 
 
 
For almost a decade now, reality television has dominated our screens. Our fascination with the likes of 
Big Brother and Celebrity Love Island is indicative of our obsession with voyeurism. CCTV is the ultimate 
reality TV. While CCTV footage is broadcast as entertainment on Tarrant on CCTV and America’s Dumbest 
Criminals, for example, this was not its intended purpose. Far from it – in fact, CCTV’s most notable role 
is the prevention of crime and it may arguably be regarded as the most prominent weapon in the crime 
prevention artillery. 
 
CCTV has become a fact of modern life and with the rapid development of more far-reaching technology, 
it does not seem that this will change. If anything it will become more intense. In October 2006, Michael 
McDowell, then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, announced an increase of the number of 
CCTV cameras on Limerick streets and estates to 70 and the further investment of €200,000 to increase 
the 35 camera coverage in Moyross. The Moyross system is now to be monitored from the control room 
in Henry Street Garda Station in Limerick as well as in the local community centre to enable swift a Garda 
response to street crime in the area.1 In a similar vein, less than four weeks later Bus Éireann announced 
it would be fitting all its city fleets with on-board CCTV to curb the recent upsurge in vandalism and anti-
social behaviour.2 These are but two of the more recent examples of the spread of CCTV. There have 
been and no doubt will be many more. The question is why has CCTV captured the imagination of those 
involved in crime prevention? 
 
Events such as 9/11, the London Bombings and the Dublin Riots received international media coverage 
and cast a spot light on the use of CCTV as a tool in the war against crime and the war against terrorism. 
Images of Mohammed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, as he caught his connecting flight from Portland, 
Maine to Boston on the morning of the attacks were published on countless newspapers and shown on 
news broadcasts.3 Following the London Bombings on 7th July, 2005 and the failed attempted attack two 
weeks later, a massive police and security forces effort began in an attempt to capture terrorist fugitives 
before they could strike again. A significant part of this campaign was the examination of over 15,000 
hours of CCTV footage in order to trace the movements and ascertain the associates of the suspects.4 
Closer to home, footage from over 300 CCTV cameras were called upon by An Garda Síochána to identify 
those involved in the riots that laid siege to Dublin in February 2006.5 With the role of CCTV in the 
aftermath of these events receiving significant media coverage, it is not difficult to see why CCTV has 
taken hold as one of the more favoured crime control tools. 
 
It does not take an act of terrorism or a massive input of funding for CCTV to grasp the headlines. 
Virtually every day in one newspaper or another, we are told of how CCTV is being used by the police to 
investigate crime. Images from surveillance cameras have been called upon in the investigation of 
                                                          
1 Woulfe.  McDowell promises Crime Czar for Limerick Housing Estate.  Irish Examiner.  20th October 2006.  Also, Duggan.  
Gardaí set to get Mobile Stations for Trouble Spots.  Irish Independent.  20th October 2006.   
2 Bracken.  Buses to get CCTV in Bid to Tackle Vandalism.  Irish Examiner.  8th November 2006. 
3 Whitington.  Storm Rising.  Irish Independent Weekend.  3rd September 2005. 
4 McCann.  Terrorism 2005:  Fortress Britain.  Irish Independent Review.  30th July 2005.  Also, Fenton & Steele.  Caught 
on Camera: Faces of the Four Suspected Bombers.  Irish Independent.  23rd July 2005.  Macintyre.  Police use Technology 
& Science to close in on Culprits.  Irish Independent.  23rd July 2005. 
5 McEnroe.  Gardaí & Businesses examine CCTV Images.  Irish Examiner.  28th February 2006. 
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offences ranging from sexual assaults6 to false imprisonment7 and criminal damage.8 Probably more 
notable is the role CCTV has played in the investigation of homicides. Countless newspaper articles refer 
to CCTV footage being trawled through to ascertain how these devastating events unfolded. One such 
example would be the investigation into the murder of Margaret ‘Meg’ Walsh in Waterford in October 
2006, in which CCTV footage was examined to assist in piecing together her final moments and to trace 
the weapon used.9 Yet another instance of CCTV coming to the aid of the police can be seen in coverage 
regarding the investigation into the tragic deaths of five women in Ipswich. To trace the final movements 
of the victims, police undertook house-to-house inquiries, appealed to the public and scoured CCTV 
footage in the hopes of revealing valuable information on what happened to the five women. Police 
even released the last known sighting of Anneli Alderton, one of the victims, on board the Harwich-
Colchester train a week before her body was discovered in woods just outside Ipswich. It was hoped that 
the release of such footage would lead to a breakthrough in the case.10 Shortly after this, two arrests 
were made and one of those arrested was released, the other Steve Wright stood trial.11 In the course 
of the trial, the jury viewed the CCTV footage of Anneli Alderton on the Harwich-Colchester train and 
also footage of Tania Nicol, another victim, getting into a car, described by a vehicle identification 
specialist, as being ‘highly likely’ to be that of Steve Wright. After a six-week trial, on 21st February 2008, 
Steve Wright was convicted of the five murders. 
 
With CCTV almost permanently occupying inches in the columns of newspapers, it is not difficult to 
fathom why CCTV has been perceived as somewhat of a ‘silver bullet’ in the war against crime. The 
media’s portrayal of the value of CCTV in particular accounts for the vast majority of public support for 
the measure. The question, which must be asked is, ‘how did CCTV begin this road to fame and 
recognition?’ And equally importantly, ‘why?’ 
 
CCTV is arguably the form of crime prevention that most prominently springs to mind. The following 
chapters trace the journey of CCTV to its current reign. By beginning with the theoretical underpinnings 
of crime prevention strategies and proceeding through to the theory of surveillance as a mechanism of 
control, the aim is to uncover exactly why and how CCTV has this come to be such a prominent feature 
in our everyday lives and now that it is, just how effective is it in its role as a crime prevention strategy. 
 
  
                                                          
6 O’Doherty.  Bus Sex Attack on Student caught on CCTV.  Irish Examiner.  10th November 2005. 
7 Managh.  Judge asked to throw out Convictions and Fines against Arcade Owner’s Sons.  Irish Examiner.  10th December 
2005. 
8 O’Doherty.  Men fire Shots through Children’s Window.  Irish Examiner.  20th November 2006. 
9 O’Connor.  Gardaí widening their Search for Missing Mum who told Friends she lived in Fear for her Safety.  Irish 
Independent.  10th October 2006.  Roche & Parsons.  Breakthrough in Hunt for Killer of Waterford Woman.  Irish Times.  
19th October 2006.  Riegel.  Weapon Search: Divers sift through Silt at Bottom of River in Effort to find the blunt 
Instrument used to kill Mother of One.  Irish Independent.  21st October 2006.  McSweeney.  No CCTV Cameras at Quay 
where Meg’s Body was dumped.  Irish Examiner.  26th October 2006. 
10 Ungoed-Thomas & Swinford.  CCTV Images of Victim’s last Hours.  The Sunday Times.  17th December 2006.  Lusher & 
Quinn.  CCTV Footage of Vice Girl released in Murder Hunt.  The Sunday Times.  17th December 2006.  Millar.  Waiting 
for an End to the Nightmare.  The Sunday Times.  17th December 2006.  Greenwood.  Pathologist has five Chances to 
catch Serial Killer.  Irish Examiner.  15th December 2006. 
11 Coverage of the trial and in particular the use of CCTV footage can be viewed at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/suffolk/7190318.stm. 
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Chapter 2: 
 
New Criminologies of the Self: 
Rational Choice Theory & Routine Activity Theory: 
A New Focus on Offenders as Rational Choice Actors. 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
“Crime, like death and taxes, is one of the few certainties of human life.”12 
 
Originally, crime was seen as an aberration and the offender as anomalous to the rest of society. In more 
recent years, however, this perception has changed and crime is now seen as a normal social occurrence. 
The total abolition of offending is no longer the reigning aspiration of those concerned with maintaining 
the social order. The control and reduction of crime are its replacement and with this, the use of 
situational crime prevention measures, such as closed circuit television (CCTV), has become 
commonplace, in a practical attempt to curb today’s high rates of property and violent crime, which as 
Garland notes, are “historically unprecedented.”13 
 
Before examining the impact of CCTV as a crime prevention strategy, it is first necessary to investigate 
the theoretical basis underlying it. Routine Activity Theory and Rational Choice Theory are the two 
predominant strains of criminological thought behind situational crime prevention, which focuses on 
the convergence in time and space of a willing offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable 
guardian, rather than just the offender or the locus of the crime. Routine Activity and Rational Choice 
theories are recent developments of the 70s and 80s and to appreciate the significance of these lines of 
criminological theory, it is necessary to take a very brief and simplistic glimpse back through their 
ancestry. 
 
 
Classicism. 
 
Up until the mid to late eighteenth century, it was thought that public spectacles of extreme punishment 
would deter the masses from engaging in criminal activity. The Black Acts of the 1720s, for example, 
introduced in excess of two hundred capital offences onto the English statute books.14 However, because 
the enforcement of such drastic sanctions was rarely automatic and certain, the deterrent element of 
this harsh punishment regime was severely undermined. The failure of this rather extreme approach 
paved the way for classical criminology to suggest a more effective and efficient theory of punishment 
and crime prevention. 
 
Classicism looked on crime as nothing more than a rational and self-interested pursuit of personal 
advantage by the offender. Consequently, the figurehead of classicism was the rational man, who would 
assess the risks of pain through apprehension and punishment against the likely awards of the offending. 
If the threat of pain were to slightly outweigh the possible gains, the potential offender would be 
                                                          
12 Kilcommins, O’Donnell, O’Sullivan. & Vaughan.  Crime, Punishment & the Search for Order in Ireland.  Institute of 
Public Administration.  Dublin.  2004.  Page 1.  See also Garland.  The Limits of the Sovereign State.  (1996) 36(4) British 
Journal of Criminology 445.  Pages 446-448. 
13 Garland (1996), page 446. 
14 Gilling.  Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy & Politics.  UCL Press.  London.  1997.  Page 26. 
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deterred. For this threat to be effective, the punishment for crimes would have to be certain, immediate 
and limited to what is necessary to deter and it would be tailored to fit the offence rather than the 
offender.15 In order for the punishment to be certain and easily calculable to the rational, potential 
offender, it would have to apply equally to all individuals, without exception. 
 
This school of criminological thought assumed all individuals shared a universal rationality, devoid of any 
wider social, personal or environmental background. Such an excessively sterile approach to crime could 
not be sustained and was later watered-down in the nineteenth century with the recognition that not 
everyone shared the same level of rationality. 
 
 
Neo-Classicism. 
 
Classicism sought to provide a system of punishment and crime prevention by looking at the offender 
as one, who freely made a rational and calculated decision to engage in criminal behaviour.16 However, 
during the nineteenth century, classical criminology gave way to neo-classicism, which retained free will 
and ‘calculative rationality’, but paid heed to the fact that some wills were not as free as others. It was 
realised that a uniform standard of rationality was little more than a fanciful ideal and accordingly the 
assignment of punishment could no longer be so rigid a measurement.17 
 
Though neoclassicism was a more practical and realistic application of classical ideals, it similarly did not 
succeed in achieving the traditional classicist ambition of crime prevention. Continually rising crime rates 
lead to the cultivation of dissatisfaction with classicism and neo-classicism during the late nineteenth 
century, leaving the way open for the fostering of a new wave of criminological thought – Positivism. 
 
 
Positivism. 
 
When neo-classicism failed to alleviate the problem of crime, attention shifted to new avenues of 
criminological thinking. This subsequent criminology took on board the tendency of neo-classicism to 
acknowledge individual circumstances, when assessing the proportionality of punishment. The 
development of new social sciences, concerned with the motivations of behaviour, ushered in a novel 
way of viewing criminal behaviour. Studies of crime and their statistics and the experiences of criminal 
justice institutions, such as prisons, altered the perception of criminal behaviour.18 Human conduct was 
no longer seen as driven by a prior rational cost/benefit analysis. It was, more often than not, irrational, 
uncalculated and paid no heed to the consequences the law had in store for it. The Holy Grail of 
positivism was the cause of crime and the quest began with the individual offender. 
 
Positivism subscribed to the premise that human behaviour is determined to forces, internal or external 
to the individual, over which the individual has no control. Therefore, it was thought that by way of the 
scientific observation of and experimentation on human behaviour, it would be possible to ascertain 
what these dictates of behaviour were, be they psychological, biological, social and so on. The rationale 
was that the discovery and study of these predispositions towards criminal activity would facilitate the 
treatment and rehabilitation of such individuals, thereby eliminating recidivism. Where the individual 
                                                          
15 Hughes. Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk & Late Modernity.  Open University Press.  Maidenhead.  
1998.  Page 29. 
16 Beirne, Inventing Criminology:  The “Science of Man” in Cesare Beccaria’s Dei Delitti E Delle Pene (1764).  In Henry & 
Einstadter. (Eds.)  The Criminology Theory Reader. New York University Press.  New York.  1998. Page 20. 
17 Hughes, page 31. 
18 Brantingham & Jeffery.  Afterword:  Crime, Space, and Criminological Theory.  In Brantingham & Brantingham. (Eds.)  
Environmental Criminology.  Waveland Press.  Illinois.  1991.  Page 233. 
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was impervious to rehabilitation and the prevention of reoffending was not viable, that individual would 
be contained for the good of society. Positivists saw the prevention of crime as attainable through the 
curing of this societal disease and by the quarantining of those immune to treatment. Treatment 
replaced punishment and the emphasis shifted from the criminal act to the criminal actor. 
 
However, the 1970s rise in crime highlighted the practical shortcomings of established criminological 
approaches to crime prevention and saw increased scientific and political dissatisfaction with the 
positivist preoccupation with identifying and eliminating the cause of crime. ‘Nothing works’ became 
the slogan of the day.19 While criminologists, of whatever denomination, remained obsessed with 
theorising, others from disciplines outside the field of criminology and criminal justice sought to tackle 
the problem of crime on a more pragmatic level. The likes of Jane Jacobs, with her idea that architecture 
and city planning could both positively and negatively contribute to crime prevention, and Oscar 
Newman with his concept of ‘defensible space’ introduced new ways of thinking about crime, which lead 
to the discipline of criminology reorienting its approach towards a more holistic evaluation of crime and 
criminality.20 
 
 
Environmental Criminology. 
 
Jane Jacobs contended that the distribution of activities throughout urban centres could influence the 
occurrence of criminal activity. She condemned modern city planning for its ‘artificial 
compartmentalisation of activities’ through its failure to recognise cities as ‘organic, living things, 
constituting a myriad of everyday social and economic interactions’, which rendered city districts 
‘custom made for crime’.21 Diversity in zoning and appropriate building design could minimise 
opportunities to offend by promoting the community’s own surveillance potential without fostering a 
‘socially divisive fortress mentality’.22 Though her recommendations were seen as overly simplistic, they 
did provide an impetus to reassess the approach of criminology to crime prevention. 
 
Newman followed up on Jacobs’ propositions and formulated a theory of ‘defensible space’, which set 
out that with proper urban planning and design, society could benefit from ‘a most effective model of 
crime prevention, utilising mechanical means of target hardening, and corrective means of mobilising 
natural social processes of territoriality and surveillance.’23 His contention was that the design of the 
residential environment could inhibit crime by reflecting a defensive attitude, which sent the message 
that this area is not conducive to offending nor would such be tolerated. The rationale was that by 
increasing the opportunities for natural surveillance and fostering a sense of community among 
inhabitants, residents could be encouraged to play a very effective part in preventing crime in their 
neighbourhood. 
 
Both of these contributions worked from the premise that the environment and geographical locus of 
the event could exercise an influence over the criminal actor. This new perspective lead to the 
identification of place as one of the essential components of crime. Classicism had focussed on the 
offence, while positivism concentrated on the offender. Environmental criminology then shifted the 
focus to the location of the crime. The idea that individuals respond to environmental stimuli triggered 
a hope of crime prevention through manipulation of the environment to discourage criminal behaviour. 
The most recent developments in criminology in the form of the ‘new criminologies of everyday life’24 
                                                          
19 Gilling, page 43. 
20 Ibid, pages 45-55. 
21 Ibid, page 47. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid, page 50. 
24 Garland (1996), page 450. 
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then entered to provide a strong theoretical framework to support the pragmatic possibilities of 
environmental manipulation in the campaign of crime control. These ‘new criminologies’ explain how 
the environment or situation factors into the individual’s decision to offend or not. 
 
 
New Criminologies of Everyday Life. 
 
Garland identifies the new predicament facing contemporary governments caused by ‘the normality of 
high crime rates and the limitations of criminal justice agencies.’25 In response to this predicament, 
criminology has produced the ‘new criminologies of everyday life’, comprising of the theories of routine 
activity, rational choice, situational crime prevention and crime as opportunity.  Conventional 
criminologies had categorised criminality as a departure from normality and civility. However these new 
criminologies recognise crime as a standard fact of modern society, rather than a deviant anomaly.26 
Garland defines crime in this context as ‘an event – or rather a mass of events – which requires no special 
motivation or disposition, no pathology or abnormality, and which is written into the routines of 
contemporary social and economic life.’27 He goes on to highlight that the significance of these new 
theories lies in their practical acknowledgement of ‘the limits of the sovereign state’ by their passing of 
the crime control baton to non-state agencies and individuals. With these new protagonists, the practical 
applications of these new criminologies focus not on the offender, but on the situations and routines of 
potential victims and everyday life, which are liable to foster criminal opportunism. By identifying and 
modifying these vulnerabilities, it is hoped a reduction in opportunities to offend will be achieved.28 
Rather than dissuading offending merely by means of deterrent punishment and threats of 
apprehension by criminal justice agencies, new criminologies advocate individuals making it more 
difficult for the individual to behave criminally.29 
 
These new criminologies are classified by Garland as ‘criminologies of the self.’ They depict the offending 
individual as a ‘rational opportunist, little different from his or her victim.’ Criminologies of the self are 
‘invoked to routinize crime, to allay disproportionate fears and to promote preventative action.’30 On the 
other side of this classification lie ‘the criminologies of the other’, which ‘… demonize the criminal, ... 
excite popular fears and hostilities, and … promote support for state punishment.’31 Practical 
embodiments of these criminologies are evident in the policies of mass incarceration, extensions of 
mandatory life sentences and capital punishment by political regimes, particularly in the US and UK.32 
This classification illustrates the two-pronged approach of ‘official criminology’, which is equivocal and 
often contradictory. The dyad of contemporary criminology operates to bestow upon society at large 
the responsibility for preventing its own victimisation, while endowing society’s political and legal agents 
with a more heavily punitive agenda. 
 
Having briefly outlined the complexities of contemporary criminology and its varied and often 
contradictory practical manifestations, it is time to look more closely at the aspect of this criminology – 
                                                          
25 Ibid, page 445. 
26 Cohen & Felson suggest that instead of assuming crime is ‘simply an indicator of social breakdown, one might take it 
as a by-product of freedom and prosperity as they manifest themselves in the routine activities of everyday life.’  Cohen 
& Felson.  Social Change & Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.  (1979) 44 American Sociological Review 
588 at page 605. 
27 Garland (1996), page 450. 
28 Ibid, page 451. 
29 Garland (1996) gives practical examples of this in the form of steering column locks, the use of CCTV in city centres 
and Neighbourhood Watch schemes.  Page 451. 
30 Ibid, pages 461-462.   
31 Ibid, page 461. 
32 Garland (1996) gives the punitive policies of the Major and Clinton administrations as examples. Page 462 
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‘the criminologies of the self’ – which espouses the use of situational crime prevention measures such 
as CCTV. 
 
 
Routine Activity Theory. 
 
One of the primary branches of ‘the criminologies of the self’ is routine activity theory. This was 
advanced as a response to the seemingly paradoxical post-war development that saw the decrease of 
criminogenic factors coincide with an increase in crime rates.33 
 
In 1979, Lawrence Cohen and Marcus Felson presented a cohesive routine activity analysis of trends in 
post-war crime rates.34 They took their prompt from the sociological paradox put forward in the 1969 
report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. The report drew attention 
to the incongruous fact that rates of urban violence had been increasing, while the typical criminogenic 
factors behind this violence had remained static.35 Cohen and Felson employed a theory that the routine 
activities exercised in the area and their structure influence the occurrence of criminal opportunities, to 
provide a logical explanation for such a paradox. 
 
Their approach does not hold the characteristics of the offender as the primary focal point, but rather 
the circumstances of the criminal event. The relevant circumstances involve the convergence in time 
and space of a likely offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian, which allows 
‘illegal activities to feed upon the legal activities of everyday life.’36 It was their contention that structural 
alterations in patterns of routine activities could affect this convergence to the extent of influencing 
rates of offending in that area. In other words, if the proportions of likely offenders and suitable targets 
in an area were to remain the same, changes in that area’s routine activities could increase the likelihood 
of their spatial and temporal convergence, thereby increasing criminal opportunities.37 The absence of 
at least one of the three elements – the motivated offender, a suitable target and the absence of a 
capable guardian – would suffice to scupper the spatio-temporal convergence necessary for crime. 
 
Cohen and Felson took the inclination to offend as a given and went on to examine how ‘the spatio-
temporal organization of social activities helps people to translate their criminal inclinations into 
action.’38 They considered crime as a normal activity, which shared many characteristics with, and was 
interdependent on, other non-criminal routine activities. The theory works from the premise that 
regular, non-offending human activity may facilitate the spatial and temporal merging of an offender 
willing and able to act, a suitable target and the absence of a guardian capable of impeding the offence. 
Cohen and Felson acknowledge that though guardianship may often be marked by the absence of 
offending, it is commonly overlooked, particularly guardianship by ordinary citizens as they pursue their 
routine activities.39 They proceed to submit that given the parasitic dependence of criminal activities 
upon other activities, ‘the spatial and temporal structure of routine legal activities should play an 
important role in determining the location, type and quantity of illegal acts occurring in a given 
community or society.’40 
 
                                                          
33 Gilling, page 57. 
34 Cohen & Felson.  Social Change & Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.  (1979) 44 American Sociological 
Review 588. 
35 Ibid, page 588. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid, page 589. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, page 590.  This type of guardianship is commonly referred to as ‘natural surveillance.’ 
40 Ibid, page 590. 
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Cohen and Felson explain that since World War Two, American society has experienced dramatic 
changes, which have had knock-on effects on the structure and type of the routine activities undertaken. 
For example, advances in technology not only facilitate the pursuit of lawful activities, but also that of 
criminal activities. Consumer goods, particularly electronics, are more conducive to easy transportation 
nowadays than ever before. This aids both legitimate and illegitimate movement thereof. Similarly, the 
increase in female involvement in the labour force since the war and the proliferation of single member 
households means domiciles are often left unattended for long periods during the working and school 
week. Societal affluence also encourages the pursuit of leisure activities, which again results in increased 
targets, be they vacant homes or added luxuries. These combine to result in a majority of routine 
activities taking place away from the household, leading to a suitable target and the absence of a capable 
guardian for the motivated offender.41 
 
For Cohen and Felson, the beauty of routine activity theory is that it explains the divergence between 
the trends in the presumed causal variables of crime and actual crime rates. It also sets out how the 
structure of the primary, legitimate routine activities in a community can be used to influence the 
likelihood of the pursuit of criminal inclinations and control them. Moreover, this theory clarifies that 
substantial increases in opportunities to offend have undermined the grasp wielded by the criminal 
justice system and society at large on social control.42 
 
According to Cohen and Felson, the opportunity structure for legitimate activity and that for illegitimate 
activity are two sides to the one coin, making it extremely difficult if not impossible to ‘root out 
substantial amounts of crime without modifying much of our way of life.’43 However, the explanation of 
the occurrence and rates of crime provided by their theory of routine activities empowers society to 
invoke strategies to reduce the suitability of targets and maximise the presences of capable guardians, 
thereby reducing the opportunities of any motivated individuals to offend. 
 
 
Rational Choice Theory. 
 
This is somewhat of a sister theory to routine activity theory. It harks back to the classical days of rational 
calculations of the costs and benefits of offending, however this contemporary theory has evolved to 
look at the situations and circumstances in which potential offenders engage in such rational 
calculations.44 As with classicism and routine activity theory, rational choice theory does not concern 
itself with the criminal inclinations and motivations, it takes them for granted. Vold et al explain that 
rational choice theory builds upon classicism’s core principle of rational choice, and like routine activity 
theory, it considers how a motivated offender might undertake a cost/benefit analysis in a given 
situation to assess whether there is an opportunity to offend. 
 
According to Vold et al, the cardinal assumption of rational choice theory is that ‘all crime is purposeful, 
committed with the intention to benefit the offender’ and the aim is to ascertain the purpose or rationale 
behind the offence.45 The ambition of rational choice theory has been to provide an explanation 
encompassing the event (the crime) and the involvement of the offender (the criminality). Gilling sets 
out that ‘in rational choice theory the intention has always been to build a bridge between situation 
(crime) and disposition (criminality), ….’46 
 
                                                          
41 Ibid, pages 593-602. 
42 Ibid, page 604-605. 
43 Ibid, page 605. 
44 Vold, Bernard & Snipes.  Theoretical Criminology.  (5th Ed.)  Oxford University Press.  Oxford.  2002.  Page 203. 
45 Ibid, page 204. 
46 Gilling, page 60. 
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Efforts to interpret the criminal event have come in terms of opportunities, which may be defined as 
‘occasions whose objective conditions appear conducive to crime’ and which are subjectively perceived 
by the potential offender as tempting.47 An explanation of the event cannot be forthcoming without an 
assessment of the role of the offender. While an open window may objectively seem an obvious criminal 
opportunity, the involvement of a willing and motivated offender is required to turn this opportunity 
into a criminal event. 
 
While opportunity may be the essence of the event/crime definition, choice is the pivot in terms of 
involvement/criminality. While rational choice resonates, to an extent, with classicist theory, it is not 
merely a repetition of old teachings. Unlike classicism, which accepts the idea of free will at face value, 
rational choice recognises that choices are not always simple and are rarely objectively rational. 
Subjective preferences and motivations complicate matters of ‘rational’ calculation and choice. Clarke 
and Felson’s make the assumption ‘that crime is purposive behaviour designed to meet the offender’s 
commonplace needs for such things as money, status, sex and excitement, and that meeting those needs 
involves the making of (sometimes quite rudimentary) decisions and choices, constrained as these are by 
limits of time and ability and the availability of relevant information.’48 This indicates that rational choice 
theory does not employ an ultimate standard of rationality and free will in the way that classicism did, 
when it comes to assessing the involvement/criminality element. 
 
Cornish and Clarke reiterate that rational choice is concerned with ‘a limited rather than normative 
rationality.’49 This more flexible notion of rationality, which takes account of constraints of time, 
intelligence and cognitive ability and available information, allows rational choice and situational 
approaches scope to address the issue of crime displacement, which has been seen by many, especially 
those with positivist affiliations, as the Achilles’ heel of this recent criminological perspective. Positivists 
would be of the opinion that, because the offender suffers from a predisposition towards criminality, 
the situational crime prevention measures invoked, following a rational choice analysis of the 
opportunity for offending, would do nothing more than shift the criminal activity to another time, place 
or target or alter the type of crime.50 Cornish and Clarke concede that displacement may occur, but insist 
that displacement is contingent upon a commonality of what they term ‘choice-structuring properties’.51 
Rational choice and situational theories adopt a crime-specific approach, instead of assuming that 
potential offenders suffer from general criminal tendencies. A potential offender makes a decision to 
commit a specific crime for specific reasons. This decision is influenced by characteristics of both the 
offender (including abilities, motives and experience) and the offence (perceived risks involved, skills 
required and amount of award and so on). Choice-structuring properties are the factors taken into 
account by the offender, when making his (subjectively) rational cost/benefit calculation. The properties 
of the offence structure the offender’s choice in line with his own characteristics. According to Cornish 
and Clarke, a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of displacement requires a crime-
specific approach to criminal decision-making, which appreciates the importance of ‘choice-structuring 
properties’ in the process of the offender’s rational calculation.  Such an approach would allow policy 
makers to accurately assess the displacing impact of situational crime prevention measures advocated 
by rational choice and routine activity theories and to take steps to curb displacement or filter it towards 
non-criminal alternatives.52 
 
                                                          
47 Ibid, page 61. 
48 Clarke & Felson.  Introduction. In Clarke & Felson. (Eds.)  Routine Activity & Rational Choice.  Transaction.  New 
Brunswick.  1993.  Page 6. 
49 Cornish & Clarke.  Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory. In Henry. & 
Einstadter. (Eds.)  The Criminology Theory Reader. New York University Press.  New York.  1998.  Page 45. 
50 Ibid, page 46. 
51 Ibid, pages 47-49. 
52 Ibid, page 53. 
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The rational choice and situational approach towards the problem of crime control was largely based on 
research by Ronald Clarke, in particular, in the 1970s under the auspices of the British Home Office 
Research and Planning Unit and it was anticipated that this novel strain of criminology would provide 
precise framework from which to derive accurately targeted and realistic crime control policies. 
Together with routine activity theory, it re-establishes the classical notion of the offender as a rational 
choice actor and informs contemporary strategies of situational crime prevention. 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
At first glance, it seems as though criminology has come full circle and returned to its (arguable) classical 
roots, with the offender once again viewed as a rational actor. This is not altogether an accurate 
assessment. Rather the contemporary position appears to somewhat of a merger of the previous strains 
of criminological thought. The ‘new criminologies of the self’ take account of their classicist genes with 
the resurgence of rational choice as a determinant of criminality. However, their acknowledgment of 
the fallacy of a universal standard of rationality is nothing less than a concession to positivism. These 
criminologies also pay homage to their environmental ancestry by situating the subjectively rational 
choice actor within the spatio-temporal boundaries of the criminal event in an attempt to formulate a 
comprehensive and cohesive platform from which to propagate effective and efficient means of crime 
control. 
 
This evolution of criminological theory brings us to the issue of Situational Crime Prevention – the 
umbrella prevention policy, which houses the use of target-hardening and surveillance strategies such 
as CCTV, advocated by routine activity and rational choice theories. These new criminologies dictate that 
effective situational crime prevention policy requires a crime-specific alteration of situations ‘to increase 
the perceived effort to commit a crime, to increase the perceived risks, and to reduce the perceived 
benefits.’53 
 
Rational choice theory and routine activity theory combine to offer those concerned with criminal justice 
and social control a more realistic and potentially effective artillery with which to manage the problem 
of crime. 
 
“Seeking to control crime is not the same as seeking to eliminate it, and this is therefore a 
criminology for the real world, and one that understandably finds favour therein.”54 
 
Just how it finds such favour will be explored in the next chapter, which looks at the emergence of 
Situational Crime Prevention as an approach to undermining offending and effectively curbing crime. 
Rational choice theory and routine activity theory undoubtedly set the seed from which this method of 
crime control has spawned. 
 
  
                                                          
53 Vold et al, page 205. 
54 Gilling, page 65. 
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Chapter 3: 
 
Crime Prevention Strategies designed to combat Rational Choice 
Offenders. 
 
 
The Development of the Preventative Paradigm. 
 
Up until the latter part of the twentieth century, the State and more specifically, the criminal justice 
system had enjoyed sovereign control over all things related to crime and criminal justice. The fall from 
grace, however, of positivism, rehabilitation and social reform ushered in the demise of this State 
domination. The criminal justice system was stretched beyond capacity and was still failing to make any 
significant inroads into the spiralling crisis. Social control seemed to drift out of the reach of the 
Sovereign, with the resulting void being filled by a new pessimism, aptly summed up by Martinson’s 
catch phrase of ‘Nothing works.’55 This marked a shift away from the utopian objective of identifying 
and eradicating the causes of crime to a more realistic and attainable goal of managing the ‘inevitable’ 
crime problem. 
 
Consequently, prevention and security developed as a third sector in the field of crime control alongside 
policing and penality.56 According to Garland, this new sector occupies the overlap between the territory 
of the State and that of its citizens, with responsibility for crime control percolating through the 
State/citizen barrier. Garland attests that preventative ripples can be felt throughout the other two 
crime control sectors of policing and penality. Prevention has been credited as becoming ‘a major 
organising principle of almost all western criminal justice systems’ or at the very least ‘a general 
government-led movement for the development of an organised set of activities under the general 
heading of crime prevention.’57 The reduction of crime is no longer to be seen as a mere corollary of the 
punishment of offenders, but as a deserving objective in its own right and one in which each citizen has 
a role to play. 
 
 
Typologies of Crime Prevention. 
 
Crime prevention may be the new and favoured weapon in the artillery against social disorder; however, 
there is no definitive consensus on what crime prevention actually is. Hughes explains that there are 
‘competing models and typologies, often of a limited theoretical nature, and seemingly driven by rather 
narrow technical concerns about the measurement and evaluation of ‘success’ or ‘failure’.58 He goes on 
to cite the recommendation of Ken Pease, a leading expert in the evaluation of preventative strategies, 
that we hesitate in searching for a universal definition of crime prevention and commonality among 
preventative measures since what we are actually looking at is ‘a set of events’, whose common ground 
rests solely in their ‘proscription by statute.’59 Put simply, if different crimes share little, then measures 
to prevent them are likely to follow suit. 
                                                          
55 Hughes.  Crime Prevention, Community Safety, and Crime & Disorder Reduction.  In Muncie & Wilson.  Student 
Handbook of Criminal Justice & Criminology.  Cavendish Publishing.  London.  2004.  Page 172. 
56 Garland.  The Culture of Control: Crime & Social Order in Contemporary Society.  Oxford University Press.  Oxford.  
2001.  Page 170. 
57 Hughes.  Understanding Crime Prevention:  Social Control, Risk & Late Modernity.   
Open University Press.  Maidenhead.  1998.  Page 12. 
58 Ibid, page 18. 
59 Hughes (1998), page 19. 
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In the absence of a clear consensus on what crime prevention should constitute, the next best thing is 
to look at the various strategies, which have been deemed to be different strains of crime prevention. 
Brantingham and Faust advocate the popular public health model of disease prevention analogy, under 
which distinctions may be most clearly drawn between different preventative measures and activities 
according to the varying stages along the development of criminal behaviour at which they are 
implemented.60 The public health analogy consists of three levels: 
(a) Primary prevention addresses the potentially criminogenic conditions of the physical and social 
environment and seeks to impede the precipitation of crime by altering those conditions. 
Brantingham and Faust label this the ideal level of prevention, whereby the opportunity for 
criminal behaviour to materialise is removed. 
(b) Secondary prevention measures are aimed at discerning groups and individuals at particular risk 
of criminal involvement and intervening in their lives to prevent the realisation of that risk. 
Nipping more serious anti-social behaviour in the bud is the objective of secondary prevention 
following the identification of potential offenders. Here prevention reaches beyond criminal 
justice agencies and incorporates the involvement of wider educational, private and general 
social service agencies. Secondary prevention is closely associated with the causal approach to 
crime prevention and since the causes of crime may not be remediable, the scope for this level 
of prevention is limited. 
(c) Tertiary prevention involves intervention in the lives of actual, rather than potential, offenders 
in order to prevent their recidivism. Measures under this level of prevention are carried out by 
agencies within the criminal justice system, namely by prisons and probation services. The ideal 
is to reform the individual offender in such a way that he conforms to a socially acceptable 
standard of behaviour. However, where this is not possible, incapacitation of the offender is 
warranted to protect society. Tertiary prevention is even more restricted as regards the bigger 
crime prevention picture in that it operates more as damage control or containment rather than 
significant prevention. 
 
Hughes presents another typology of crime prevention formulated by Tonry and Farrington.61 This 
classification distinguishes among four types of prevention: law enforcement, developmental, 
communal and situational prevention. Despite the acknowledgement of law enforcement as a 
preventative strategy, it is largely denied a comprehensive consideration as such. Developmental 
prevention seeks to excise the potential for criminality in individuals by focussing on risk factors and 
inhibitors identified through the study of human development. Communal prevention targets offending 
in residential communities by altering social facilitators of crime in those communities. Situational 
prevention looks to thwart the incidence of crime by altering the physical environment to reduce the 
opportunity for crime to occur while also increasing of the risks of detection and apprehension. It is this 
strain of crime prevention that is of interest here. 
 
 
                                                          
60 Brantingham & Faust (1976), page 287-296.  Brantingham & Faust accept that others have made various adjustments 
and added to this more basic version of the tripartite model. 
61 Hughes (1998), pages 21-22 Though in theory, there may be various distinct classifications of preventative measures, 
in practice the divisions are quite fluid, especially in light of the fact many strategies may be socio-situational hybrids. 
For example, the distinction between situational and social prevention has become less defined in recent years with the 
merger of the purely situational approach with the social agenda to form a more general ‘community safety’ 
perspective. This has occurred more by default than intention through the recruitment of very diverse agencies in the 
implementation of the situational approach. A discussion of this variant of crime prevention is beyond the scope of the 
present work.  See further Gilling Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy & Politics.  UCL Press.  London.  1997.  Chapters 4 & 
8.  See also Crawford.  Crime Prevention & Community Safety: Politics, Policies & Practices.  Longman.  London.  1998.  
Chapter 1. 
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The Emergence of Situational Crime Prevention: 
 
The new criminologies of everyday life62 took the stage from the waning dispositional theories of 
positivism and the focus moved from treatment and rehabilitation to prevention, risk management and 
harm reduction. However laudable, positivism’s search for the ultimate causes of criminality was 
realised to be nothing more than a fool’s errand. Identifying what instigated criminal behaviour is one 
thing, but actually removing those triggers is quite another. The total alleviation of the many socio-
economic and psychological precipitants of crime, even if they could be agreed upon, is an unrealistic 
and futile goal, as attempts during much of the twentieth century had shown. Growing frustration and 
disillusionment with established approaches to deal with crime as a mere symptom of society’s vast ills 
instigated a change of tack in addressing the crime problem. As Crawford attests ‘… the ‘nothing works’ 
pessimism has precipitated a criminological shift away from the offender as the object of knowledge 
towards the offence – its situational and spatial characteristics – as well as the place and role of the 
victim …’63 
 
Rational choice and routine activity theories filled the theoretical gap left by the emaciated dispositional 
approach. These perspectives work from the premise that crime is an everyday occurrence and 
offenders are nothing more than reasoned actors, who may suffer under particular pressures and are 
exposed to situational inducements and opportunities.64 According to rational choice theory, the 
decision to offend is arrived at through a rational calculation of the perceived risks and effort involved 
set against the potential rewards of the criminal behaviour. Effective prevention under this theory would 
necessitate increasing the perceived risks and effort required and decreasing any potential rewards in 
order to alter this rational decision-making process.65 Proponents of rational choice have distilled 
Classicism’s initial abstract and simple human decision-making model to take account of the fact that 
rationality is far from a universal standard, but is limited by time, the potential offender’s intelligence, 
cognitive ability and available information and criminal decision-making is a dynamic process involving 
a series of decisions rather than a once-off decision to offend.66 
 
Crawford asserts that the likes of Clarke and Felson have lent weight to the trend of addressing the 
situational and spatial features of crime by drawing associations with routine activity and rational choice 
theories.67 Routine activity theory explains, quite competently, that variations in crime rates correspond 
with changes in the routine activities in that particular area.  Consequently, by altering the routine 
activities in an area and, more specifically, by discouraging the spatio-temporal convergence of a 
motivated offender, a likely target and the absence of a capable guardian, the opportunity to offend will 
have been thwarted. 
 
                                                          
62 Garland.  The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society.  (1996) 36(4) British 
Journal of Criminology 445 at page 450. 
63 Crawford (1998), page 35. 
64 Muncie.  Contemporary Criminology, Crime & Strategies of Crime Control.  In Muncie & Wilson (Eds).  Student 
Handbook of Criminal Justice & Criminology.  Cavendish Publishing.  London.  2004.  Page 11. 
65 Potential victims may also be considered as rational choice actors, who are free to choose to implement measures to 
maximise their own security and safety. With choice comes responsibility. Situational crime prevention apportions 
responsibility to potential victims for their vulnerability to crime. Responsibility carries with it the potential for blame 
on failure. This is indicative of the overall decentralisation of the crime control mandate from the State to the individual.  
See further Crawford (1998), page 72 and Garland (1996). 
66 Cornish & Clarke.  Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory. In Henry & Einstadter 
(Eds.)  The Criminology Theory Reader. New York University Press.  New York.  1998.  Page 54. 
67 Crawford (1998), page 79. 
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Together with situational crime prevention, rational choice theory and routine activity theory form the 
three prongs of what Garland has christened the criminologies of everyday life,68 ‘for which crime is seen 
as a risk to be calculated and hence avoided or managed, rather than a moral abnormality in need of 
explanation.’69 Crawford classes situational crime prevention as the practical element of these related 
criminologies and suggests that routine activity and rational choice theories may have developed 
subsequent to the practical approach to give it a theoretical basis and conceptually bolster its pragmatic 
propositions.70 He identifies a number of hypotheses upon which situational crime prevention rests: 
(a) Crime is largely opportunistic in nature. 
(b) Individuals are rational choice actors. 
(c) Situational features have a greater potential for change than individuals. 
(d) Deterrence operates most effectively through the certainty of detection, rather than the severity 
of punishment. 
 
Rather than establishing bare theoretical suppositions like their predecessors, the new criminologies of 
everyday life incorporate a strong empirical basis upon which to build their preventative proposals. 
Much of the groundwork for these recent perspectives was laid by the British Home Office Research and 
Planning Unit during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Previous dispositional theories advocated 
addressing the causes of crime and individual tendencies towards criminality. The social reforming and 
rehabilitative strategies deduced from these propositions had proven ill-equipped to tackle the existing 
crime problem and, even more dishearteningly, were utterly impotent in the face of spiralling crime 
rates in the era of post-war affluence. Home Office researchers took heart in the ideas of ‘defensible 
space’ and the spatio-temporal analysis of crime incidence and opted to explore the potential for 
reducing the opportunities for crime by manipulating its setting rather than attempting to eliminate its 
causes.71 The propagation of this new attitude towards crime prevention was greatly facilitated by 
patronage of the Home Office and its well-funded and prestigious army of researchers and its resultant 
subsumption into government policy.72 
 
 
An Explanation of Situational Crime Prevention: 
 
As a consequence of the emergence of this situational perspective, the new crime control agenda 
focussed on practical and targeted measures to alter the physical environment and promote processes 
of informal social control. At the heart of this new agenda was the relationship between the offence and 
its situation, rather than between the offender and their environment. In other words, the situational 
approach advocated a crime-specific strategy. 
 
In short, it is the policy of situational crime prevention to alter the situational features of a criminal 
opportunity in order to minimise it and increase the prospect of detection. This is achieved by 
manipulating the principle elements in the potential offender’s ‘rational’ cost-benefit assessment of the 
opportunity, namely the effort required, the risks involved and the possible rewards entailed. Situational 
measures tend to take the form of (a) effort increase, (b) risk increase or (c) reward reduction. Often, 
such preventative techniques are combinations of these forms.73 
 
                                                          
68 Garland (1996), page 450. 
69 Crawford (1998), page 80. 
70 Ibid page 69. 
71 Hughes (1998), page 60. 
72 Ibid, page 61. 
73 Crawford (1998), pages 66-68. 
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Increasing the effort involved in committing a crime primarily involves ‘target hardening’, in other words 
providing additional physical security to the target of the offence, be it property or a person. Security 
locks and steering column locks are examples of measures undertaken to reinforce protection against 
an offender gaining access to a property or making off with a vehicle. While such initiatives may not 
completely foil criminal endeavours, they may combine with other risk-increasing or reward-reducing 
measures to tilt the rational cost-benefit calculation against targeting that property.74 Quite often the 
success of such target-hardening measures is dependent on the diligence of property owners and 
residents and this diligence is similarly commensurate with the risk under which the target suffers.75 
 
Increasing the risks involved in offending entails utilising methods to accentuate the chance of detection. 
Technology, in the form of CCTV and burglar alarm systems, is often employed under this category of 
situational prevention. Street lighting and environmental design contribute to the effectiveness of 
‘natural’ surveillance, by which the observing potential of civilians is invoked. Involving the local 
community in preventative measures is indicative of the promotion of informal social control and the 
divesting of the State’s core responsibility for control. Screening entry and exit points and the tagging of 
merchandise are other examples of risk-increasing measures. 
 
The prospect of being seen in the course of offending is possibly the most menacing threat taken into 
account by the potential offender. The deterrent power of surveillance rests less in the actual risk of 
being observed and more in the perceived risk.76 Mayhew acknowledges that the effectiveness of 
surveillance is contingent upon the class of witness. He discusses the impact of observation by those 
with a law enforcement mandate, such as security personnel and the police, residents and those 
employed in public places, such as bus conductors and receptionists. Even though they may be 
specifically employed and trained to observe and thwart offending, Mayhew concedes that the weak 
deterrent element of policing is illustrated by the fact that offenders are seldom apprehended in the 
course of offending.77 In regard to surveillance by residents, while they may have a vested interest in 
paying heed to suspicious presences and activity in their locality, the fact that residential crime occupies 
such a small proportion of the overall crime risk means that surveillance by residents, be it formal 
(through technology) or natural, does not feature high on the agenda in relation to expenditure and 
effort.78 Surveillance by employees in a more unofficial capacity has been undervalued, according to 
Mayhew, given the frequency of crime in such public places as underground stations, shops and parks. 
Mayhew contends that the susceptibility of these places to a higher risk of offending warrants greater 
research into and financing of surveillance aids and training to optimise the capacity for employee 
surveillance. 
 
Reducing rewards often means devaluing the targeted property for the offender. Property marking not 
only increases the detection risk, but also undermines market price of the stolen item. The true owner 
of the property is more easily traced, making it less attractive for black market dealing. Similarly, car 
                                                          
74 Templeman & Doherty.  Criminology.  Old Bailey Press.  London.  1997, page 128.  Templeman & Doherty cite the 
1984 survey of burglars by Bennett & Wright, which revealed that of the respondents only 10% would definitely be put 
off from burgling a house with security locks, while 20% said they might be so deterred. 
75 Ibid, page 129.  In two English studies during the 1980s, one of which was undertaken by the Home Office (1986), 20% 
of burglarised properties were entered via unlocked doors or windows. See also note 24 below and the accompanying 
text. 
76 Mayhew.  Crime in Public View: Surveillance & Crime Prevention.  In Brantingham & Brantingham (Eds).  Environmental 
Criminology.  Waveland Press.  Illinois.  1991.  While the potency of surveillance may be in the threat it is perceived to 
pose rather its capacity to be a real menace, it is difficult to gauge how much weight a potential offender will attribute 
to a particular ‘perceived’ risk at any given time during the dynamic process of criminal decision-making. Mayhew 
accepts that his explanation of the value of surveillance in crime prevention may be based more on speculation 
regarding offender perceptions rather than on a firm knowledge thereof.  Page 120-122. 
77 Mayhew (1991), page 122.  This is largely the extent to which Mayhew addresses the role of professional surveillance.  
78 Ibid, pages 123-128. 
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stereos and vehicles themselves have inbuilt immobilisers to prevent or at least hamper unauthorised 
use. Target removal is a more extreme version of this form of situational prevention. This involves 
removing targets from environments accessible to potential offenders. Templeman and Doherty 
illustrate a variation of target removal suggested by Hough et al, which amounts to the immediate repair 
of damage so as not to inspire further attacks.79 
 
Felson recognises another element in situational prevention, which he attributes to Clarke’s deduction 
of the types of situational prevention initiatives from a potential offender’s decision-making process. 
Increasing guilt may steer individuals less resolved in their potential criminality away from offending by 
way of controlling disinhibitors such as alcohol, removing excuses often used to offset guilt and 
facilitating compliance with rules. He explains that the inducement to offend will be vitiated, where the 
sum of the guilt, the effort and the risks involved outweigh the potential reward attached to the target.80 
 
Having looked at the various objectives behind the many situational crime prevention measures invoked 
to combat the potential criminality of the rational choice actor, it now seems apt to address a number 
of individual initiatives to elucidate how such situational strategies have materialised. 
 
 
Examples of Situational Crime Prevention Strategies. 
 
What follows is a brief collection of examples of diverse situational measures utilised to target different 
types of crime to varying degrees of success.81 
 
British gas suicide82 – During the 1960s and 1970s, carbon monoxide was removed from domestic gas 
supplies in Britain. Clarke and Mayhew looked back at the impact of this development on suicide levels 
and the possible implications for criminology. Suicide rates throughout Europe had risen significantly 
between 1963 and 1975. This was with the exception of England and Wales, whose annual suicide rate 
declined from almost 6,000 to almost 4,000. Prior to this, 40% of all suicides were attributable to gas 
intoxication. Following the removal of the more toxic element, suicide by gas was virtually eliminated. 
This development was not accompanied by an increase in the number of suicides by other means, 
suggesting that there was no significant displacement. This supports Clarke and Mayhew’s contention 
that displacement is not inevitable, but rather contingent upon a commonality of choice-structuring 
properties between the different offences.83 Suicide by gas intoxication was painless, clean and easily 
accessible. These features may have prompted those, who opted for that method of suicide to so decide 
and the absence of these choice-structuring properties in other suicide methods meant they did not 
choose to commit suicide by another means. Though this was not an overt crime prevention strategy, 
its consequences lend weight to the theory that by altering the opportunity-structure around certain 
                                                          
79 Templeman & Doherty (1997), page 129.  See also Wilson & Kelling.  Broken Windows.  (1982) The Atlantic Monthly.  
29.  Studies have shown that vandalism left unaddressed fosters further attacks, as it suggests that ‘no one cares’. On 
the other hand, where vandalism is quickly addressed and remedied, a message is sent out decreeing that such 
behaviour is not tolerated.  See also note 48 below and the accompanying text.  
80 Felson.  Crime & Everyday Life.  (2nd Ed.)  Pine Forge Press.  London. 1998.   
81 Crawford cautions that it is often the case that the findings of the research into these initiatives are ‘the product of 
the methodology that gives rise to them.’ In other words, the approach of the research can influence the findings. The 
time span of the study, the type of data collected, its source and so on can have significant repercussions on the findings. 
Crawford (1998), page 84. 
82 Ibid, page 85. 
83 For a more extensive discussion of ‘choice-structuring properties’ and their implication for displacement see also 
Cornish & Clarke.  Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory.  In Henry & Einstadter 
(Eds.)  The Criminology Theory Reader.  New York University Press.  New York. 1998.   
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behaviour, that behaviour can be controlled or even avoided without major displacement implications. 
This seemed all the more potent given that suicide is often seen as ‘deeply motivated’84 behaviour. 
 
Crawford cites similar studies of gas detoxification and suicide rates in the Netherlands. His findings were 
not consistent with those of Clarke and Mayhew. He goes on to refer to subsequent studies on British 
areas, whose suicide rates reflected this decline, even though their gas supplies were not detoxified until 
much later. The suggestion being that the drop in suicides was not entirely attributable to the removal 
of carbon monoxide from domestic gas supplies.85 
 
Motorcycle theft & helmet legislation86 – Concerns over the safety of motorcycle users led to the 
introduction of legislation compelling the wearing of protective helmets in West Germany. Mayhew 
credits this legislation with the reduction in motorcycle thefts by 60% during the period from 1980 to 
1986. It was thought that the requirement of wearing a helmet would deter the opportunistic 
motorcycle thief in that his risk of being detected for the theft increase by the clearly observable fact of 
his not wearing a helmet. Similar research on the impact of comparable legislation in the Netherlands 
and England in the 1970s yielded consistent conclusions. Despite claims by Mayhew that no significant 
displacement occurred, Gabor argues that there were noticeable increases in car and bicycle thefts 
probably due to displacement during the initial period of the helmet legislation.87 
 
Car theft & steering column locks.88 – In West Germany in 1963, legislation was passed making it 
mandatory for all cars, new and old, to be fitted with steering column locks. A 60% reduction in car theft 
was subsequently recorded.  Similar legislation was introduced in Britain in 1971 requiring all new cars 
to incorporate steering column locks. While new cars were hardened as targets, older cars became more 
vulnerable to the theft. Crawford terms this ‘regressive displacement’, whereby the cost of offending is 
transferred to those already less capable of carrying it.89 He also draws attention to the fact that steering 
locks did not fare so well in reducing car thefts in the United States, possibly because they were not of 
the same standard. Felson lists a number of other situational features to combat vehicle theft. These 
include reinforced window glass, audible reminders to remove keys, central locking and immobilisers.90 
 
CCTV91 – Home Office funded research was undertaken by Poyner in the early 1990s on the effect CCTV 
had on theft from and theft of vehicles in the car parks of the University of Surrey. The former type of 
theft had been more prevalent and appeared to be more adversely affected than the theft of cars. The 
incidence of theft from vehicles dropped from 92 the year prior to CCTV installation to 31 the year of 
the installation. Crawford concurs with Poyner’s explanation that the presence of a manned security 
post monitoring campus entry and exits restricted unauthorised access to vehicles and contributed to a 
lower rate of vehicle theft. 
 
Crawford notes Tilley’s caution regarding CCTV. Quantifying the effectiveness of CCTV in preventing 
crime is a very difficult task, particularly where it coincides with other preventative measures. However, 
it appears that CCTV has a synergistic preventative quality when partnered with other such initiatives. 
The assessment of the displacement consequences of CCTV is similarly problematic. Tilley also warns 
                                                          
84 Crawford (1998), page 85. 
85 Ibid, page 86. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Crawford (1998), page 87. 
88 Clarke. ‘Situational’ Crime Prevention:  Theory & Practice.  In Muncie, J (Ed.). Student Handbook of Criminal Justice & 
Criminology.  Cavendish Publishing.  London.  2004.  Page 141. 
89 Crawford (1998), page 87-88. 
90 Felson (1998), page 168. 
91 Crawford (1998), pages 88-89.  This particular situational measure will be dealt with much more extensively in 
subsequent chapters. 
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that the longevity of CCTV’s preventative potency is dependant not only on the presence of security 
personnel in front of the screens, but also on its successful utilisation in the apprehension of offenders. 
 
Crawford also notes studies undertaken on CCTV usage in the London underground.92 He mentions 
Burrows’ conclusions that the implementation of CCTV surveillance in four underground stations 
resulted in the spatial displacement of thefts and robberies to the other fifteen stations in the area, with 
the seven more proximate stations faring worst. He also alludes to Brown’s 1995 appraisal of three town-
centre CCTV systems. Brown deduced that CCTV’s deterrent element is short-lived and it in fact had little 
effect on the incidence of crimes against the person, apart from facilitating a more rapid response and 
reducing the seriousness. 
 
Vold et al postulate that the success of deterrence rests in increasing the certainty of detection, 
apprehension, conviction and ultimately punishment.93 The capable guardian that is the properly 
maintained and manned CCTV system is a foremost tool in the proliferation of certainty of detection. 
 
Improved street lighting94 – Crawford uses Painter’s two London street lighting projects to illustrate how 
fear of crime and perceptions of intimidating behaviour can be alleviated. People felt more at ease on 
the streets, which consequently became more frequented. Painter resolved that good street lighting 
could revitalise public areas, foster natural surveillance and aid the identification of assailants. Crawford, 
however, questions Painter’s empirical basis for such conclusions based on the methodology employed 
in the studies. He criticised the short time span during which the studies were undertaken and suggests 
that perhaps the improved perceptions of residents and pedestrians of crime in the area are just that – 
perceptions, rather than accurate assessments of the actual effect the improved lighting had on crime. 
Crawford contemplates that while studies have implied that street lighting may have an insignificant, if 
any, effect on crime, it does seem to impact upon the public’s fear of crime and arguably, the fear of 
crime is as destructive as crime itself. Gilling asserts that ‘fear of crime is now considered to be an 
important rationale for preventative intervention in its own right95, as it ‘extends beyond the bounds of 
actual criminal victimisation to include also potential victims, so that overall it reaches the status of a 
quite general social problem.’96 
 
Kirkholt Burglary Project.97 – During the mid-1980s, the Home Office financed a project to combat 
burglaries in the Kirkholt housing estate. In 1985, 25% of houses on the estate were targeted. The 
research showed that the chance of falling victim to subsequent burglaries was quadruple the likelihood 
of suffering the initial burglary. Based on this information, victimised residences became the focal point 
of preventative measures in the vicinity. Physical security was upgraded. Coin-fed utility metres were 
removed and neighbourhood watch programmes huddled around the targeted residence. 
Revictimisation of these properties fell by 80% following the initial application of the programme of 
target hardening, target removal and improved surveillance. Displacement did not appear to be an issue 
and in fact the benefits of this situational package seem to have diffused beyond the focal residence. 
Crawford highlights a difficulty in this comprehensive preventative project. The combination of a 
number of measures makes ascertaining the relative effectiveness of each measure and whether their 
overall impact was synergistic or cumulative exceptionally difficult. 
 
                                                          
92 Ibid, page 89. 
93 Vold, Bernard & Snipes.  Theoretical Criminology.  (5th Ed.)  Oxford University Press.  Oxford.  2002.  On the other 
hand, they assert that ‘further increases in the severity of punishments probably will have no impact on crime reduction 
and, for various reasons, may actually increase crime.’  Page 208. 
94 Crawford (1998), pages 91-92. 
95 Gilling (1997), page 186. 
96 Ibid, page 187. 
97 Crawford (1998), page 94-98. 
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Other situational measures: 
 Phone entry systems operate to reinforce notions of ‘defensible space’ within residences. This may 
have the adverse impact of accentuating the fear of crime among residents by encouraging the 
perception that strangers are inevitable mal-intentioned.98 
 Road closures along routes frequented by prostitutes and their clientele have been used to 
discourage kerb-crawling. It is thought that this may have the added benefit of alleviating the 
problem of other crimes committed by or attracted by prostitution, such as car theft.  It may also 
actually worsen the problem by facilitating prostitutes sitting on bollards and solicit drivers forced 
to slow down.99 
 The presence of a conductor on double-deck buses deters vandalism; however this may coincide 
with increased assaults on conductors.100 
 Electronic tagging, frequent stock inventories and even alternating the directions of hangers on 
racks can reduce retail theft.101 
 As regards subway graffiti, a ‘broken windows’ policy is often followed, whereby the offending 
material is cleaned off immediately.102 The Stockholm Metro took a novel approach in reducing 
graffiti. Artworks were officially commissioned for the metro stations. This hindered effective 
graffiti, as did having highly polished and very rough surfaces.103 
 To combat violence at sports events and in bars, buses may be arranged to arrive shortly before the 
event commences, thereby avoiding the situation of multitudes of intoxicated supporters mulling 
around before kick-off. Also rather than using glass containers for drinks, plastic or more resilient 
containers are dispensed. 
 Another form of alcohol-related behaviour, which has seen intervention by situational crime 
prevention measures, is bar-hopping.104 The average weekend night saw more than six thousand 
people descend on Geelong, the second largest city in the Australian state of Victoria, to socialise 
and consume alcohol. The evening would normally begin with beer purchased from a liquor store 
and consumed in the car, before moving from bar to bar to avail of their specials. Females were 
given free drinks in the hopes of drawing more males. When the specials ran out, it was back to the 
car for more beer. Empty bottles became missiles to be hurled at people and property.  Concerned 
that their specials were undermining their profits and that their staff were in danger, pub owners 
consulted with local police and the liquor board and formulated ‘The Accord’. This comprised of a 
number of policies to discourage pub-hopping, which included the cessation of specials and happy 
hours, the institution of cover charges after 11pm, the denial of free re-entry and the prohibition of 
open containers on the street. Having evaluated ‘The Accord’, Felson et al found it proved most 
effective in stopping almost all bar-hopping and significantly reducing violence. 
 
The above list of situational measures is far from exhaustive, but provides an overall impression of the 
various initiatives employed to combat the rational choice offender and their general effectiveness. 
 
                                                          
98 Crawford (1998), page 91. 
99 Ibid, page 92-94. 
100 Felson (1998), page 167-168. 
101 Ibid, page 169-170. 
102 See note 25 above. 
103Felson (1998), page 170-171. 
104 Ibid, page 171-176.  In relation to bar-hopping, see also Felson, Berends, Richardson & Veno.  Reducing Pub Hopping 
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Studies, Volume 7.  Criminal Justice Press.  New York.  1997.   
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A Critical Appraisal of the Situational Crime Prevention Measures. 
 
One of the main criticisms of situational crime prevention is displacement. This provides the primary 
means of attack by advocates of dispositional theories of positivism. Such critics would maintain that 
situational measures merely deflect the focus of the criminally-predisposed offender to another target. 
Barr and Pease identify displacement as ‘an albatross around the neck of purposive crime prevention.’105 
Clarke explains that the chance of displacement occurring depends on the category of the offending.106 
He contends that in the case of opportunistic crimes, merely increasing the level of difficulty is enough 
to significantly reduce the likelihood of offending. With regard to professional criminals, he concedes 
that their attention will more than likely just be deflected by situational measures to another more 
accessible target. Crawford echoes this, when identifying the ‘theoretical conundrum for situational 
approaches: those most likely to conform to a rational choice model of behaviour – the self-maximising 
professional criminals – are exactly the group of offenders most likely to be displaced.’107 Clarke also 
admits that most crimes do not fall into either the professional or the opportunistic category. They are 
perpetrated by those with a deliberate intention, who seek out a suitable opportunity in which to realise 
this intention. Clarke acknowledges that, along with professionally perpetrated crime, this category of 
offence is likely to be displaced.108 
 
On a more positive note, Cornish and Clarke are of the opinion that displacement is by no means an 
inevitable side-effect of situational crime prevention initiatives. They argue that, in actual fact, it is 
contingent upon the choice-structuring properties. In other words ‘the readiness with which the offender 
will be prepared to substitute one offence for another will depend upon the extent to which alternative 
offences share characteristics which the offender considers salient to his or her goals and abilities.’109 
Gilling even suggests that displacement is not necessarily a negative aspect of situational prevention.110 
‘Malign’ displacement is displacement to a more serious crime or to an area already suffering heavily 
from offending or to an area less able to afford security measures. There is also, however, the possibility 
for ‘benign’ displacement, which involves displacement to a less serious offence or to non-criminal 
activity (desistance), or to an area that can cope.111 It also entails, as Gilling puts it, ‘spreading the burden 
of victimisation.’112 According to him, ‘displacement is not a sound basis on which to reject situational 
crime prevention.’113 
 
Another contention against the merits of situational prevention is that it only addresses certain types of 
offence, namely property crimes. Crawford explains that it is not equipped to deal with offences 
perpetrated behind closed doors114, while Hughes professes that the exclusion of corporate crimes and 
crimes by governments from its ambit ‘is surely tied to the fact that its agenda has been largely set by 
the demands of its patron, either the state or private corporation.’115 Situational prevention proponents 
adhere to the principle that effective crime prevention measures are crime-specific in focus. The 
approach does not claim to be a panacea to the entire crime problem.116 If it does manage to put a 
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significant dent into a certain proportion of the crime problem, then its failure to be all encompassing is 
hardly a reasonable criticism, especially since there has been no such magic formula thus far. 
 
Many evaluations of the various situational initiatives have been limited in their time span, making it 
difficult ascertain the longevity of their impact. Crawford recognises that the nature of crime and 
criminals is dynamic requiring preventative measures to adjust. He accepts that the ever-improving 
technology employed to combat ever-evolving criminality may often be used as a double-edged sword 
against its primary objectives.117 This resonates with what Cohen and Felson said in regard to the 
symbiotic relationship between legitimate and illegitimate activities and behaviour.118 
 
Situational crime prevention strategies have also been condemned for promoting an over-reliance on 
technology, which may cause us to let our guard down. But even if street lighting, for example, makes 
little actual preventative inroads in relation to the vast crime problem, what is the harm if our faith in it 
frees us from our own perceptions of intimidation. Crawford cautions that ‘technology is more likely to 
have enduring effects if it is conceived of as an enhancement of human activity rather than as a substitute 
for it.’119 
 
Despite Clarke’s claims that situational measures are largely unobtrusive, the fact remains that an 
‘enduring unease’ surrounds them.120 Concerns over who monitors the monitors and possible misuse of 
collected information adds to the distrust of Big Brother in the CCTV viewing room. Gilling speaks of ‘an 
almost pathological mistrust that we have of surveillance, which is enhanced when it is embodied in 
technology rather than embedded in social life, and especially when it is perceived as being conducted 
on behalf of the state.’121 This together with the argument that many situational measures promote 
social exclusion and generate an ‘anti-communitarian fortress mentality’122 are common among critics 
of the approach. Arguably, an unreasonable fear of crime may be encouraged by the proliferation of 
surveillance and target-hardening. An over-reliance on and a normalisation of situational measures may 
lead to the destruction of, what Crawford terms, the framework of culturally important interpersonal 
trust relations.’123 This merits concern given that fear of crime seems to have become a significant social 
problem in its own right.124 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
All of this said, as Crawford asserts ‘situational crime prevention clearly represents an example of what 
Garland (1994) refers to as the ‘governmental’ project within criminology, its gaze firmly focussed on the 
administrative task of crime control and management.’125 
 
The preventative paradigm emerged in response to the failure of the State and its criminal justice 
agencies to reign in the crime problem through its established approaches. Rhetoric about how crime 
could be banished by addressing the causes of crime lost favour following decades of futility. Facing 
crime prevention as a worthy goal in itself rather than a coincidental extension of the traditional criminal 
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justice practices of law enforcement and punishment was the first step in re-infusing optimism in the 
crime predicament. 
 
Situational crime prevention took centre stage under the ‘notoriously woolly notion of crime 
prevention’126 with its evidence-based and pragmatic response. Its methods embody a common-sensical 
approach to the rational choice offender by manipulating the deciding factors in his rational calculation 
of a potential criminal opportunity. It abandons the traditional guise of theoretical pontificating in favour 
of a straightforward practical and realistic approach. While its initiatives may not be perfect, they do get 
results in many cases, even if it is to varying degrees. It may be little more than a matter of fine-tuning 
and combining them with each other and more social preventative measures127 to tailor a holistic 
preventative package designed for the particular crime problem of a particular area. Even though 
situational crime prevention initiatives are shaped to target specific crimes, their potential for a 
‘diffusion of benefits’ should not be overlooked.128 
 
Hughes sums it all up in saying ‘situational crime prevention is arguably now the most powerful and 
hegemonic discourse of crime prevention in the late twentieth century.’129 
 
The next chapters will focus on the emergence of CCTV as arguable the predominant situational crime 
prevention strategy and explore its performance in Britain and Ireland. 
 
  
                                                          
126 Hughes (1998), page 24. 
127 For example, neighbourhood watch.  See Gilling, chapter 8 and Crawford, chapter 1 in relation to the evolution of 
the ‘community safety’ method of crime prevention. This is, arguably, a hybrid of situational and social crime prevention.   
128 Crawford (1998), page 84.  Crawford defines a diffusion of benefits as occurring where the ‘effects of a situational 
measure may extend beyond the targeted offences or areas, thus heralding more general benefits of crime reduction’ 
and suggests it is ‘tantamount to the inverse of displacement.’ 
129 Hughes (1998), page 63. 
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Chapter 4: 
 
CCTV: Its Use – Success or Failure from a Comparative Perspective. 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
With the fall of the Utopian desire to rid society of crime through the identification and excision of 
criminal inclinations, a more realistic and pragmatic approach took hold.  Risk management and the 
containment of society’s inevitable ill of offending became the order of the day. This, together with the 
delegation of partial responsibility for crime control to the public itself, ushered in the diversion of 
attention from the offender to the situation of the offence. Situational crime prevention has therefore 
come into its own as the predominant means to tackle the rational choice actor and alter the routine 
activities of the spatio-temporal situation so as to limit and control crime. With little doubt, closed circuit 
television has become the favoured situational crime prevention strategy. 
 
What is to follow is a brief glance at surveillance, in general, as a mechanism of social control and order 
and an exploration of the rise of closed circuit television, in particular, as the most prevalent form of 
surveillance in modern society. The sheer pervasiveness of CCTV schemes suggests it holds the throne 
of situational crime prevention. This reality begs the question of whether CCTV can competently wear 
that crown. 
 
 
The Emergence of the Risk Society, Actuarial Justice and their Consequent Entourage. 
 
Now that crime is viewed as an inevitable fact of life, risk management is the driving agenda in crime 
control and with that has emerged what is known as the ‘Risk Society’. In this risk society, policing takes 
on a new forward-looking perspective, becoming ‘increasingly proactive rather than reactive’130 with a 
view to risk assessment and management. But even where policing is reactive, it involves the collection 
of information with a view to future risk assessment. Surveillance feeds directly into this risk society by 
facilitating the accumulation of information with which to assess the level of risk posed. With the dawn 
of the digital age and the combination of digital databases with ever-advancing technology, such as 
automated surveillance, facial and vehicle recognition and ‘intelligent scene monitoring’ software, 
surveillance in the risk society has reached an entirely new stratosphere of capability.131 Together with 
the driving preoccupation with risk, virtually everyone falls within the realm of suspicion and virtually 
everyone may be treated accordingly. 
 
‘What is important here is that the emphasis on risk makes everyone a legitimate target of 
surveillance: ‘Everyone is assumed guilty until the risk profile assumes otherwise.’132 
 
                                                          
130 Norris & Armstrong. The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise of CCTV.  Berg.  Oxford.  1999.  Page 24. 
131 For further discussion of the more recent technological advances see Norris.  From Personal to Digital:  CCTV, the 
Panopticon and the Technological Mediation of Suspicion and Social Control.  In Lyon (Ed).  Surveillance as Social Sorting: 
Privacy, Risk & Digital Discrimination.  Routledge.  London.  2003.  Pages 268 – 278.  Also for a discussion of the 
consequent development of the phenomenon of the ‘digital persona’ or the ‘data subject’, see McCahill & Norris 
Literature Review (Working Paper No. 2), 2002 in Urbaneye – On the Threshold to Urban Panopticon? Analysing the 
Employment of CCTV in European Cities & Assessing its Social & Political Impacts.  RTD-Project (September 2001-
February 2004), 5th Framework Programme of the European Commission.  Available at http://www.urbaneye.net.  Pages 
5-6. 
132 Norris & Armstrong (1999), page 24. 
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This risk society is accompanied in its emergence by a new, often ambivalent, style of crime control, 
fashioned by economic reasoning and drawing upon the new criminologies of everyday life.133 Garland 
introduces a two pronged approach to the crime control predicament facing modern governments. The 
first branch of this approach involves the State attempting to reassert control with ‘zero tolerance/tough 
on crime’ type policies. The second branch is what Garland terms a ‘responsibilization strategy,’134 
whereby responsibility for crime control is delegated to citizens.  Surveillance and CCTV in particular, 
can be placed to fit comfortably within this new governmental style. On one side, we have the likes of 
open street CCTV complimented by an increasing number of databases operated by the police and on 
the other, we have private CCTV installations operated by civilian organisations and institutions to 
protect their own domain. Both privately and officiously administered surveillance enhances the 
capabilities of its operators to assess risk and categorise and manage its subjects accordingly. Feeley and 
Simon term this recent approach the ‘New Penology’, which focuses on ‘techniques for identifying, 
classifying and managing groups assorted by levels of dangerousness.’135 According to them, this 
increasingly actuarial justice and its consequent interventions, such as preventative detention and 
offender profiling, are based on risk assessment with the hope of leading to containment of the risk 
posed and the effect of putting a control on the crime predicament. Mass surveillance is but another 
intervention, which feeds off and feeds into the Risk Society. 
 
 
Surveillance as a Social Control Mechanism. 
 
Mass surveillance and CCTV in particular cater for this actuarial justice approach to crime control. It is in 
fact an implement for what Garland terms ‘supply side criminology’, which aims to temper the routine 
activities of everyday life ‘by limiting the supply of opportunities, shifting risks, redistributing costs and 
creating disincentives.’136 But just how is it that surveillance operates as a social control mechanism? 
 
Norris and Armstrong describe the power of vision and how it regulates and is regulated in the context 
of social interaction.137 They tell how, in its simplest form, the ‘gaze’ operates within certain unwritten 
and fundamental rules of social interaction. The look regulates and is regulated by the tender balance 
of order and acceptable behaviour in social interaction. There is an equality between the parties that 
allows for and maintains this delicate balance. Each look invites a proportionate response. This equality 
is facilitated by the co-presence of the parties, which permits an insight into the motivations of the 
‘gazer’ and the furnishing of a measured reply. The same reciprocal exchange does not occur between 
the watcher and the watched, when the conduit of the ‘gaze’ becomes the lens of a camera. The watcher 
is shielded from the questioning and challenging by the watched – watching becomes an act of 
unilateralism. 
 
There is more, however, to the use of CCTV surveillance than merely the ability to observe, even on a 
grand scale. Embedded within the concept of mass surveillance is the idea that the ‘surveiller’ wields a 
significant degree of power and influence over the ‘surveilee’. To capture the essence of the power-
vision core of surveillance, one must look to Jeremy Bentham’s 19th Century architectural design for a 
                                                          
133 Garland.  The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society.  (1996) 36(4) British 
Journal of Criminology 445 at page 450.    
134 Garland (1996), page 452.  
135 Feeley & Simon.  Actuarial Justice, the Emerging New Criminal Law.  In Nelken (Ed).  The Futures of Criminology.  Sage 
Publications.  London.  1994.  Cited in Norris & Armstrong (1999), page 25 and McCahill & Norris (2002), page 8. 
136 Garland (1996), page 451. 
137 Norris & Armstrong.  Introduction: Power & Vision.  In Norris, Moran & Armstrong.  Surveillance, Closed Circuit 
Television & Social Control.  Ashgate.  Aldershot.  1998. (Norris & Armstrong (1998)). 
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revolutionary new prison – the Panopticon138, which is described in the words of Michel Foucault as 
consisting of: 
 
‘at the periphery, an angular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide 
windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, 
each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the 
inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other on the outside, allows the light 
to cross the cell from one end to the other, all that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in 
a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man or a 
schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out 
precisely against the light the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are 
like so many cages, so many theatres, in which each actor is alone, perfectly individualised 
and constantly visible.’139 
 
At all times, the inmate is seen without ever seeing, creating a relationship of dominance and 
subordination at the outset. Simon contends that ‘this seeming combination of structurally imposed 
visibility (one is always seen) and the perceptual uncertainty (but one cannot see) has led many 
commentators to focus on the centrality of vision in the production of social control.’140 The true capacity 
of surveillance to control lies in its ability, or rather potential, to coerce. Norris and Armstrong reflect on 
Lukes’ three dimensions of power, when illustrating the three levels at which this panoptic power may 
be deployed.  The first is the ability of the watcher to enforce conformity by launching a ‘direct and 
authoritative response to observable non-conformity.’141 The second is the capacity to deter non-
conformity through the fear of detection and the threat of mobilisation of that authoritative response. 
The third is the nurturing of conformity at a most basic level by the subconscious guiding of behaviour 
towards conformity, thereby excising the potential for deviance in the first instance. According to 
Foucault, 142 the overall effect of the Panopticon should be that the ‘inmate’ is conditioned to conform 
through the perceived continuity of surveillance, even though the surveillance may not in fact be 
continuous. 
 
Be it by way of enforced, persuaded or self-induced conformity, the Panopticon epitomised the power 
of surveillance to go beyond mere observation and to effect control. Though Bentham’s 1787 vision for 
‘an architectural system of social discipline applicable to prisons, factories, workhouses and asylums’143 
was never realised, Foucault accurately predicted the seeping of its panoptic principles into the wider 
world. His foresight has been realised with the dawn of the era of spatio-temporal transcending 
technology, such as CCTV, which seeks to effect the dispersal of discipline throughout society. Reeve 
remarks that the use of CCTV in urban centres is ‘clearly reminiscent of what Foucault has described as 
the disciplinary society, in his use of the metaphor of the Panopticon as a device of total surveillance in a 
rationally ordered society.’144 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
138 According to Norris & Armstrong, Foucault views the Panopticon as representing ‘a crystallisation of the power of 
vision embodied in architectural form.’  Norris & Armstrong (1998), page 5. 
139 Foucault.  Discipline & Punishment: The Birth of the Prison.  Pantheon.  New York.  1977, page 200. 
140 Simon.  The Return of Panopticism: Supervision, Subjection & the New Surveillance. [2005] Volume 3(1) Surveillance 
& Society 1 at page 4. Available at http://www.surveillance-and-society.org/articles3(1)/return.pdf. 
141 Norris & Armstrong.  (1998), page 6. 
142 Foucault (1977), page 201. 
143 McCahill & Norris (2002), page 2. 
144 Reeve.  The Panopticisation of Shopping: CCTV & Leisure Consumption.  In Norris, Moran & Armstrong (Eds)  
Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television & Social Control.  Ashgate.  Aldershot.  1998.  Page 71. 
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The Stranger Society & the Urban Panopticon – CCTV & Social Control. 
 
Rather than subscribing to the view that CCTV is today’s ‘silver bullet’ of crime prevention, Bannister 
Fyfe and Kearns perceive it as a ‘symbol of the current urban malaise.’145 They describe public spaces, 
particularly the streets as the ‘life blood’146 of the city, whose strength lays in its ability to absorb and 
feed off difference and variety. They outline the benefits of exposure to difference.147 Disparity demands 
from us a greater array of psychological, intellectual and emotional reactions than banality does. 
Consequently, the presence of difference stimulates development and promotes public sociability. 
Exposure to difference contains our fear of it. Without such exposure, we lose the ability to tolerate 
difference and react in a more exaggerated fashion when we do encounter it: 
 
‘Crime should not be understood as the root of public disorder, but merely a facet of it. Public 
disorder arises, more generally, from an inability to cope or lack of desire to cope with 
‘difference.’148 
 
To maintain civility and sociability, city streets need to be in constant use and to continue to applaud 
difference in interactions between strangers. This however is not the reality. Bannister et al address, 
what Christopherson termed, ‘the fortification of the city.’149 This process is increasingly evident with 
the emergence of gated residential communities and the deployment of private security personnel and 
CCTV in prolific office complexes and shopping centres. The construction of zoned encampments for the 
various urban activities frustrates the possibility of encountering difference on a regular basis, thereby 
heightening the fear of it. Difference loses its appeal and garners yet more suspicion, while insecurity 
peaks. Unsurprisingly, this fuels the drive for the further buttressing and patrolling of partitions in urban 
centres so as to exclude difference. 
 
The mushrooming of out-of-town retail and business parks in the last number of decades came at the 
expense of the city and town centre. Their existence away from the urban centre imbued them with 
connotations of security and safety. Private security personnel and CCTV reinforced this peace of mind. 
In order to quell their social and economic decline, urban centres, through the Town Centre 
Management movement, sought to replicate the feeling of security enjoyed in those out-of-town malls. 
The installation of town-centre CCTV was of vital importance in this endeavour. A prime example is the 
story of Glasgow.150 During the 1980s, Glasgow experienced significant unemployment in the 
manufacturing industry and consequently it fell to city-centre retail and office employment to fill the 
void. Soon it came to light that criminal damage, theft and fear of crime dissuaded many from venturing 
into the city centre. To address this, the Glasgow Development Agency with the cooperation of the 
public and private sector launched Citywatch, a CCTV system to reinforce the sense of security in the 
city and thereby encourage economic growth. The slogan used to persuade private business interests to 
assume some of the installation and running costs was ‘CCTV doesn’t just make sense – it makes business 
sense!’ 
 
Returning for a moment to Lukes’ dimensions of power and the deployment of the panoptic power,151 
the use of CCTV could be said to enable the economic revival and nurturing of the urban centre on all 
                                                          
145 Bannister, Fyfe & Kearns.  Closed Circuit Television & the City.  In Norris, Moran & Armstrong.  Surveillance, Closed 
Circuit Television & Social Control.  Ashgate.  Aldershot.  1998.  Page 22. 
146 Bannister et al (1998), page 22. 
147 Ibid, pages 24-27. 
148 Ibid, page 22 
149 Christopherson.  The Fortress City: Privatized Spaces, Consumer Citizenship.  In Amin (Ed).  Post-Fordism: A Reader.  
Blackwell.  Oxford.  1994.  Cited in Bannister et al (1998), pages 26-27. 
150 Bannister et al (1998), page 29-30. 
151 See further note 12 above and the accompanying text.   
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three levels of power mobilisation. Those not conforming to the commercial image of the city could be 
observed, identified and excluded152, while the prospect of this would encourage others to conform and 
the remainder would be subliminally conditioned to conform under the influence of the panoptic gaze 
of the cameras. 
 
 
The Panoptic Capacity of CCTV. 
 
The rise of the ‘society of strangers’153 has shifted the sands for regulation by surveillance. Face-to-face 
interaction – the traditional social regulator154 – has somewhat relinquished its role as the social control 
protagonist. The increasing aversion to intermingling with ‘strangers’ and the symbiotic generation of 
the ‘anti-communitarian fortress mentality’155 have meant a growing reliance on CCTV, a more 
omnipotent and omnipresent ‘surveiller’. Norris sets out how the introduction of CCTV has altered the 
capabilities of discipline through surveillance. While acknowledging the widely held notion that this 
technology ‘heralds a massive expansion of the disciplinary … social control … through the ever-present 
threat of authoritative intervention to any acts of deviancy [which] creates anticipatory conformity on a 
scale unthinkable on the basis of mere co-presence,’156 he goes on to suggest that perhaps with this 
‘massive expansion’, has come somewhat of a dilution of panoptic power. He addresses this suspicion 
under a number of general headings concerning how surveillance has evolved with the introduction of 
CCTV: 
 
The removal of spatial constraints and the requirement of co-presence.157 
Norris suggests that the ability of CCTV to extricate the requirement of the surveiller’s co-presence 
removes ‘situated knowledge’ and entices anonymity. The distance weakens the bond through which 
the ability to discipline is channelled. The small Scottish town of Airdrie became somewhat of a flagship 
for the CCTV campaign.158 Here, there was a very high likelihood of personalised knowledge of the 
surveillance targets by the local police, resulting in a successful dispersal of panoptic discipline in this 
close-knit community. Conversely, in city centre systems, the large volume of people involved and the 
extensive areas covered, the chance of any localised knowledge significantly diminishes. This problem 
                                                          
152 Individuals falling into this category would include adolescents congregating in shopping centres, individuals 
consuming alcohol in public spaces and the homeless. In some cases, such individuals are asked to ‘move along’ – for 
example in McCahill’s study of the use of CCTV in a private shopping centre, he came across a written instruction from 
the management, which read “If you see any groups of youths hanging around, you can ask them to move along. If you 
have to tell them more than twice, could you please ask them to leave the centre?” (From McCahill, ‘The Surveillance 
Web:  The Rise & Extent of Visual Surveillance in a Northern City.  Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Hull, 1999.  Cited 
in Norris (2003), page 267.). [See generally, McCahill.  The Surveillance Web: The Rise of Visual Surveillance in an English 
City.  Willan Publishing.  Devon.  2002]  In others, there may be a local ordinance specifically designed to address their 
non-conformity. For example, in Glasgow in August 1996, a blanket ban on the consumption of alcohol in public places 
was introduced.  See further McCahill & Norris (2002), pages 13-16. 
153 Norris & Armstrong.  CCTV & the Rise of Mass Surveillance Society.  In Carlen & Morgan.  Crime Unlimited? Questions 
for the 21st Century.  McMillan Press.  London.  1999.  Page 76.  (Norris & Armstrong (1999b)). 
154 See note 8 above and the accompanying text.  
155 Gilling.  Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy & Politics.  UCL Press.  London.  1997.  Page 186.  Be it a fear of strangers 
and difference or a fear of crime, the increasing reliance on and normalization of ‘organised’ surveillance (as opposed 
to ‘natural’ surveillance by way of unmediated social interaction) merely exacerbates this precipitant fear. It becomes 
a self-propagating cycle. 
156 Norris (2003), page 253. 
157 Ibid, pages 254-258. 
158 Ibid, page 257.  An analysis of the performance of CCTV in Airdrie can be found in Ditton & Short.  Yes, It Works, No, 
It Doesn’t: Comparing the Effects of Open CCTV in Two Adjacent Scottish Town Centres.  In Painter & Tilley (Eds.) 
Surveillance of Public Space: CCTV, Street Lighting & Crime Prevention.  (Clarke (Ed) Crime Prevention Studies.  Volume 
10).  Criminal Justice Press.  New York.  1999.  See further note 99 below and the accompanying text regarding the 
Airdrie evaluation. Similarly, it could be said that Cork is a relatively small and centralised city, meaning that An Garda 
Síochána would have substantial localised knowledge enabling the successful dispersal of panoptic power through CCTV. 
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of ‘distanciation’ exponentially increases with the emerging trend of centralising monitoring centres to 
alleviate pressure of the considerable running costs on local providers.  While amalgamating monitoring 
centres reduces the financial burden of operating CCTV systems, it simultaneously undermines their 
panoptic power. 
 
The removal of temporal constraints.159 
Modern technology has freed the act of surveillance from the shackles of time as well as space. 
Information gathered through CCTV surveillance can be stored in huge volumes for review at any point 
in the future. The scope of information, together with the fact that it can be more accurately accessed 
in retrospect without the same threat to its integrity carried in human memory recall, have underlined 
its value as an investigative police tool. While this may be the case in theory at least, Norris explains that 
in reality the sheer volume of recorded data to be waded through renders it ‘an alternative, yet equally 
resource-intensive tool as other investigative strategies.’160 He illustrates his point with the case of the 
London nail bomber, David Copeland.161 Copeland’s first attack was in Brixton on April 17th, 1999. He 
was arrested almost two weeks later, but only after two further bombings – his final attack, at the 
Admiral Duncan pub in central London, left three dead and seventy-six injured. Footage of the 
perpetrator from the first attack was captured, but it took approximately 4,000 man hours to wade 
through over a 1,000 videotapes with about 26,000 hours of recording before investigators had an image 
of sufficient quality to release to the media for identification. While CCTV surveillance does allow for the 
long-term storage of accurate information, it by no means guarantees the police a precise investigative 
shortcut. 
 
The functional separation of monitoring and authoritative intervention.162 
While police officers on patrol act directly on their own suspicion, CCTV operators cannot. They must 
instigate an intervention by others. Police officers on patrol have the freedom to act unilaterally on their 
own initiative, while the CCTV operator must convey his suspicions to the patrol officer in order for 
action to be taken. Surely this fortifies the prerequisite of accountability for the launching of an 
authoritative intervention.  This, in turn, may mean that deployment of intervention becomes less 
frequent, which was evident in the research of Norris and Armstrong in 1999163, where it was shown 
that in over 600 hours of surveillance there were only 45 interventions instigated by CCTV operators. 
Another issue, which came to their attention, was that civilian operators were not necessarily aligned 
with police as regards the type of incident or conduct warranting police deployment.164 CCTV 
installations do not lead to automatic interventions – rather they add a further stage – deployment – 
between surveillance and intervention. Thus as well as being increasingly spatially and temporally 
distantiated, surveillance has similarly become functionally isolated, thereby losing an element of its 
panoptic influence. 
 
The democratisation of the act of surveillance.165 
Marx sketched the view held by some that CCTV-mediated surveillance is democratised surveillance in 
that it is unbiased and without agenda.166 This impression is bolstered by the submission by many CCTV 
advocates that rigorous codes of practice ensure that there is no deliberate monitoring of law-abiding 
citizens and that only ‘suspicious’ behaviour will be targeted. Norris aptly points out, however, that given 
the fact that many CCTV systems are submerged in considerable volumes of data, operators need to be 
                                                          
159 Norris (2003), pages 258-260. 
160 Ibid, page 259. 
161 Ibid, page 260.  
162 Ibid, pages 260-263. 
163 Norris & Armstrong.  (1999b). See chapters 8 and 9 in particular. 
164 Norris (2003), page 263. 
165 Norris (2003), pages 263-266. 
166 Marx.  The Engineering of Social Control: The Search for the Silver Bullet.  In Hagan & Peterson (Eds).  Crime & 
Inequality. Stanford University Press.  California.  1995.  Page 238.  Cited in Norris (2003), page 253. 
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selective in their focus. Who attracts their attention and what constitutes ‘suspicious’ behaviour is often 
left up to the discretion of the operator. While the camera may not distinguish between different social 
classes, its operator may well – while ‘technology may be … neutral, but the uses to which it is put are 
not.’167 Even though it is a practical necessity to engage in selection for targeted surveillance, Norris and 
Armstrong found that age, gender and race were the decisive criteria for selection. From their 
observations in three CCTV control rooms, they deduced that of those targeted for surveillance 93% 
were male, 39% were teenagers and 32% were black.168 They also noted that in each case these 
incidences were approximately twice the percentage presence of each in the population, in other words 
men, teenagers and black people were twice as likely to be targeted as their presence in the population 
suggested. While Norris accepts that this may reflect the involvement of these individuals in suspicious 
behaviour, he is not entirely convinced – particularly in light of Norris and Armstrong’s finding that 36% 
of those selected for prolonged surveillance were targeted ‘for no obvious reason’, 24% for involvement 
in ‘suspicious behaviour’ and 34% due to their affiliation to a particular social group.169 Again, of those 
targeted for no particular reason, a significant proportion fell into the ‘categories’ of male, black or 
teenagers. Consequently Norris reasons that ‘… rather than promoting a democratic gaze, the reliance 
on categorical suspicion intensifies the surveillance of those already marginalised and further increases 
their chance of official stigmatisation.’170 
 
A perceived increase of inclusionary social control.171 
In theory, the panopticon would be an inclusionary social control mechanism, which would dismantle 
deviance and foster conformity in the offender before returning him to the societal fold. Norris, 
however, asserts that ‘exclusion is frequently at the heart of situational crime prevention strategies’172 
and, arguably, CCTV has lead the charge of this approach to crime control. He goes on to note that the 
Town Centre Management movement, which developed in response to the economic decline of city and 
town centres,173 brought with it ordinances and prohibitions intended to eradicate certain behaviour, 
thus having the indirect effect of excluding certain classes of people, who failed to live up to the 
commercial and aesthetic image of the urban centre. Anti-Social Behaviour Orders under the English 
Crime & Disorder Act 1998 and local ordinances prohibiting the consumption of alcohol on the streets 
are exclusionary tactics. Their exclusionary capabilities are supported by CCTV surveillance targeting. In 
his study of the operation of CCTV in a northern city shopping centre, McCahill concluded that teenagers 
were the prime targets for both prolonged surveillance and subsequent exclusion.174 While theoretically, 
the panopticon aims to facilitate inclusionary social control, Norris maintains that in reality CCTV 
‘significantly becomes a powerful tool in managing and enforcing exclusion.’175 
 
With the introduction of CCTV, surveillance has taken on a new dimension. The electronic age has altered 
the nature of surveillance and brought the potential for social control to a whole new level, while 
perhaps losing some of their potency along the way. Norris does acknowledge that the digitalisation of 
CCTV surveillance will ease, among others, the burden of processing and retrieving stored data.176 
Digitalisation however, brings along its own complications – the more advanced the technology, the 
more advanced their problems. McCahill and Norris draw attention to the works of Bogard and Graham, 
                                                          
167 Norris & Armstrong (1999b), pages 94 -95. 
168 Ibid, page 167. 
169 Norris (2003), pages 265-266.   
170 Ibid, page 266. 
171 Ibid, pages 266-268. 
172 Ibid, page 266. 
173 See further note 21 above and the accompanying text.  
174 See further Chapter 4 (The Panopticon Mall) in McCahill.  The Surveillance Web: The Rise of Visual Surveillance in an 
English City.  Willan Publishing.  Devon.  2002.  In The Panopticon Mall, McCahill tells of the exclusion of various classes 
of people ‘who disrupted the commercial image’ of the shopping centre.  Page 126. 
175 Norris (2003), page 267. 
176 Ibid, pages 268-278. 
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both of whom have explored the application of the most recent information technology and advanced 
software to the surveillance web and its social control mandate.177 These writers explain how simulation 
software, surveillance technology and digital databases can be combined to ‘attempt to identify 
deviance prior to the occurrence of the behaviour or the event in real time.’178 ‘Intelligent scene 
monitoring’, facial and vehicle recognition software permit CCTV-accumulated images to be 
automatically interpreted and significant threats of deviance to be anticipated and neutralised. Norris 
and Armstrong indicate that the marriage of digital databases, CCTV and automated identification 
software marks a shift from mass to maximum surveillance.179 As well as tracking the movements of an 
individual, it is becoming increasing possible to assess the individual’s ‘moral worthiness’ based on the 
dossier of information stored in the database. The known offender is no longer alone in surveillance-
targeting – everyone is a dossiered ‘data subject’ with a ‘digital persona.’180 With time, these digital 
personae take on a life of their own. Norris and Armstrong offer a disturbing example.181 Two Welsh 
football fans were mistakenly entered into Britain’s National Crime Intelligence Unit database of football 
hooligan suspects. On arrival in Belgium for a match, the brothers were identified by Belgian police, 
arrested and deported, all on foot of their digital, not actual, identities. Their movement within Europe 
was considerable restricted, even though they had done nothing to merit it. It took six years before their 
campaign to have the National Football Intelligence Unit database amended and their names removed 
from Belgian record succeeded. Because football hooligan databases are shared in Europe, it is unclear 
how many other databases contain these erroneous digital personae, in particular, or any others for that 
matter. 
 
According to Norris and Armstrong, the union of the camera, the computer and the database is the 
harbinger of, what Poster coins, the ‘superpanopticon.’182 While harbouring their own difficulties, 
arguably, these most recent technological developments go a long way to addressing the deficiencies, 
as noted by Norris, of CCTV surveillance as the modern embodiment of Bentham’s Panopticon183 and 
fortify it as a social control device.  
 
 
A Natural Progression to CCTV – The Chronology of the Camera & Social Control. 
 
With each technological development, surveillance is being fine-tuned; however, camera-mediated 
social control was not initiated by the arrival of closed circuit television. The use of the camera to effect 
control is not a recent phenomenon; it is merely a contemporary slant on an age-old practice. Norris and 
Armstrong recount the enlightening history of the relationship between the photographic image and 
the control of crime.184 They tell that within a decade of the realisation of the photography, it had 
applications for the administration of justice. By 1854, James Gardner, Governor of Bristol Gaol, 
                                                          
177 McCahill & Norris (2002), pages 5-6.  See further Bogard.  The Simulation of Surveillance. Hyper Control in Telematic 
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Technologies, Digital representations, and Material Geographies.  (1998)  Volume 6.  Environment & Planning: Society 
& Space 483.  
178 McCahill & Norris (2002), page 5. 
179 See generally Norris & Armstrong (1999), Chapter 10: Towards the Maximum Surveillance Society. 
180 Norris & Armstrong (1999), page 221. 
181 Ibid, pages 221-222. 
182 Poster. Database as Discourse; or, Electronic Interpellations.  In Lyon & Zureik.  Computers, Surveillance & Privacy.  
University of Minnesota Press.  Minneapolis.  1996.  Page 184.  Cited in Norris & Armstrong (1999), page 222 
183 Automation and the availability of comprehensive databases mean the absence of the personalized knowledge of 
co-presence and the potential for discriminatory targeting ceases to be a flaw in the armour of the urban panopticon. 
However, Norris & Armstrong’s cautionary words should be reiterated – ‘Technology may be … neutral, but the uses to 
which it is put are not.’ (1999b), pages 94-95. 
184 Norris & Armstrong.  (1999b), pages 77-81.  For a more detailed account of the evolution of photographic 
surveillance, see Norris & Armstrong (1999), chapter 2 ‘A History of Photographic Surveillance and the Rise of CCTV.’ 
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photographed prisoners in order to identify habitual offenders for closer supervision and recommended 
other institutions follow suit. Those individually classified as habitual offenders were removed from the 
community by transportation and imprisonment. The photographing of offenders proceeded to become 
a necessary step in the processing of inmates. For years, habitual offenders anonymously travelled from 
place to place, giving a different name each time they were apprehended and therefore cloaking their 
recidivism with a multitude if aliases. Criminal identity consequently rose in priority and photography 
provided the ideal tool to ascertain it.185 
 
As well as individual classification, statistical classification was also greatly advanced through the use of 
photographs. With the dawn of criminology and the Lombrosian project,186 which attributed, at least in 
part, criminogenic tendencies to physical characteristics, photographs were used to categorise and 
document the ‘criminal type.’ For example, in 1883, over a decade of research culminated in the 
publication of Francis Galton’s Inquiries into Human Faculty, which included composite portraits of 
various categories of individuals, including the diseased and the criminal. These composites were 
grounded in ‘statistically based photographic syntheses.’187 Galton, having pioneered the use of 
photography to identify the ‘born’ criminal, went on to establish the eugenics movement. In 1914, the 
British Eugenics Society declared their objective of preventing the procreation of future innate criminals 
by segregating those statistically classified as criminal, due to their physical characteristics identified 
through Galton’s work, for the duration of their fertility.188 Clearly, even from its infancy, photography 
was used to classify and manage risk – at the very least in theory if not in reality. 
 
While the application of the disciplinary potential of surveillance in eighteenth and nineteenth century 
institutions required ‘the direct, unmediated, human monitoring,’189 photography was limited in its 
control potential by its once-off, snapshot nature, which was not compatible with the routine monitoring 
available in the institutional emulations of the Panopticon. However, with the dawn of the television era 
in the 1930s and later the video cassette recorder in the 1960s, the camera’s surveillant potency was 
vastly increased – its ‘true panoptic potential was realised.’190 
 
Norris and Armstrong’s tale leads to an understanding that the most recent application of the camera 
to crime control is conceivably less a bolt from the blue and more a ‘natural’ step in the evolution of 
social classification and control. Arguably, it is the sheer proliferation of this new stage that captures 
attention. 
 
 
The Proliferation of CCTV. 
 
Bannister et al ascribe the pervasive rise of CCTV surveillance to the ‘changing nature of contemporary 
urbanism’191 – the escalation of fear, the preoccupation with ‘risk’ and the resultant cultured instinct to 
exclude. Unsurprisingly, the phenomenon of out-of-town malls relished in the decline of the urban 
centre. The discomfort felt amid the miscellany of the city streets faded to a distant memory in the 
enclosed seclusion of these self-contained retail centres. CCTV was recruited as a primary tool in the 
                                                          
185 See further Ireland.  The Felon & the Angel Copier: Criminal Identity & the Promise of Photography in Victorian England 
& Wales.  In Knafla.  Policing & the War in Europe.  Criminal Justice History.  Volume 6.  Greenwood Press.  Conneticut.  
2002. 
186 Refer back to Chapter 2 regarding positivism.  Cesare Lombroso was arguably the most notable of the positivist school 
of criminology.  See further Hughes. Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk & Late Modernity.  Open 
University Press.  Maidenhead.  1998.  Page 39. 
187 Norris & Armstrong (1999b), page 77.   
188 Ibid, page 78. 
189 Ibid, page 78. 
190 Ibid, page 79. 
191 McCahill & Norris (2002), page 11. 
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maintenance of these biospheres of security and safety. As far back as 1967, the expansion of surveillant 
capacity posed by this new technology was recognised and almost immediately this potential was 
applied to crime control in the private retail sector.192 
 
McCahill and Norris point out that the emergence of out-of-town retail outlets was indicative of a 
manifest trend of city planning known as zoning.193 Urban areas were defined by reference to their 
function. Residential, business and retail areas were zoned and their boundaries were reinforced.194 
Gated communities, CCTV and private policing were further symptoms of this ‘fortress impulse.’ The 
division into and fortification of the different zones complimented the shift toward the preventative 
paradigm of crime control. Those who are ‘different’ or ‘strangers’ pose the greatest threat and the 
optimal way of dealing with that risk is to exclude those, who present it. By homogenising urban space, 
it becomes easier to expel those who do not fit. 
 
The vibrant business and retail zones tended to be located on the outskirts of the urban centres. Not 
only did this add to the social decline of town and city centres, but it also fuelled their economic 
decline.195 To lure investment and breathe economic life back into urban centres, the town centre 
management movement sought to emulate the security of the out-of-town shopping mall. The 
promotion of a business-friendly image of the urban centre was best served through the extension of 
CCTV into public spaces. Norris and Armstrong illustrate this by reference to a promotional video for a 
CCTV system, which ‘emphasised not the detection of crime but the role of CCTV was to play in revitalising 
the city centre’s flagging fortunes by contributing to the ‘feel good factor’ and encouraging the shopper 
back to the centre.’196 The portrayal of the urban centre as a utopia of consumption demanded the 
exclusion of those incongruent with its commercial image.197 CCTV facilitated this and was connotative 
of the security and safety offered in those out-of-town shopping malls. 
 
One of the first ventures of CCTV into the public, or at least semi-public, arena occurred on the Northern 
line of the London Underground in 1975. Its introduction was an attempt to curb robbery and assaults 
on London Transport staff.198 The initial system expanded into other branches of the underground over 
the next decade. The first instances of CCTV use in public space proper were largely to tackle traffic and 
protest-type public order incidents. Norris and Armstrong tell of the deployment of CCTV under the 
Central Integrated Traffic Control system to address congestion on London’s major arterial roads. The 
Lynx system involved the installation of eight cameras focussing on the main rallying points for 
demonstrations in central London. Football stadia became another locus for surveillance. The targets of 
this public gaze were classified as ‘marginal’ – protestors and football hooligans.199 It was not until the 
mid-1980s with the introduction of CCTV on the promenade in Bournemouth that the surveillance net 
was cast wider. There was no longer the same overt targeting through camera positioning as was the 
case with the initial public exploits of CCTV surveillance – everyone and anyone frequenting that area 
were potential surveillance subjects. They did not have to be demonstrators or football hooligans. By 
1990, however, CCTV fever had not yet gripped Britain. By that time, there was still only a hand full of 
public space systems. Within a decade, this would all change. 
                                                          
192 Norris & Armstrong tell of Photoscan’s introduction of CCTV in 1967 to deter and apprehend shoplifters. Norris & 
Armstrong (1999b), page 79. 
193 McCahill & Norris (2002), pages 11-12. 
194 Bannister et al (1998), pages 27-29. 
195 See note 21 above and the accompanying text on the use of CCTV in Glasgow.   
196 Norris & Armstrong.  Categories of Control. The Social Construction of Suspicion and Intervention in CCTV Systems.  
(A draft manuscript of material being prepared for Images of Control. CCTV and the Rise of the Surveillance Society, to 
be published by Berg in 1999).  1998.  Page 46.  Cited in McCahill & Norris (2002), page 13. 
197 See further note 42 above and the accompanying text.  See also Chapter 4 - The Panopticon Mall – in McCahill.  The 
Surveillance Web: The Rise of Visual Surveillance in an English City.  Willan Publishing.  Devon.  2002.   
198 Norris & Armstrong (1999b), page 79.   
199 Norris & Armstrong (1999b), page 80.   
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CCTV had become a routine feature in the retail environment, but was a relatively sparse occurrence 
outside that context. It largely fell well below the public’s radar. Nonetheless, this was all about to 
change. By 1994, there had been consecutive increases in recorded crime rates.200 This increased public 
receptiveness to a more general application of CCTV’s panoptic capabilities. The real watershed event, 
however, was the tragic killing of Jamie Bulger. Arguably, that grainy, yet unforgettable, image of the 
two-year-old being led out of the Liverpool shopping centre marked the turning point at which the 
potential of CCTV gained widespread recognition. The public’s familiarity with CCTV has been further 
cemented by its notable capturing of other momentous events – for example, Princess Diana and Dodi 
Al Fayed leaving the Ritz Hotel in Paris; Jill Dando out shopping or the brief glimpse of the hooded 
perpetrator of the Admiral Duncan pub nail-bombing near the scene in Soho.201 More recently, CCTV has 
vividly documented the images of the London bombing suspects and many of the Dublin rioters. The 
cumulative effect of this archive of CCTV imagery has catapulted the potential of CCTV into the public 
consciousness. As a consequence, it is hardly surprising that financial support from British central 
government for widespread CCTV systems has not waned. 
 
Far from it – in October 1994, on the heels of a Home Office published CCTV instruction manual offering 
advice to local agencies and interest groups, the British Conservative Government launched its CCTV 
Challenge Competition.202 With its £2 million, this initiative would fund up to half the cost of installing 
the systems with the remainder coming from the competing co-operatives of local agencies and 
interests. Almost 500 bids were received and the fund was increased to £5 million. 106 were awarded 
and the huge demand meant three further competitions were launched by 1998. Between Home Office 
financing and local partnership efforts, £85 million was raised to establish 580 CCTV schemes in Britain. 
The change in government in 1997 with New Labour coming to power did not alter the attitude towards 
CCTV. In fact, 1999 saw the new administration pledge an impressive £153 million toward CCTV 
expansion over the following three years as a core element in its crime-reduction programme. By July 
2001, 447 new schemes had been awarded grants totalling £128 million.  Norris calculates that in the 
decade between 1992 and 2002, the British central government spent approximately a quarter of a 
billion pounds on CCTV expansion through the competitions and the general crime reduction 
programmes – and given that Home Office funding through the CCTV challenge competitions is to be 
matched by locally-raised financing, this sum merely reflects a fraction of the amount expended on 
CCTV.203 
 
The CCTV Challenge Competition is but one example of the dispersal of responsibility for crime control 
outward from central government. Another is the more overarching Safer Cities programme, which itself 
served the CCTV project. These epitomise the adaptive strategy of responsibilisation described by 
Garland, whereby central government provides ‘help for self-help’ to ‘activated’ communities and multi-
agency partnerships in order to relieve the crime control burden, which once rested squarely and solely 
on the shoulders of the sovereign State.204 The eagerness of the recipients of this delegated 
responsibility is evident in the popularity of the CCTV competitions and Safer Cities programmes. The 
                                                          
200 Norris (2003), page 255. 
201 Parker.  Total Surveillance: Investigating the Big Brother World of E-Spies, Eavesdroppers and CCTV.  Judy Piatkus 
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perception of significant reductions in crime and the fear of crime, together with the feel-good factor 
and the hope of economic revitalisation have resulted in seemingly unanimous public205 and political 
support for the mass expansion of CCTV in Britain. The question then becomes whether CCTV in fact 
warrants such ardent advocacy. 
 
 
The Effectiveness of CCTV – A Symposium of Evaluations: 
 
Britain is, without doubt, the most surveilled society. Parker illustrates the comprehensiveness of British 
surveillance.206 He explains that on any particular day, an individual moving around in any large British 
city will be captured by in excess of 300 cameras affiliated to 30 CCTV networks. He claims this is not 
mere speculation, but is based solidly on official statistics issued by Home Secretary Jack Straw. He even 
suggests that in reality the incidence of surveillance might be greater. He goes on to tell that if the same 
individual was to travel the 7,500-mile expanse of the British motorway system, their vehicle would be 
picked up by the surveillance system every four minutes and if they were to make their way to London, 
on crossing the ‘Ring of Steel’, established to combat I.R.A. attacks, their number plate would be 
recorded on the vehicle recognition system and tracked for the entirety of their stay. This is ever before 
the individual actually does anything in the city, be it shopping or attending a football match, where they 
will again be observed. Relative to the ever increasing concentration of surveillance, there has not been 
a correlative series of comprehensive evaluations. Pawson and Tilley argue that many fervent 
proclamations of the success of CCTV were based on ‘post hoc shoestring efforts by the untrained and 
self-interested practitioner.’207 
 
Before turning attention to any individual assessments of CCTV’s crime prevention capabilities, it is 
worth noting the possible rationales behind performing such evaluations in the first place. Tilley provides 
an enlightening inventory of CCTV evaluation purposes.208 The design of the evaluation and whether it 
is even worthwhile at all depends upon its purpose. He lists eight possible evaluation purposes in the 
hopes of firstly, encouraging evaluators to more effectively and consciously address the aims and logic 
of their task and secondly, to reveal some technical difficulties associated with CCTV effectiveness 
evaluations.209 
 
1. To assess whether CCTV works:210 
Does CCTV work? – While it may well be a simple question, there does not seem to be a straightforward 
answer. Tilley tells of the three stock responses by evaluators to this ‘bottom-line’ query. Optimistic 
evaluators conclude that yes, CCTV does work, some of the time. Others categorise the efforts of CCTV 
                                                          
205 Parker concludes from various studies that a ‘running average’ of 72% have no objection to the use of CCTV.  Parker 
(2000), page 65. See further Ditton.  Public Support for Town Centre CCTV Schemes: Myth or Reality. In Norris, Moran & 
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under the pessimistic slogan ‘nothing works’, since no, CCTV does not work all of the time. A third 
contingent of evaluators remains on the fence, calling for further research and the necessary funding to 
pursue that elusive ‘bottom-line’ answer. Inevitably, the same mixed results and their consequent 
inferences are the best any resultant research can hope to conclude. In short, the consensus of 
evaluations is that CCTV works some of the time, but not all of the time.211 
 
Tilley explains that ordinarily on the introduction of a new crime prevention initiative, initial findings, 
sometimes of a cursory and often of an anecdotal nature, cast an optimistic light on the capabilities of 
this new measure. A drive is then ignited amongst those with responsibility for crime control to employ 
this new wonder measure without delaying its benefits by awaiting more thorough and longer-term 
analyses of its effectiveness. With time and more comprehensive evaluations, it typically becomes 
apparent that the initial success of this new measure was either inflated or short-lived and ‘confidence 
that the measure actually does work begins to wane.’212 When the dust settles, arbitrary and mixed 
findings seem to emerge from the body of evaluations undertaken to assess whether CCTV works or not. 
Tilley proceeds to shed light on the possible reasons for such ambiguity, claiming there are two types of 
explanation for it – the first being technical weaknesses of the evaluation and the second being the 
underlying reason for the inevitability of varying results. In relation to technical difficulties, he explains 
that some evaluation flaws result from the evaluator’s inexperience and their consequent use of 
improper methods, while others defy circumnavigation even by weathered evaluators. He lists nine such 
difficulties:213 
 
(a) ‘Pseudo-random fluctuations in crime’: The occurrence of what Tilley terms ‘wide ‘natural’ 
fluctuations in local crime rates’ hinders any attempt to distinguish the impact of a crime 
prevention strategy. 
(b) ‘Regression to the mean’: In light of this phenomenon of pseudo-random fluctuations, a crime 
prevention initiative may be introduced in a time of abnormally high crime rates. Regardless of 
any new preventative measure, crime rates would be expected to return to their normal level. 
Where this regression coincides with the launch of that new measure, an impression of 
significant impact is given, which may not be entirely reliable. 
(c) ‘Floor effects’: Some evaluations may be located in areas with particularly low crime rates 
hampering the detection of any crime reducing influence of the preventative measure. 
(d) Where more general background crime rates fluctuate, the evaluator’s attempt to discern the 
impact of a crime prevention initiative in a specific area may be undermined. 
(e) As well as the introduction of a crime prevention strategy, the target area may experience 
concurrent or subsequent changes, which again would interfere with the task of marking the 
impact of the strategy. 
                                                          
211 Later in this chapter, various evaluations displaying these mixed and arbitrary findings will be addressed.  See note 
98 below and the accompanying text. 
212 Tilley (1998), page 141.  Tilley concedes that the initial success of new crime prevention initiatives may be more real 
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(f) It is well known that not all crimes are reported and of those reported, not all are recorded. The 
initiation of a crime prevention tactic may influence crime reporting and recording patterns, for 
example a CCTV operator may acknowledge incidents, which would otherwise go unnoticed or 
not be brought to police attention. Changes in reporting and recording patterns would in turn 
impact upon the crime rates changes documented. 
(g) Where a package of measures is introduced to combat crime, it is virtually impossible to 
calculate the exact proportional impact of each initiative, given that the different measures may 
indistinguishably interact additively, synergistically or otherwise. 
(h) Displacement is another phenomenon, which poses a significant obstacle to accurate evaluation. 
Regardless of the difficulty in precisely measuring displacement, Tilley warns that it can never 
be established that no displacement has occurred and so the more robust evaluations will 
address this issue. Temporal, geographical, functional (different type of crime), target and 
possible less so tactical (different method of commission) displacement must be taken into 
account by evaluators and as well as displacement away from the target area. Tilley warns that 
displacement into the area should also be considered. 
(i) A phenomenon known as a ‘diffusion of benefits’ is another complication facing evaluators. A 
crime prevention strategy’s beneficial influence may spread beyond the sharp edges of its 
intended target zone. The possibility of diffusion needs to be taken into account, when 
comparing crime rates of neighbouring areas in order to measure the preventative strategy’s 
effect. 
 
The above selection of technical difficulties is in some way and to some extent manageable, if only to be 
identified as hampering the arrival at an exact effect measurement. Together with this technically-based 
explanation, Tilley suggests a second, more insurmountable reason for such mixed results. He refers to 
Poyner’s 1991 overview of 122 evaluations of 47 different crime prevention measures and Short and 
Ditton’s 1995 overview of CCTV evaluations.214 In both, one certain consistency emerged and that was 
the inconsistency in the results. Tilley explains that the circumstances around the introduction of a crime 
prevention measure will inevitably vary, meaning that the manner in which that measure takes effect 
will also vary.215 For example, he suggests that if an area experiences significant offending by a small 
number of prolific offenders, the arrest and incarceration of such offenders through the use of CCTV will 
have a considerable impact on the crime levels. For this to occur, a small number of offenders must be 
responsible for the vast majority of offending, the CCTV system must be monitored and police deployed 
quickly to apprehend the offenders as they commit the offence or flee afterwards. On the other hand, 
if the CCTV system is not being monitored or there is no timely police deployment capacity, then the 
picture quality must be such as to allow the identification of offenders when the footage is reviewed. 
The convergence of these variables brings about particular evaluation findings. Altering any one of the 
variables will alter the findings; consequently there can never be a ‘fixed universal invariant relationship 
between the introduction of a crime prevention measure (such as CCTV) and the change in crime 
levels’.216 
 
For Tilley, ‘Does CCTV work?’ is ‘not a sensible, useful or intelligible question to address, notwithstanding 
the frequency with which it is asked or the money and effort spent trying to answer it.’217 
 
 
                                                          
214 Tilley (1998), page 143.  Tilley refers to Poyner.  What works in Crime Prevention?  Paper presented at the British 
Criminology Conference.  York University.  1991.  Also referred to is Short & Ditton.  Does CCTV affect Crime?  1995.  Vol. 
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2. To learn whether CCTV can work:218 
‘Can CCTV work?’ – This is a relatively simple question to answer. Evaluations to date, whether 
technically robust or not, have established to one extent or another, that CCTV can have an effect on 
crime. Tilley contends that there is no longer any need to address this question, since in all likelihood 
the potential for CCTV to impact upon crime has been realised to varying degrees of success. An 
evaluation concluding that CCTV has failed to have any effect on crime rates would not unring the bell 
of its effectiveness heard in previous evaluations.  Nor would an evaluation confirming CCTV’s crime 
reduction potential add a new dimension to or progress the answer to the question of ‘can CCTV work?’ 
Analysis of CCTV scheme effectiveness must move past this evaluation question. 
 
3. To discover what it is about CCTV that works in what circumstances and how:219 
This purpose takes CCTV evaluations to a whole new level, delving deeper to reveal the mechanisms by 
which and the contexts within which CCTV operates effectively and to what exact effect it does function. 
Tilley advocates such ‘realistic evaluation’ as a means to pinpoint circumstances in which CCTV would 
operate most effectively and efficiently in preventing crime. By analysing in greater detail how CCTV 
operates, it is possible to avoid situations, where the impact of CCTV would not endure sufficiently to 
merit investment or where overreliance on CCTV would diminish ‘natural’220 vigilance to the extent that 
its introduction would be counterproductive and in fact contribute to crime increases. ‘Realistic 
evaluation’ equips practitioners with the information needed to intelligently employ particular 
preventative strategies, rather than simply blindly following the trend of the time. 
 
4. To aggrandize the CCTV scheme and its host town:221 
Tilley cautions against automatically taking evaluation findings at face value, because unfortunately 
sometimes seemingly independent evaluations are commissioned with an agenda to find the ‘right’ 
answers. Positive results may be welcomed as affirmation of the vision of those who instigated the 
introduction of the scheme. 
 
5. To assess the cost-efficiency of CCTV:222 
Tilley discounts this as a substantial evaluation purpose, given that it is unlikely that there would ever 
be sufficient data to accurately calculate the costs and benefits associated with a CCTV scheme, 
particularly as the list of what could be classified as a cost or benefit is potentially endless. 
 
6. To contemplate improvements and modifications:223 
By assessing the operation of a CCTV scheme, it is possible to adapt and improve its functioning. It can 
be determined through monitoring whether the system is performing in the manner envisaged and to 
its optimum. Where it falls short, adjustments and modifications can be made. 
 
7. To adjudicate whether CCTV has alleviated the problem:224 
Subsequent to the introduction of CCTV, evaluations can establish the status of the problem sought to 
be addressed by the introduction. Without actually ascertaining how exactly CCTV is impacting upon the 
crime rates, it can be discerned on a superficial level whether the crime rate has been reduced, increased 
or remained stagnant. 
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8. To disclose what effects CCTV is having:225 
As with the cost-benefit assessment, the list of effects of CCTV is possibly unending. Tilley refers to 
CCTV’s potential to trigger a ‘butterfly effect’.226 The full consequences of CCTV – social, economic, 
political, and so on – whether desirable or not, defy enumeration. However, evaluating CCTV schemes 
with a view towards contemplating its effects allows for the substantiation of speculation surrounding 
its widespread consequences and to regulate for the desirable effects and against the undesirable. 
 
Having looked at Tilley’s inventory of evaluation purposes, what follows are synopses of some of the 
most notable CCTV evaluations. 
 
Does CCTV have an impact on crime? – A summary of some of those mixed findings:227 
 
Airdrie.228 
November 1992 saw Scotland’s first open street CCTV scheme with the installation of twelve cameras in 
Airdrie town centre and in December 1993, the Scottish Office commissioned Short and Ditton to 
undertake research on the impact of CCTV in Scottish city and town centres. The Airdrie evaluation had 
a number of objectives, which included assessing the impact of CCTV on crime and detection rates as 
well as the nature and extent of displacement. Recorded crime figures from two years before and two 
years after the installation were analysed. Five control areas229 of increasing size were employed to assist 
in accounting for any external influences on crime rates and displacement. Average figures for each 
offence group and total offences were calculated and ‘smoothed’ to eliminate seasonal fluctuations and 
underlying trends were accounted for by reference to the data collected on the geographically wider 
control area (the remainder of that Strathclyde Police Division). Comparing the two years prior to and 
the two years after the installation of CCTV in Airdrie, the following was noted: 
 
(a) Total recorded crimes fell by 21%. Prior to adjustment for seasonal variations and so on, a 
reduction of 35% was noted in the CCTV area. The reduction experienced in the remainder of 
that particular division was 12% and it was 7% in the rest of the Strathclyde Police Force 
catchment, while the remainder of Scotland saw an increase of total recorded crimes and 
offences of 2%. Consequently, even though there was an overall downward trend in the 
Strathclyde jurisdiction, CCTV seems to have effected a significantly greater decline. 
(b) Crimes of dishonesty (namely theft of and from vehicles; house-breaking; shoplifting) decreased 
by 48%. 
(c) Vandalism and fireraising was reduced by 19%. 
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227 What follows are merely summaries of a number of the evaluations undertaken predominantly in Britain. More 
comprehensive discussions of each individual evaluation are referenced below.   
228 Short & Ditton.  Does Closed Circuit Television Prevent Crime? An Evaluation of the Use of CCTV Surveillance Cameras 
in Airdrie Town Centre.  Crime & Criminal Justice Research Findings No. 8.  The Scottish Office Central Research Unit.  
Edinburgh.  1995.  See also, Ditton & Short.  Evaluating Scotland’s First Town Centre CCTV Scheme.  In Norris, Moran & 
Armstrong (1998). 155-173.  (Ditton & Short (1998)) 
229 The five control areas were (i) the remainder of that ‘police beat’ not covered by CCTV; (ii) the remainder of that 
police sub-division; (iii) the remainder of that particular Strathclyde Division; (iv) the remainder of the Strathclyde Police 
jurisdiction and (v) the remainder of Scotland. 
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(d) The clearance rate improved by 16%. This involves the police tracing, cautioning or 
apprehending perpetrators of vandalism, minor assaults, public order and drug-related offences 
in particular. 
(e) There was no apparent evidence of displacement to either the immediate surrounds or to the 
remainder of the police sub-division. It was noted that there was a slight increase in total crimes 
recorded in the remainder of the police beat not covered by CCTV and the rest of the sub-
division. This was, however largely attributed to the increase in offences committed while on 
bail and drug possession or supply offences, which the CCTV-covered area also experienced.230 
(f) Public order offences appeared to increase by 33% following the introduction of CCTV. While 
this suggests CCTV was ineffective from a crime prevention point of view as regards this type of 
offence, Ditton & Short question the accuracy of this supposition given that the increase may be 
attributed to more offences coming to the attention of the authorities because of the 
surveillance rather than an elevation in actual commission.231 
 
In 1995 and 1996 respectively, Ditton and Short followed up on their statistical research with qualitative 
interviews with both the CCTV system instigators and offenders. This placed their statistical data in 
context and gave their results a further dimension.232 The overall conclusion from the Airdrie evaluation 
was that CCTV effected a ‘real reduction’ in crime rates and an increase in detection. 
 
Glasgow. 233 
As was the case with Airdrie, the Scottish Office commissioned research on CCTV in Glasgow, where the 
thirty-two camera city-centre scheme was instigated in November 1994. This study looked at police 
recorded crime rates for a two-year period prior to and a twelve-month period after installation. 
Researchers also undertook street surveys to assess public awareness and perceptions of CCTV and its 
impact. The overall conclusion reached by the researchers was that CCTV had been ‘relatively’ successful 
in Glasgow, but this was a different type of success to that experienced in Airdrie.234 Twelve months 
after the launch of Glasgow CityWatch, there were just over three thousand less crimes and offences 
recorded compared to the average of the twenty-four months prior to installation. However, when the 
figures were adjusted to account for the general downward trend, there was no evidence of CCTV 
effecting an overall reduction in crime, even though some reduction was noted in certain offence 
                                                          
230 Ditton & Short accept that it is possible to rule out the incidence of displacement from unaccompanied statistical 
data, consequently in 1996, they took their cue from Repetto and interviewed thirty offenders. As Gabor contends ‘the 
recognition of the subjective element involved (in offending) necessitates the investigation of the offenders’ motives and 
rationale for target selection…our inability to detect displacement [from statistics] does not mean that the phenomenon 
is not present.’  (Gabor.  Crime Displacement & Situational Prevention: Toward the Development of some Principles. 
(1990) Vol. 32 Canadian Journal of Criminology. 41, page 60 cited in Ditton & Short (1998), page 163).  Despite initial 
statistical indications, interviews with offenders suggested there was displacement to an extent.  For interview excerpts, 
see further Ditton & Short (1998) at pages 163-169.  In relation to displacement more generally, see Repetto.  Crime 
Prevention & the Displacement Phenomenon.  (1976) Vol. 22 Crime & Delinquency.  166.  Also, Gabor.  Crime 
Displacement: The Literature & Strategies for its Investigation. (1978) Vol. 6(2) Crime & Justice.  100.   
231 Interviews with offenders gave Ditton & Short the impression that CCTV in actual fact had a greater impact on public 
order offences than the statistical data led them to believe initially. Those interviewed in relation to public order 
offences had been caught on camera and claimed they would be more cautious in future.  Ditton & Short (1998), page 
169.  
232 Ditton & Short (1998), pages 155-169. 
233 Ditton, Short, Phillips, Norris & Armstrong.  The Effect of Closed Circuit Television on Recorded Crime Rates & Public 
Concern about Crime in Glasgow.  Crime & Criminal Justice Research Findings No. 30.  The Scottish Office Central 
Research Unit.  Edinburgh.  1999. 
234 For discussion of the Airdrie and Glasgow evaluations and an explanation of the divergent results, see Ditton & Short.  
Yes, it works, No, it doesn’t:  Comparing the effects of Open-Street CCTV in Two Adjacent Scottish Town Centres.  In 
Painter & Tilley (Eds.) Surveillance of Public Space:  CCTV, Street Lighting & Crime Prevention.  (Clarke (Ed) Crime 
Prevention Studies.  Volume 10).  Criminal Justice Press.   New York.  1999.  (Ditton & Short (1999)) 
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categories.235 With trend adjustments, the research showed recorded crimes and offences in fact rose 
by 9% and the general clear-up rate in fact fell from 64% to 60%. There was, however a slight decrease 
in concern about becoming the victim of crime among the three thousand people surveyed. This concern 
fell from 61% before installation to 55% fifteen months after the cameras were installed. 
 
It was concluded that CCTV did not have a significant impact on crime at least during its first twelve 
months in Glasgow. It did, however, operate to identify incidents as they arose, which might otherwise 
go unnoticed and allowed for their diffusion before they went on to have serious consequences. CCTV 
in Glasgow permitted more cost-effective investigation, rather than significantly reducing crime rates – 
arguably this is another type of success.236 
 
Doncaster.237 
In October 1995, sixty-three cameras were introduced in Doncaster, a northern English town, which had 
been enduring economic decline and high unemployment since the 1980s.238 In evaluating the 
effectiveness of CCTV in Doncaster, Skinns undertook both quantitative and qualitative research over a 
period of twelve months prior to and twelve months after installation. Police recorded crime statistics; 
victimisation data and surveys of town centre-, multi-storey car park- users, school pupils and the 
business community; attitude surveys of those working on the frontlines, such as police officers and 
magistrates and finally interviews with young offenders were combined to build a picture of CCTV’s 
impact in Doncaster. Comparisons were drawn between recorded crime data in areas in the Doncaster 
Police district covered by CCTV and those not and its surrounds to assess the incidence of displacement 
and/or diffusion of benefits. The findings were as follows: 239 
 
(a) There was a 16% decrease in overall offences in surveilled areas. The other unsurveilled areas 
either experienced a lesser downward trend or an increase in overall offences. This decrease 
was, however, not deemed to be significant and was in fact to be expected in light of previously 
established trends for the town centre.240 
(b) Burglary and criminal damage showed a fall of 25% and 32% respectively, but again this was in 
line with established trends and so was not deemed significant. 
(c) Shoplifting fell by 11%, which, once again, was not significant. 
(d) ‘Other thefts’ and assaults displayed a slight increase, which was not significant. 
(e) Theft of and from vehicles, on the other hand, did show a decrease, which could more 
confidently be traced back to the installation of CCTV. The reduction experienced under this 
category was one of 50%. 
                                                          
235 While crimes of violence fell by 22%, fireraising and vandalism fell by 8% and motor vehicle offences fell by 12%, 
crimes of indecency, dishonesty and other offences rose by 17%, 23% and 32% respectively. 
236 Ditton & Short warn against a crude, oversimplistic interpretation of the Glasgow findings, which, on first glance, 
appear to indicate failure of CCTV to achieve a positive impact on crime. They group together concerns under the 
following headings: ‘Adequacy of Test’s Effectiveness’; ‘Types of Testing Situations’ and ‘Timing of CCTV Introduction’.  
These concerns elucidate the wisdom of not jumping to the conclusion that CCTV did not work in Glasgow.  Ditton & 
Short (1999), pages 212-217.  
237 Skinns.  Crime Reduction, Diffusion & Displacement: Evaluating the Effectiveness of CCTV.  In Norris, Moran & 
Armstrong.  Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television & Social Control.  Ashgate.  Aldershot.  1998. 
238 Skinns (1998), pages 175-176. 
239 Ibid, pages 181-186. 
240 With decreases falling in line with existing downward trends, it is not possible to attribute such reductions to the 
introduction of CCTV – consequently CCTV could not be said to have a significant effect. 
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(f) Surveys showed a significant reduction in witnessing of crime by all categories of users. Prior to 
installation 24% of town centre users reported witnessing crime, while after installation 12% 
did. 
(g) Victimisation among the business community fell from 89% to 65% following the introduction 
of CCTV, while town centre user victimisation fell from 5% to 3%. 
(h) In relation to displacement and diffusion of benefits, the immediate surrounds of the covered 
area experienced an 11% decrease, which was not expected under existing trends and was 
significant. It was suggested that, while this may be a diffusion of benefits, it may also be 
attributable to changes in police deployment – the allocation of resources may have been 
informed by CCTV coverage, meaning directly or indirectly, CCTV may have played an important 
role in this decrease. Beyond the immediate surrounds, however, there does seem to have been 
evidence of displacement – data showed a 31% increase for all offences across the four outlying 
townships. This did not fit expectations given existing trends and was significant. Group 
interviews with young offenders did not reflect the crime statistic data.241 
 
Taking displacement and diffusion into account, Skinns calculated the overall impact of CCTV in 
Doncaster to be a 6% reduction in recorded crime. He urged caution, however, in regard to the findings 
on a number of grounds.242 For example, the fact that the evaluation merely assessed the situation 
twelve months after installation meant that the findings were more a momentary snapshot rather than 
a comprehensive portrait of CCTV’s capabilities. The timing of the evaluation also coincided with 
whatever technological and organisational ‘teething troubles’ the scheme was going to experience on 
initiation before the dust was allowed to settle. He similarly warns that because this assessment did not 
take place in a controlled laboratory, potential extraneous influences (changes in police practices, 
parking arrangements and so on) were not necessarily factored into the finding, and their impact was 
perhaps not capable of being measured into the mix. He concluded that what is necessary is the 
‘reinvesting [of] evaluation with criminological theory and undertaking a detailed examination of why 
and how CCTV systems affect crime.’243 
 
The London Underground.244 
In November 1975, four London Underground stations were equipped with CCTV. This installation came 
following a year of ‘special policing measures’ in the vicinity to combat ‘muggings’, which had become 
somewhat of a plague on a number of Underground stations, including the four to be surveilled. 
Recorded offence statistic covering robberies, thefts and assaults with intent to rob (muggings) in the 
Underground stations between October 1973 and November 1976 were utilised.245 Even though the risk 
of falling victim to a robbery or theft on the Underground was extremely small,246 the southern sector, 
including the stations where CCTV was installed, carried a disproportionately high risk of victimisation. 
Consequently, special police patrols were launched in 1974 and were removed in December 1975 
following the introduction of CCTV. Notices were used and the cameras and monitoring units were quite 
                                                          
241 Skinns (1998), pages 183-184. 
242 Ibid, pages 185-186. 
243 Ibid, page 186. 
244 Burrows.  The Impact of Closed Circuit Television on Crime in the London Underground.  In Mayhew, Clarke, Burrows, 
Hough & Winchester.  Crime in Public View.  Home Office Research Study No. 49. Home Office Research Unit.  Her 
Majesty’s Stationary Office.  London.  1979 
245 Burrows (1979), page 21-22.  In relation to the number of recorded offences, Mayhew et al concede that the figures 
used would not accurately reflect the actual incidence of such offences – not all offences are reported by victims; those 
that are reported may not all be recorded by the authorities – particularly if the victims were tourists not be easily 
contactable meaning their data remains incomplete and unverified; some offences are only discovered by the victims 
after leaving the Underground and so may not be attributed to the Underground.  Mayhew et al at page 22. 
246 One robbery for every 8.4 million journeys (i.e. journey stages) taken and one theft for every 173,000 journeys taken.  
Burrows (1979), pages 22-23. 
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conspicuous. Data from the first year following installation and the year prior to the special police patrols 
was compared between the four surveilled stations and other Underground stations, particularly in the 
southern sector.  Results from the evaluation were as follows:247 
 
(a) Thefts were almost four times lower, which was a significantly greater decline than at the other 
fifteen southern sector stations analysed and a slightly greater decline than at the remaining 
stations. 
(b) The occurrence of robberies was low to start with; however, this decreased following 
installation, while the incidence increased in the other fifteen southern stations and doubled in 
the remaining stations. 
(c) In relation to displacement, it was concluded that temporal displacement did not arise as CCTV 
operated continuously, however some geographical displacement to the other stations could 
not be dismissed, nor could displacement to outside the Underground. Analysis showed theft 
rates fell by 27% in the other fifteen unsurveilled southern sector stations, while the decrease 
in the remaining stations was 39% – the difference being significant and suggestive of 
geographical displacement. Of those fifteen stations surrounding the CCTV-covered stations, the 
seven closest – with the most similar crime rates to begin with – experienced the lowest 
decrease of 24%, while the eight furthest away experienced a 45% decrease. The incidence of 
robberies was too low to draw any conclusions on displacement. 
 
The evaluation concluded that CCTV appeared to have proved useful in its first year and, on foot of the 
analysis, it was extended to six central stations. Conspicuous cameras, their continuous monitoring, 
communication between monitors and police and publicity seemed to have operated a deterrent effect. 
Burrows, however warned that this may be a novelty effect, which would fade with time and encouraged 
further monitoring of CCTV’s performance in the London Underground.248 
 
Welsh and Farrington’s Meta-analysis.249 
The evaluations above are but a small selection of the many CCTV studies undertaken, which display 
some similar and some divergent findings. To achieve a more general impression of the effect of CCTV 
on crime, the Home Office commissioned a review of all the methodologically reliable CCTV evaluations. 
By looking at a wide range of reliable evaluations, it was thought that general conclusions on what works 
to reduce crime would be more attainable rather than confining the examination setting and thereby 
localising any findings. To undertake this cumulative assessment of the effectiveness of CCTV, Welsh and 
                                                          
247 Burrows (1979), pages 26-27. 
248 In 1992, Webb & Laycock evaluated two other London Underground CCTV programmes and found there to be mixed 
results. The first programme in six stations at the south end of the northern line showed a greater decrease in robberies 
compared to the two control areas (62.3% as against 50% and 12.2%). There was no evidence of robbery displacement 
apparent, while there was evidence of a diffusion of benefits. The second programme took place at Oxford Circus 
Station, however, did not display such positive results. Robberies increased by almost 50% in the experimental area 
compared to just over 20% in the control area.  Welsh & Farrington.  Crime Prevention Effects of Closed Circuit Television: 
A Systematic Review.  Home Office Research, Development & Statistics Directorate.  London.  2002, pages 28-32.  See 
further Webb & Laycock.  Reducing Crime on the London Underground: An Evaluation of Three Pilot Projects.  Crime 
Prevention Unit Series Paper 30.  Home Office.  London.  1992. 
249 Welsh & Farrington (2002), page 3.  Welsh & Farrington speak of the nature and methodology of this review 
technique – ‘Systematic reviews use rigorous methods for locating, appraising and synthesising evidence from prior 
evaluation studies, and they are reported with the same level of detail that characterises high quality reports of original 
research … They have explicit objectives, explicit criteria for including or excluding studies, extensive searches for eligible 
evaluation studies from all over the world, careful extraction and coding of key features of studies, and a structured and 
detailed report of the methods and conclusions of the review.’ 
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Farrington assembled forty six evaluations from Britain and North America, according to strict 
methodological criteria.250 These criteria included: 
 
(a) CCTV was the main and most important intervention – otherwise it would be impossible to 
disaggregate the impacts of the various interventions. 
(b) Crime rates before and after the intervention were compared, with the minimum before 
intervention total number of crimes being twenty. 
(c) There was an outcome measure of crime – the most relevant being property and violent crimes. 
(d) At least one experimental and one comparable control area were included. 
 
Of the forty-six studies selected, only twenty-two fulfilled these criteria satisfactorily. These evaluations 
were situated in three types of setting – city centre or public housing, public transport and car parks. 
The following gives a summary of the main findings:251 
 
 Of the twenty-two, eleven displayed a desirable effect on crime; five showed an undesirable 
effect; in five, there was clear evidence of null effect and in the remaining study, there was no 
clear evidence of an effect.   
 Eighteen of the twenty-two studies had the data required for the meta-analysis. Of those, nine, 
all of which were British, showed a desirable effect on crime, with the other nine displaying no 
evidence of a desirable effect. All five studies from North America were in this category. The 
overall reduction was 4%. 
 The five studies looking at violent crimes showed CCTV had no effect (Cambridge 2002, Burnley 
1999, Montreal Metro 1997, London Underground 1992, London Underground-Oxford Circus 
Station 1992), while the eight evaluations involving vehicle offences indicated CCTV had a 
significant impact.252 Together with Cambridge 2002, Newcastle 1995 and Burnley 1999, four of 
the five car park evaluations (Hartlepool 1993, Coventry 1993, Bradford 1993 and Sutton 1995) 
showed a desirable effect on vehicle crime and one displayed an undesirable effect (Guildford 
1991).253 
                                                          
250 Welsh & Farrington, pages 3-4. 
251 Ibid, pages 41-45. 
252 Ibid, page 34. 
253 Welsh & Farrington, pages 37 and 39.  The studies mentioned above are:   
Farrington, Bennett & Welsh.  Rigorous Evaluations of the Effects of CCTV on Crime.  Unpublished Manuscript.  Institute 
of Criminology, University of Cambridge.  Cambridge.  2002.  (Cambridge 2002);  Armitage, Smyth & Pease.  Burnley 
CCTV Evaluation.  In Painter & Tilley (Eds.) Surveillance of Public Space:  CCTV, Street Lighting & Crime Prevention.  
(Clarke (Ed) Crime Prevention Studies.  Volume 10).  Criminal Justice Press.  New York.  1999. (Burnley 1999);   
Grandmaison & Tremblay.  Evaluation des Effects de la Tele-Surveillance sur la Criminalite commise dans 13 Stations du 
Metro de Montreal. (1997) 30 Criminologie. 93 (Montreal Metro 1997);   
Burrows.  The Impact of Closed Circuit Television on Crime in the London Underground.  In Mayhew, Clarke, Burrows, 
Hough & Winchester.  Crime in Public View.  Home Office Research Study No. 49.  Home Office.  London.  1979.  (London 
Underground 1979);  
Webb & Laycock.  Reducing Crime on the London Underground: An Evaluation of Three Pilot Projects.  Crime Prevention 
Unit Series Paper 30.  Home Office.  London.  1992.  (London Underground 1992, London Underground-Oxford Circus 
Station 1992);   
Brown.  CCTV in Town Centres: Three Case Studies.  Crime Detection & Prevention Series.  Home Office.  London.  1995 
(Newcastle 1995);   
Tilley.  Understanding Car Parks, Crime & CCTV: Evaluation Lessons from Safer Cities.  Crime Prevention Unit Series Paper 
42.  Home Office.  London.  1993.  (Hartlepoole, Coventry & Bradford 1993);   
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 In the city centre/public housing setting,254 overall there was a slight reduction in crime of 2% in 
the experimental areas compared to the control areas. There was a small, but significant effect 
in the five British evaluations concerned (a desirable effect in Birmingham 1995, Doncaster 1998 
and Burnley 1999; an undesirable effect in Newcastle 1995 and Cambridge 2002) and no effect 
on the four studies from the United States (New York 1978 and three in Cincinnati 2000).255 
Evidence of a diffusion of benefits was apparent in more studies than was evidence of 
displacement. 
 Of the four public transport evaluations,256 two studies showed a positive effect (London 
Underground 1979 and 1992), one showed no effect (Montreal Metro 1997) and the other 
showed an undesirable effect on crime (London Underground – Oxford Station 1992). Because 
the sites of the desirable effects hosted a package of crime prevention measures, for example 
notices, special police patrols, mirrors and passenger alarms, the specific impact of CCTV could 
not be ascertained. The overall crime reduction in the public transport evaluations was a 6% 
decrease, which was not significant. Only the London Underground 1979 and London 
Underground 1992 studies examined displacement and diffusion of benefits and evidence of 
both was found. 
 The most notable effect of CCTV is seen in the five car park evaluations (Guilford 1991, Hartlepool 
1993, Bradford 1993, Coventry 1993 and Sutton 1995-1996),257 where a significant decrease of 
41% was evident in experimental areas compared to the control areas. As with the public 
transportation studies, which indicated effectiveness, CCTV was not an isolated crime prevention 
strategy in these car parks. Improved lighting, the cutting-back of foliage and so on may have 
also influenced offending rates. Displacement and diffusion of benefits were largely ignored in 
these evaluations. 
 
Having analysed quite a substantial collection of evaluations, Welsh and Farrington arrived at a number 
of conclusions in relation to the research methodologies employed. The methodological shortcomings 
of some evaluations undermined their integrity and limited their value to the crime control debate. 
Welsh and Farrington recommend focussing on comparable experimental and control areas over longer 
periods of time, when assessing the impact of a crime prevention initiative and its durability. They also 
identified the need for research on the financial costs and benefits of CCTV, on the CCTV ‘dose-response 
relationship’258 and research to pinpoint the ‘active ingredients’ of successful CCTV programmes.259 This 
more in depth category has also been advocated and largely pioneered by the likes of Tilley and Pawson 
with their ‘realistic evaluation’, which will be discussed later in this chapter.260  
                                                          
Sarno.  Impact of CCTV on Crime.  In Bulos (Ed.).  Towards a Safer Sutton? Impact of Closed Circuit Television on Sutton 
Town Centre.  London Borough of Sutton.  London.  1995.  (Sutton 1995);  
Poyner.  Situational Crime Prevention in Two Parking Facilities.  (1991) 2 Security Journal 96.  (Guildford 1991). 
254 Welsh & Farrington, pages 13-27.  
255 The studies mentioned above are:   
Brown.  CCTV in Town Centres: Three Case Studies.  Crime Detection & Prevention Series.  Home Office.  London.  1995 
(Birmingham 1995);   
Skinns.  Crime Reduction, Diffusion & Displacement: Evaluating the Effectiveness of CCTV.  In Norris, Moran & Armstrong.  
Surveillance, Closed Circuit Television & Social Control.  Ashgate.  Aldershot.  1998.  (Doncaster 1998);   
Musheno, Levine & Palumbo.  Television Surveillance & Crime Prevention: Evaluating an Attempt to create Defensible 
Space in Public Housing.  (1978) 58 Social Science Quarterly 647. (New York City 1978);  
Mazerolle, Hurley & Chamlin.  Social Behaviour in Public Space: An Analysis of Behavioural Adaptations to CCTV.  
Unpublished Manuscript.  Griffith University, Queensland.  Australia.  2000.  (Cincinnati 2000). 
256 Welsh & Farrington, pages 27-34. 
257 Welsh & Farrington, pages 34-39. 
258 CCTV dose-relationship refers to the number of cameras required to achieve an effect or result. 
259 Welsh & Farrington, page 43. 
260 See note 146 and the accompanying text. 
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Phillips’ Meta-analysis.261 
While it could be said that Welsh and Farrington’s meta-analysis looked primarily at the settings in which 
CCTV is utilised as a crime prevention strategy, Phillips’ review could equally be said to focus on the 
types of crime it impacts. This review employed the Tilley/realistic evaluation model as a guide to 
determine the mechanics of CCTV operation in the included studies.262 Suffice it to say for the moment 
that this method involves determining the specific outcome (i.e. offence reduction) of the crime 
prevention measure resulting from the firing of its mechanism(s) (i.e. effective deployment) in the 
particular context (i.e. numerous security staff in proximity).263 Because Phillips’ undertook a meta-
analysis, she relied on already assembled data by the previous evaluators. Consequently, the data 
available was oftentimes limited and insufficient to fully determine which mechanism was being fired in 
which context to attain the particular outcome. As a result, she used the Tilley method as a guide rather 
than a rigid structure. She also identified a number of other difficulties to accurately assessing the 
performance of CCTV, namely displacement, diffusion of benefits and detections.264 The first two come 
into existence when the effect of CCTV spills over into usually the adjacent or neighbouring areas in 
either a negative or a positive way respectively. She warns that a number of the evaluations included in 
her review do not comprehensively engage with displacement and diffusion, which may overstate or 
understate the impact of CCTV on the experimental area. Similarly, what may appear to be an increase 
in offending may, in actual fact, be an increase in detection.  Conversely, the installation of CCTV may 
lead the public to abdicate any duty they may have once felt to report offences. As a result, apparent 
crime rates may not be real crime rates and Phillips recommends the use of victimisation surveys to 
ascertain rates of greater accuracy. This review assessed the performance of CCTV in relation to property 
crimes, personal crimes, public order offences and fear of crime. The results are summarised as follows: 
 
 In relation to property crimes, Phillips found promising, mixed and negligible impacts on crime in 
the various evaluations included in her meta-analysis. The positive findings, for example included, 
Newcastle, where Brown found in his 1995 study that there was a reduction in the total number of 
incidents for all property offences after CCTV installation. The reduction was maintained in regard 
to burglary and criminal damage, but offences such as theft of and from vehicles experiences a fade 
effect with time. Brown gathered some evidence of diffusion, but none of displacement.265 In Tilley’s 
study of a car park in Hull in 1993, it was found that criminal damage to vehicles fell by 45%, theft 
from vehicles reduced by 76% and theft of vehicles dropped by 89% following the installation of 
CCTV.266 
 
Mixed results included Skinns’ study in Doncaster, which was discussed earlier.267 There thefts from 
and of vehicles fell; however other offences such as assault and criminal damage did not. Evidence 
of both diffusion and displacement was found. Poyner’s evaluation of CCTV effectiveness in a 
university car park in Surrey showed a reduction in theft from vehicles from ninety-two crimes in 
                                                          
261 Phillips.  A Review of CCTV Evaluations: Crime Reduction Effects & Attitudes towards its Use.  In Painter & Tilley (Eds.) 
Surveillance of Public Space:  CCTV, Street Lighting & Crime Prevention.  (Clarke (Ed) Crime Prevention Studies.  Volume 
10).  Criminal Justice Press.  New York.  1999. 
262 Phillips, pages 125-127. 
263 The Tilley model will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.  See further note 146 and the accompanying 
text below.  
264 Phillips, pages 127-128. 
265 Ibid, page 129.  See further Brown.  CCTV in Town Centres: Three Case Studies.  Crime Detection & Prevention Series.  
Home Office.  London.  1995. 
266 Phillips, page 131.  See further Tilley.  Understanding Car Parks, Crime & CCTV: Evaluation Lessons from Safer Cities.  
Crime Prevention Unit Series Paper 42.  Home Office.  London.  1993.  This study is dealt with in greater detail later in 
this chapter.  See further note 148 and the accompanying text.   
267 See above note 108 and the accompanying text. 
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1985, the year CCTV was introduced, to thirty-one in 1986. However, little impact was made on 
criminal damage rates.268 
 
An example of a negligible impact by CCTV is seen in Musheno et al’s evaluation of CCTV in a New 
York housing project, where no crime reduction effect was evident. Cameras were placed in the 
lobbies and elevators of three housing blocks, with residents monitoring on their televisions. When 
surveyed, only 14% of residents said they viewed the images at least once a day and given that 
much crime was committed by residents, deterrence was not particularly active. Four of the eight 
crime types increased after installation, while the remaining four experienced a negligible 
reduction.269 
 
 As regards personal crime and public order offences, mixed results seem to be the order of the day. 
In Kings Lynn, Brown found a decrease in assaults and woundings after the installation of CCTV, 
because the police had defused situations before they escalated into offences.270 Sivarajasingam 
and Shepherd observed a 24% drop in police recorded violent crime in Rhyl town centre in Wales, 
while they also noted an increase of 35% in assaults in emergency rooms records. Swansea 
displayed a similar discrepancy, while Cardiff showed a 20% increase in police recorded assaults, 
but emergency room records showed a 12% decrease.271 This underlines the need to broaden data 
sources in the quest for accuracy. 
 
Phillips concludes that CCTV may be quite effective on property crimes in certain settings, such as car 
parks, but not so effective, for example where the rationale behind installation was faulty.272 The 
deterrent potential of CCTV does not appear to have an impact on personal violence or public order 
offences. However, Phillips points to Brown’s argument that CCTV enables effective deployment, the 
prevention of incident escalation and efficient post-event investigation in relation to these offence 
types.273 She recommends further research to ascertain the mechanisms by which CCTV operates to 
have a positive impact on crime.  Research to date, where it has explored mechanisms, seems to indicate 
deterrence holds more potential than the apprehension of offenders in the crime reduction stakes.274 
The evaluation framework for future research advocated by Phillips is the Tilley method, which seeks to 
delve deeper into how exactly CCTV works, when it does ‘work’. Research of this nature promises to be 
invaluably instructive to crime prevention policymakers and practitioners. What follows is an analysis of 
what is known as the Tilley model or the realistic evaluation method. 
 
 
How does CCTV effect this impact? – The Tilley Model 
 
Pawson and Tilley put forward a very rudimentary, and yet not so frequently addressed question.275 The 
effectiveness of CCTV initiatives seems to be most evident in combating vehicle crime in car parks – just 
what is it about CCTV that makes it effective? Pawson and Tilley conclude that the CCTV camera takes 
                                                          
268 Phillips, pages 133-134.  See further Poyner.  Situational Crime Prevention in Two Parking Facilities.  In Clarke (Ed.).  
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies.  Harrow & Heston.  New York.  1992. 
269 Phillips, page 135.  See further Musheno, Levine & Palumbo.  Television Surveillance & Crime Prevention: Evaluating 
an Attempt to create Defensible Space in Public Housing.  (1978) 58 Social Science Quarterly 647  
270 Ibid, page 136.  See further Brown (1995) 
271 Ibid, page 136.  See further Sivarajasingam & Shepherd.  Effect of Closed Circuit Television on Urban Violence.  (1999) 
26 Journal of Accident & Emergency Medicine 225. 
272 Such faulty reasoning was evident in the New York housing study by Musheno et al, where reliance on residents 
monitoring the system undermined any deterrent potential, given that most residents did not monitor the system and 
many offences were perpetrated by residents knowing of the absence of a diligent monitor. 
273 Phillips, page 141.   See further Brown (1995). 
274 Ibid, page 142-143. 
275 Pawson & Tilley.  Realistic Evaluation.  Sage Publications.  London.  1997.  Pages 78-82. 
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effect by triggering ‘a chain of reasoning and reaction’276 and through their realist evaluation, they seek 
to identify the mechanisms and contexts in which CCTV factors into the thought-process of the potential 
offender, causes them to desist and leads to the realisation of the crime control capabilities of 
surveillance. 
 
Tilley undertook answering this question when he applied what has become known as the ‘Tilley model’ 
in assessing the effectiveness of CCTV on the rate of vehicle crime in a number of car parks in the early 
1990s.277 Firstly, however, his reasons for targeting this category of crime in this particular setting should 
be established. His justification for doing so is clearly evident when looking at the relevant crime 
figures.278 The most recent Home Office crime statistics available to him at the time (July 1991 to June 
1992) revealed that vehicle crime constituted 28% of all recorded crime in England and Wales, having 
increased by 7% on the previous year. According to the British Crime Survey undertaken by Mayhew and 
Aye Maung in 1992, 99% of the 571, 700 vehicle thefts were reported and 93% were recorded. 53% of 
the 931, 300 thefts from vehicles were reported and 32% were recorded.  Mayhew and Aye Maung also 
discovered that in the decade from 1981 to 1991, according to both police recorded crime figures and 
British Crime Survey data, attempted theft of and from vehicles saw the greatest rise, with respective 
increases of 336% and 395%. This clearly displays the height of activity of car thieves. In light of these 
figures, it is easy to see why vehicle offences would capture attention. While Hope, using the 1984 British 
Crime Survey, found that most of these offences tend to occur in the locality of the driver’s residence, 
Webb, Brown and Bennett concluded that on average 20% of thefts from vehicles and 22% of thefts of 
vehicle occurred in car parks. This suggested car parks as the likely setting for evaluation. In using the 
‘Tilley model’, Tilley made it clear that pinpointing exactly what it was that gave CCTV the potential to 
reduce vehicle crime and deducing the optimum circumstances for the most effective exercise of this 
potential should be of the utmost importance to those involved in crime control policy and practice.279 
Consequently, delving deeper than the traditional ‘does it or doesn’t it work?’ he phrased his evaluation 
question – ‘under what initial circumstances (context) and how can CCTV be used (mechanism) to reduce 
specified car crimes and for how long (outcome pattern)?’280 
 
A mechanism fired by a crime prevention measure is the way in which it achieves a particular outcome 
or result in a particular context. The context referred to is the set of conditions required for the crime 
prevention strategy to fire its potential mechanisms to produce that result. Logically then, the outcome 
pattern is the practical effect(s) of the mechanism fired in the particular context – for instance, the type 
of crime reduced through deterrence, detection and disablement or displacement and whether the 
effect was short term or enduring.281 Tilley explains the thrust of realistic evaluation is ‘to construct 
context-mechanism-outcome pattern configurations’, which ‘specify contextual conditions for triggering 
identified mechanisms to generate particular outcome patterns.’282 
 
 
                                                          
276 Ibid, page 78. 
277 Tilley.  Understanding Car Parks, Crime & CCTV: Evaluation Lessons from Safer Cities.  Home Office Police Research 
Group.  Crime Prevention Unit Series Paper No. 42.  London.  1993.  Tilley evaluated the CCTV schemes installed under 
the Safer Cities programme in Hartlepool, Hull, Lewisham, Bradford, Coventry and Wolverhampton.  
278 Tilley (1993), page 1.  Tilley cites figures and conclusions reached in the following:  Hope.  Residential Aspects of 
Autocrime.  1987 Research Bulletin No.23 28.  Mayhew & Aye Maung.  Surveying Crime: Findings from the 1992 British 
Crime Survey.  Research Findings No.2.  Home Office Research & Statistics Department.  1992.  Webb, Brown & Bennett.  
Preventing Car Crime in Car Parks.  Crime Prevention Unit Paper 34.  Home Office.  London.  1992. 
279 Tilley (1993), page 2. 
280 Tilley (1993), page 6. 
281 Other outcome patterns would include increased detection, increased or decreased usage by different groups, 
improved profitability of business, altered distribution of crime and/or incivilities and so on.  See further Tilley (1998), 
pages 147-148.   
282 Tilley (1998), page 148. 
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Pawson and Tilley have identified some of the mechanisms typically launched by CCTV and the contexts 
in which those mechanisms might operate: 
 
Mechanisms:283 
 The ‘caught in the act’/removal mechanism is whereby an actual perpetrator is observed offending, 
arrested, punished and deterred. 
 The ‘you’ve been framed’ mechanism arises where the risk of apprehension and conviction based 
on video evidence of their exploits is enough to deter potential offenders. 
 The effective deployment mechanism involves CCTV facilitating the deterrence of potential 
offenders and the apprehension and removal of actual offenders through the effective and targeted 
distribution of security personnel or police in response to observed suspicious behaviour. 
 The publicity mechanism operates where the combination of CCTV and associated signage represent 
a serious attitude towards crime and its reduction. Potential offenders may apprehend an increased 
risk of detection and punishment because of the perception of a greater commitment to crime 
reduction. Usage of the area may increase due to the perception of greater security, thereby 
augmenting natural surveillance and consequently also the risk of apprehension. 
 The time for crime mechanism takes effect where the time available to commit a particular offence 
is a matter for consideration.284 The more time a crime takes to commit, the greater the probability 
that security personnel or the police will be deployed or that the offender will be captured on CCTV 
footage. Offences that are committed in shorter periods of time are less likely to be affected by this 
particular mechanism. 
 The memory jogging mechanism functions when CCTV and its notices remind individuals that they 
or their property may be vulnerable and spur them on to take precautions for their own security. 
 The appeal to the cautious mechanism operates when those most security-conscious frequent an 
area with CCTV coverage. The combination of a cautious attitude, the consequent employment of 
additional security devices and CCTV surveillance provides an overall synergetic increase in 
protection of the area. 
 
Contexts:285 
 The criminal clustering context – the number of offences in a given area is attributable to a number 
of offenders. For example, one hundred recorded car crimes might be the work of a single very 
active individual, a number of individuals or a group of individuals. Removing an offender, for 
example through the ‘caught in the act’ mechanism, could significantly alter the offender-offence 
ratio. 
 The style of usage context – an area not regularly frequented may have a high per user crime rate. 
A CCTV-fired mechanism that increases usage, while increasing the number of offences, could 
reduce the per user rate. 
 The lie of the land context – an area falling in a camera blind spot will be vulnerable to crime. The 
‘caught in the act’ and ‘you’ve been framed’ mechanisms would be of little effect in this context, 
                                                          
283 Pawson & Tilley (1997), pages 78-79.  Also, Tilley (1993), pages 3-4 and Tilley (1998), page 147. 
284 Time here is what Cornish & Clarke term a ‘choice-structuring property’.  Refer to note 40 in Chapter 2: (Crime 
Prevention Strategies to combat Rational Choice Offenders) and the accompanying text.  See also Cornish & Clarke, 
Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application of Rational Choice Theory. In Henry & Einstadter, The Criminology 
Theory Reader.  New York University Press.  New York 1998.  Pages 47-49. 
285 Pawson & Tilley (1997), pages 79-80.  Also, Tilley (1993), pages 4-5 and Tilley (1998), pages 147-147. 
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however a mechanism which altered user attitudes, such as the ‘memory jogging’ mechanism could 
have a significant impact. 
 The alternative targets context – if there are other targets in the vicinity and offenders are so-
disposed, any of the mechanisms could operate to effect displacement away from the CCTV-
covered area. 
 The resource context – if an area is not fitted with adequate resources, for example security 
personnel or nearby police patrols, the effective deployment mechanism will not be fired 
effectively. 
 The surveillance culture context – the pervasiveness of CCTV surveillance throughout society and its 
portrayal in the media is reflected in the response it receives. 
 
Tilley clarifies that crime prevention strategies may fire any number of mechanisms and emphasises that 
whether a potential mechanism is fired at all and whether it is, in fact, effective will be dependent upon 
the given context. The implementation of the CCTV system will also have a considerable impact upon 
the mechanism firing potential. Tilley elaborates by reference to picture quality and monitoring. If the 
CCTV system installed does not offer clear footage, then it is unlikely that apprehension and conviction 
based on video evidence will result. Consequently, deterrence of potential offenders on foot of this risk 
will not be the crime prevention outcome. Similarly, in situations where CCTV is not monitored, the 
effective deployment mechanism will not be launched.286 As is evident in a number of evaluations, where 
the deterrence mechanism operates by way of a perceived increased risk of apprehension and that risk 
does not materialise, the crime reduction effect fades.287 Unless the perception of an increased risk is 
realised at least periodically and this is publicised, then offenders will regard the CCTV system as an 
empty gesture. 
 
Having established the goal of the evaluation – to ascertain in what context and how precisely CCTV 
operated to achieve a particular effect on crime – Tilley identified a number of characteristics, which 
marked a scheme as best suited to his realist evaluation:288 
1. Stipulation of the mechanism(s) intended to be launched. 
2. Analysis of how the system is to be implemented and operated so as to trigger the mechanism(s). 
3. Identification of the outcome-pattern expected. 
4. The employment of means to monitor implementation and operation to ensure optimal-
mechanism firing and to evaluate those fired mechanisms and their outcomes. 
 
To reiterate, Tilley’s objective in undertaking this realist evaluation was to identify how CCTV works best, 
when it does, by ascertaining the context-mechanism correlation most favourable to achieve the 
optimum outcome-pattern in a given setting. Engaging in this type of thematic study may well set in 
motion a trend of well-thought through and effective CCTV-directed crime control, rather than 
haphazardly installing CCTV systems without considering how to optimise their effect or to even have 
an effect in the first place. 
 
Following his examination of the car parks in the six Safer Cities urban centres of Hartlepool, Hull, 
Lewisham, Bradford, Coventry and Wolverhampton, Tilley determined that there was ‘quite strong 
evidence’ that CCTV ‘generally led to reductions’ in various types of vehicle offences. He conceded that 
                                                          
286 Tilley (1993), page 5. 
287 For an example of this ‘fade effect’, see note 166 below and the accompanying text regarding Hartlepool and the life 
cycle of crime prevention initiatives. 
288 Tilley (1993) at page 6. 
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given the attainable data, it was difficult to conclude with certainty which mechanisms operated and 
impossible to ascertain the extent of any temporal, spatial or functional displacement. From his 
observations, he was, however, able to surmise that:289 
 
1. CCTV systems do not need to be very technically advanced and continuous monitoring is not an 
essential requirement in order to have an effect in car parks. The Lewisham study concerned 
three fixed lens, unadjustable cameras and a dummy camera, which were not continuously 
monitored and were of poor playback quality.290 Even though data on the overall Lewisham 
crime rates were not available, it seemed that background patterns of offending would not 
account for the considerable reductions experienced – leaving CCTV together with the notices 
and substantial publicity campaign as the obvious explanation. The cost of initial installation in 
1991 was a little over £13,000 and because the system is relatively unsophisticated, subsequent 
expense was negligible. 
 
In most cases, images were not sufficiently clear to render identification possible and Hartlepool 
was the only location, where effective deployment was a likelihood.  There, the control room 
was continuously staffed and seven security officers were available (not simultaneously) for 
dispatch according to the monitor’s observations.  Guided by CCTV, deployment was effective 
and accurate.291 
 
2. Given the insignificant number of arrests after CCTV installation, the ‘caught in the act’ 
mechanism does not seem to effect any occurring reduction.292 Tilley goes on to question 
whether this would ever be the case in light of the fact that it would demand more highly 
sophisticated technology, greater manpower and resources to identify, pursue and convict 
offenders. For this mechanism to be fired, it would require a much more significant financial 
outlay and arguably, it would not be necessary to expend such amounts, when other 
mechanisms fired by CCTV alongside additional situational crime prevention measures succeeds 
in effecting reduction. 
 
3. CCTV works best when aligned with other crime prevention measures. In Hull, Coventry and 
Bradford, CCTV was installed together with lighting in the car parks, which were also painted.293 
In Lewisham, the potential for identifying offenders was publicised,294 while in Hartlepool, visible 
                                                          
289 Ibid, pages 23-25. 
290  The unsophisticated nature of the Lewisham system contrasts sharply with the Hartlepool scheme, which involved 
tilt, pan and zoom cameras with infra-red capability.  The Hartlepool cameras could be effectively used night and day, 
covering vast areas and still zooming in for closer detail.  They were continuously monitored with a band of security 
personnel awaiting deployment.  Tilley (1993), pages 14-15 regarding the Lewisham study and at pages 8-12 regarding 
Hartlepool. 
291 Tilley (1993), page 8. 
292 In Hartlepool, there were a number of well-publicised convictions on foot of CCTV evidence.  On some occasions, 
security personnel testified as to what they had witnessed, while on others, defence lawyers advised against contesting 
cases, having viewed the CCTV footage.  Tilley (1993) , page 8.  The Hartlepool scheme is by comparison sophisticated, 
rendering relatively useful evidence for prosecutions.   
293 Coventry, in particular, saw the periodic introduction of a battery of crime prevention measures with funding from 
Safer Cities. The height of walls was reduced, foliage was cut back and lighting was upgraded, all leading to improved 
visibility. High fencing was erected, thereby restricting pedestrian access. The Whitefriars car park, in particular, saw a 
considerable reduction in theft of and theft from vehicles consequent to the introduction of CCTV and fencing. Efforts 
to sustain the improved surveillance continued with the frequent trimming of foliage.  Tilley (1993), pages 18-21. 
294 Prominent notices declaring CCTV surveillance in the car park itself, substantial publicity in the local newspaper and 
visits by a patrol officer to the adjacent junior school ensured widespread awareness of the systems installation and the 
potential to identify culprits, thereby highlighting the perceived risk of apprehension for potential offenders and the 
encouragement of cautious behaviour among the car park users as the probable fired mechanisms.   Tilley (1993), page 
15. 
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security personnel were deployed and any successes were publicised. In Wolverhampton, Tilley 
found that this synergetic impact was least notable where the CCTV was least supported by other 
measures. By employing a number of measures, especially measures designed to complement 
each other, the impression that crime is being taken seriously is reinforced. Such a 
comprehensive strategy encourages the perception of an increased risk to potential offenders. 
 
4. Where the potential of CCTV for apprehension does not materialise, its effect fades. Its crime 
reduction potency can, however, be reignited by periodically, at least, casting the spotlight on 
its successes. For example, where CCTV led to an apprehension, the role it played should be 
emphasised, even to the point of over-statement, so that potential offenders can be in no doubt 
that CCTV poses a credible threat. Hartlepool showed signs of following the ‘life cycle of 
initiatives,’295 experiencing a fade effect. 
 
5. Many CCTV studies cover a relatively short period of time – most look at twelve months before 
and twelve months after installation. This short-spanned evaluation method inhibits any 
productive empirical analysis of the durability of the impact CCTV has on crime. This would 
facilitate the induction of a theoretical framework to direct the employment of either an ‘all 
systems’ or a ‘drip-feed’ approach when implementing a programme of crime prevention.  An 
‘all systems’ approach is where a package of measures is installed. While there is evidence that 
such a strategy is effective, it is questionable whether this effect will be sustained. Tilley’s study 
also found significant support for the ‘life cycle’ model, whereby intermittent surges of 
preventative activity encouraged a rejuvenation of effectiveness. In order to select the most 
suitable approach, it is necessary to identify the relevant context-mechanism partnership.   
 
6. Another conclusion induced by Tilley was that offenders perpetrating vehicle crimes do not 
experience homogeneous difficulties. Theft of vehicles and theft from vehicles incorporate 
different considerations for the offender. By the same token, preventative measures may not 
operate uniformly to combat the various subcategories of offence. Tilley uses the example of a 
fixed CCTV camera focussed on a pedestrian exit. While this may well increase the perceived risk 
to potential perpetrators of theft from vehicles, as their escape will more than likely be by foot, 
it is improbable that this measure would have any impact on the theft of vehicles. 
 
Tilley’s evaluation goes deeper than merely ascertaining whether or not CCTV was an effective crime 
reduction tool in the car park setting. He looks for the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ and cautions that post hoc 
evaluations will be confined by the data at hand.296 The gathering of data informed at the first instance 
by the context, mechanism and outcome-pattern framework promises to produce a most instructive 
evaluation containing specific conclusions. Successive evaluations of this more comprehensive and 
illuminating nature would collaborate to produce a ‘cumulative understanding of what can work in what 
circumstances,’297 with a more attainable aspiration of accuracy and efficiency in subsequent CCTV 
deployment. 
 
Gill and Turbin took their cue from Pawson and Tilley and employed the realistic evaluation method in 
two retail stores in Leeds. In undertaking this study, they had two aims – the first being an evaluation of 
                                                          
295 See more generally, Berry & Carter.  Assessing Crime Prevention Initiatives: The First Steps.  Crime Prevention Unit 
Paper 31.  Home Office.  London.  1992.  The vehicle offence rate in car park facilities throughout Hartlepool showed an 
overall downward trend prior to the introduction of CCTV. After the installation of CCTV, this continued in the covered 
car parks, while non-CCTV covered experienced an increase in vehicle offences. The significance of the reduction began 
to fade over time in the CCTV-covered car parks, with the underlying local trends beginning to reassert themselves. 
While this may be the ‘fade effect’ stage of the life cycle of crime preventative measures, Tilley ponders whether it 
might be attributable to temporary displacement from CCTV-covered to non-covered car parks.  Tilley (1993), page 9. 
296 Tilley (1993), page 25. 
297 Ibid, page 25. 
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the impact of CCTV in the retail stores and the second, an examination of the realistic evaluation 
methodology itself and its practicalities.298 
 
In their assessment of the impact of CCTV in the two stores, Gill and Turbin concluded that the dynamic 
between CCTV, staff and offenders merited further exploration. The role of staff in particular was a focal 
point given that staff proved to form part of the context and the mechanism elements of the context-
mechanism-outcome configurations. The effectiveness of CCTV was contingent upon the attitudes and 
involvement of staff, making CCTV a tool to combat shop theft rather than a silver bullet. It was 
concluded that training and involvement of management and staff in the operation of in-store CCTV 
systems would be pivotal in maximising the mechanism-firing potential of CCTV. Where staff was 
positively disposed towards installation, they engaged with it in the performance of their security duties. 
The firing of one mechanism was made evident in some staff interviews, in which it was explained that 
the presence of CCTV increased staff confidence in approaching and confronting suspects – increased 
challenging by staff may operate as a deterrent to would-be shoplifters. Whereas the mechanism 
proposing that staff would become over-reliant on CCTV and therefore less vigilant themselves seemed 
to be largely rejected. It was hypothesised that in fact the opposite was true – CCTV accentuated staff 
awareness of security. Another mechanism proposed that CCTV tapes would be of evidentiary use in the 
prosecution of offenders. Given that only two prosecutions followed the transfer to tapes to the police, 
it was submitted that CCTV in these retail stores operated as a deterrent rather than the facilitation of 
prosecutions.299 Overall, Gill and Turbin deduced that some of their twelve suggested mechanisms did 
fire in the contexts of these retail stores, while others did not – the upshot being that security managers 
and crime prevention practitioners in general should be context-mechanism sensitive in order to avoid 
the futile and inappropriate deployment of CCTV. The methodology of realistic evaluation serves this 
task well. 
 
In relation to this methodology, Gill and Turbin profess it bestows a very promising future upon crime 
prevention strategy evaluations; however they do concede that it will require refinement. This 
innovative method provides a logical framework, which enables a comprehensive examination of how a 
crime control initiative effects a particular impact. According to Gill and Turbin, ‘the methodology 
demonstrates that by identifying ‘how’ CCTV impacts on theft it is possible to begin to understand in 
what circumstances a similar effect may be produced elsewhere.’300 They go as far as to suggest that an 
apparent ‘failure’ by a CCTV scheme to impact upon crime levels may, in fact, be attributable to the 
context in which it was expected to perform as opposed to the incompetence of the system itself.301 By 
delving behind the ‘does it or doesn’t it work’ façade to ascertain the mechanics of its effect, CCTV can 
be accurately and efficiently deployed, thereby ensuring the firing of the optimal mechanism(s) in the 
particular context to achieve the desired outcome. Even though realistic evaluation does not make such 
a smooth transition into practical research results, Gill and Turbin claim this is not an insurmountable 
problem. The primary difficulty posed is that of data collection. The Tilley model adds further dimensions 
to the evaluation process.  This inevitably increases the volume and impacts the nature of the data 
required to render realistic evaluation more than a mere theory. Nevertheless, the Tilley method of 
evaluation has the potential to culminate in the deployment of appropriate, effective and efficient crime 
prevention strategies. 
 
                                                          
298 For a more detailed discussion of the first of Gill & Turbin’s aims, refer to Gill & Turbin.  CCTV & Shop Theft: Towards 
a Realistic Evaluation.  In Norris, Moran & Armstrong (1998).  In relation to the second aim, see Gill & Turbin.  Evaluating 
‘Realistic Evaluation’: Evidence from a Study of CCTV.  In Painter & Tilley (1999). (Eds.) Surveillance of Public Space:  
CCTV, Street Lighting & Crime Prevention.  (Clarke (Ed) Crime Prevention Studies.  Volume 10).  Criminal Justice Press.   
New York.  1999. 
299 Gill & Turbin (1998), pages 194-197.  These are just three of the twelve mechanisms explored by Gill & Turbin.  See 
further Gill & Turbin (1998), pages 194-200. 
300 Ibid, page 201. 
301 Gill & Turbin (1998), page 201. 
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In order to do this, such evaluations must first distill what makes such crime prevention measures 
effective. Arguably, the effort by Gill and Spriggs is the most robust such evaluation to date, when they 
undertook an evaluation of 13 CCTV projects.302 Their research led them to arrive at a number of most 
enlightening and informative observations, which will undoubtedly instruct future deployment of CCTV. 
The following summarises a number of those conclusions:303 
 
1. The usefulness of crime rates in evaluating CCTV effectiveness is overestimated. An increase in 
crime rates can indicate the successful firing of a crime detection mechanism. However, where 
such a mechanism is fired along with another, which reduces crime, the mechanisms can cancel 
each other out in terms of crime rates. This is another reinforcement of the need to delve deeper 
into CCTV’s effect. 
2. As well as reducing crime, the use of CCTV for evidentiary purposes should not be ignored. It can 
be employed to identify witnesses, perpetrators and victims, eliminate individuals from police 
enquiries and so on. 
3. CCTV should not be oversold as a ‘silver bullet’. What constitutes success should be determined 
at the outset and systems should be evaluated with reference to such objectives. It is imperative 
for such a tailored evaluation that the system is installed and managed in such a way as to strive 
towards these objectives. Otherwise, the system is destined to fail in the eyes of the evaluation. 
4. For the most part, CCTV seems to work best in smaller, enclosed areas, such as car parks and 
also some residential estates. The researchers did caution however that it could not be 
definitively concluded to what extent CCTV was responsible for any reductions. 
5. While a higher camera density does seem to correlate with greater crime reduction, this should 
not be taken for granted and the characteristics for each area should be considered. These 
include population density, area size and so on. 
6. ‘Acquisitive’ crimes such as vehicle theft seem to be most susceptible to CCTV’s impact. The 
Hawkeye car parks showed the most impressive results in this regard, but they did have the 
added advantage among others of being self-contained. 
7. CCTV schemes employed to target specific issues such as drug-related offences showed 
promising results. 
8. Control room studies indicated CCTV proved most effective, where there was a close and 
cooperative relationship between operators and the police. 
9. CCTV operates impressively when properly integrated with and used in compliment to other 
preventative measures such as Retail and Pub Radio, whereby intelligence can be circulated 
between operators, thereby optimising the effect of CCTV particularly in relation to retail crime 
in urban centres. 
10. Proper lighting will obviously impact upon the effectiveness if CCTV. 
11. The centralisation of monitoring can mean that one or more areas can suffer for the benefit of 
other more active areas. Quieter areas tend to be less monitored on a contemporary basis. 
                                                          
302 Gill & Spriggs.  Assessing the Impact of CCTV.  Home Office Research Study 292. Home Office Research, Development 
& Statistics Directorate.  London.  2005.  This evaluation in fact combined two methodologies, being the quasi-
experimental techniques and the realistic evaluation techniques. In brief, as far as the quasi-experimental model is 
concerned, the researchers compared changes in police recorded crime rates and fear of crime rates in the target area 
to those in comparable control areas. Public attitude studies were also carried out. In relation to the realistic evaluation 
model, various data sets were combined with observations, interviews, desk-based documentation study and so on.  
See further Gill & Spriggs, pages 123-135.   
303 Ibid, pages 115-121. 
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Evidence showed that where CCTV did have an impact on particular offences in quieter areas, it 
did so by way of deterrence and such areas enjoyed fewer on-the-spot apprehensions and 
provided less recorded evidence for police investigation. 
12. On the whole, the public’s feelings of safety did not increase in the presence of CCTV and for the 
most part, they perceived it to be less effective as regards crime reduction than first thought. 
Despite this, there was no urge to abandon CCTV and little evidence of any major concerns 
regarding civil liberties. 
 
Looking at these observations and conclusions, it is ease to conceive how a well-rounded, multi-
dimensional evaluation can be most effective in informing proper future deployment of crime 
prevention strategies. 
 
Asking the old question of whether or not CCTV works is not instructive.  The answer to that question is 
somewhat of a moveable feast. Different contexts and different mechanisms impact, producing different 
outcomes – some more desired than others. Ascertaining the success of CCTV as a crime control strategy 
depends on what constitutes ‘success’. Is it measured according to the number of offences not 
committed, the number of offences detected or the number of offences ‘cleared up’ by the police or all 
of the above? Enlightenment comes from ascertaining why, and how, CCTV works when it does work. 
Evaluations on the effect of CCTV need to exceed the boundaries of the traditional empirical studies. By 
broadening the scope of inquiry beyond a mere before-and-after comparison, it is possible to identify 
the ideal conditions for optimal CCTV effectiveness and its suitability in the first place, as well as how to 
maintain this effectiveness. As Pawson and Tilley conclude ‘without a theory of why CCTV may be 
effective, and a theory of the conditions which promote this potential, research into its usage is blind.’304 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
The emergence of the ‘risk’ and ‘stranger’ society and the consequent rise of actuarial justice have set 
the scene for the arrival of the surveillance as the ‘in vogue’ method of managing the crime predicament. 
This chapter briefly explored the theoretical basis for surveillance as a social control mechanism as a 
backdrop to the use of CCTV as a crime control mechanism. Tracing the path of surveillance from 
Bentham’s Panopticon up to today’s mass surveillance society provides an understanding as to how 
CCTV has come to be the primary situational crime prevention measure to tackle the rational choice 
offender. CCTV-fever seemed to take hold and pre-empt any comprehensive exploration of the merits 
and appropriateness of this form of surveillance. This void has more recently been addressed by the 
plethora of evaluations, which have uncovered quite a chequered performance record for CCTV. 
Frustration with mixed and ambiguous results has encouraged the abandonment of the original question 
of whether CCTV works in favour of the question ‘how does it work?’ 
 
This rephrasing of the evaluation question has proven, and undoubtedly will continue to prove, most 
instructive. It is steering crime prevention policy and practice in a more fruitful direction and suggests 
that even though CCTV may not be the silver bullet for crime, it is by no means a failure. While CCTV will 
not be suitable in every situation, existing data and research indicate that some settings, such as car 
parks, are more receptive to the impact of CCTV than others and certain categories of crime, particularly 
property offences, are more susceptible to its effect. Rather than making a sweeping claim on the 
effectiveness of CCTV, the Tilley model of evaluation shines a light in the direction of precisely-targeted 
CCTV deployment. The ability to identify the mechanics of CCTV effectiveness brings with it the potential 
to reproduce its ‘success’, potentially also in settings other than car parks and on offences other than 
vehicle crimes. It also endows practitioners with a framework from which to identify contexts, where an 
                                                          
304 Pawson & Tilley (1997), page 82. 
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effective CCTV mechanism will not be fired, therefore resources will not be wasted on futile deployment 
– instead, alternative, more suitable crime prevention initiatives can be employed. 
 
Because Britain has been the forerunner in this mass surveillance age, British, and to a much lesser 
extent, North American CCTV systems and evaluations have been the focus of this chapter. The next 
chapter will look at the developing net of CCTV surveillance in Ireland, and particularly Cork City’s CCTV 
system, and CCTV’s potential to effect crime control here. 
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Chapter 5: 
 
CCTV in Ireland – The Story so Far. 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
Up until relatively recently, public CCTV systems in Ireland had been instituted and controlled by An 
Garda Síochána. In June 2005 however, Michael McDowell, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
launched a Community Based CCTV Scheme, whereby local communities throughout the country would 
have the opportunity to install and maintain CCTV systems with a view to minimising criminal activity 
and anti-social behaviour and increasing public safety as a whole in their areas.305 The Scheme is set to 
provide funding to a number of successful applicants each year to support the introduction of CCTV into 
that local community. This is a relatively recent development in the Irish CCTV story and before it is 
explored further, it is prudent to trace the background to this latest event. 
 
While Britain enjoys a much more mature love affair with CCTV, dating back to the 1970s, Ireland’s 
experience of public CCTV is comparatively much younger. This is not to say, however, that Irish CCTV is 
unsophisticated. Rather it is fledgling in terms of its coverage, but that is changing. The lessons learned 
through Britain’s decades of experience with CCTV have been taken on board here. The previous chapter 
detailed the power of surveillance as a social control mechanism and the rise of CCTV as the most 
prevalent form of surveillance. To date British society is the most surveilled in the world. Having said 
that, even though the amount of research undertaken on the effect of CCTV as a crime control 
mechanism is increasing, it still pales in comparison to the proliferation of CCTV itself. Though Ireland 
has an amount of ground to make up before it reaches the same concentrations of surveillance 
experienced in Britain, we are not plagued by a similar dearth of research on the impact of CCTV on 
crime levels in Irish society. Currently out of the nine ‘established’ public area CCTV systems, six have 
been evaluated.306 It can only be prudent to continue to engage in localised studies of the effects of 
surveillance and CCTV in particular in Ireland and with the realisation of the Community-Based CCTV 
Scheme, it is hoped that the resultant golden opportunity to continue this impetus will not go abegging 
in the coming years. There have been a number of quite significant reports completed to date on the 
use of CCTV.307 Unfortunately, not all of those reports are currently accessible due to the fact that they 
                                                          
305 Minister Launches Grants for Community CCTV Systems.  Progressive Democrats Press Release.  15th June 2005.  
Available at http://www.progressivedemocrats.ie/press_room/1444/ 
See also O Cuiv welcomes Community Based CCTV Scheme in RAPID Areas.  Department of Community, Rural & Gaeltacht 
Affairs Press Release.  15th June 2005.  Available at 
http://www.pobail.ie/en/PressReleases/2005/June/htmltext,6264,en.html. 
306 In order to evaluate a CCTV system, it has to be operational for a certain period of time before sufficient data can be 
accumulated for use in the evaluation. More recent systems are not yet ready for evaluation. These six established 
systems are operated and have been evaluated by An Garda Síochána. Unfortunately, many of the evaluations are as 
yet not readily accessible for operational reasons. 
307 Kavanagh, D. Towards Economic Evaluation of Closed Circuit Television in Public Places as an Aid to An Garda 
Síochána. The Institute of Public Administration, Dublin.  (Unpublished Dissertation).  1999. 
O’Dwyer, K. & Furey, M.  CCTV in Dublin & Tralee – Preliminary Evaluation.  Research Report No. 1/00.  Garda Research 
Unit.  Templemore.  (Unpublished Report).  2000. 
Parsons, S.  Watching the Watchers:  An Garda Síochána & CCTV in Dublin’s North City Centre.  Trinity College, Dublin. 
(Unpublished Dissertation).  2001.  
Lynch, E. Evaluation of CCTV in Dun Laoghaire.  Research Report No. 7/06.  Garda Research Unit.  Templemore.  
(Unpublished Report) 2006. 
Lynch, E. Evaluation of CCTV in Dundalk.  Research Report No. 8/06.  Garda Research Unit. Templemore.  (Unpublished 
Report) 2006. 
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contain sensitive operational material, whose confidential status An Garda Síochána has seen fit to 
maintain.308 Consequently, any analysis of the research completed on the impact of CCTV in Ireland will 
be limited. What follows is a history of the use of public CCTV in Ireland, an examination of its future 
trajectory and an exploration of the accessible research that has been completed. 
 
 
The Road to Public CCTV in Ireland. 
 
Kavanagh, in his 1999 unpublished dissertation Towards Economic Evaluation of Closed Circuit Television 
in Public Places as an Aid to An Garda Síochána, tells of how An Garda Síochána has nurtured the 
expansion of public town centre surveillance systems.309 One very significant step came in 1996 with the 
drafting of a policy document by the Garda Commissioner.310 This document was distributed throughout 
Ireland’s Garda Divisions with a view to standardising the implementation and use of CCTV systems. 
While the document advocated the expansion of town centre surveillance, it was adamant that CCTV 
would be a tool to aid An Garda Síochána rather that a replacement for Gardaí on the street. As well as 
including a code of practice setting out the duties of those involved and the handling of video recordings, 
this policy document also signalled the establishment of an Advisory Committee comprised of Senior 
Garda Officers together with Garda telecommunication specialists. The role of this committee was to be 
one of oversight. It was to monitor the implementation of the Garda CCTV programme and prioritise 
applications. In the spirit of cooperation and increased ‘civilianisation’ in the force, the policy document 
envisaged local Gardaí consulting with interested parties when CCTV was being considered for a 
particular area and suggested that civilian personnel would undertake monitoring duties under direct 
Garda supervision, while overall management responsibilities would rest with An Garda Síochána. 
Funding would be primarily sourced from central government; however the local business community, 
which would be a major beneficiary, would be requested to contribute to the set-up and running costs 
of the system. 
 
 
The Realisation of Public CCTV in Ireland. 
 
By 1999 there were three public CCTV systems in operation in Ireland. The first such system was 
introduced in the Temple Bar area of Dublin in October 1995 with Pearse Street Garda Station being the 
monitoring centre. At the time of the introduction of the eight CCTV cameras into the area, Temple Bar 
was undergoing significant redevelopment and rejuvenation. Since then Temple Bar has thrived as one 
of Dublin’s mostly frequented districts and CCTV is seen as having contributed greatly to this. 
Consequently the Department of Justice together with the local business community funded the 
extension of the Temple Bar system onto the Grafton Street – St. Stephen’s Green area to incorporate a 
total of twenty four cameras.311 
 
Also in 1995, Tralee, Co. Kerry was the location of a pilot scheme, which saw four CCTV cameras 
strategically dispatched on a temporary basis in the town. The following year the system was expanded 
to twenty-four cameras and put on a permanent basis. Tralee Garda Station is the monitoring centre; 
                                                          
Browne, P. Evaluation of CCTV in Cork.  Research Report No. 15/07.  Garda Research Unit.  Templemore.  (Unpublished 
Report) 2007. 
308 Of the abovementioned evaluations, only that of Kavanagh and O’Dwyer & Furey were accessible to the writer.   
309 Kavanagh, D.T. Towards Economic Evaluation of Closed Circuit Television in Public Places as an Aid to An Garda 
Síochána. Unpublished dissertation.  The Institute of Public Administration. Dublin. August 1999.  Pages 38-43.   
310 An Garda Síochána.  Policy Document on Closed Circuit Television in Public Places.  (Unpublished).  1996. 
311 Kavanagh, D.T. Towards Economic Evaluation of Closed Circuit Television in Public Places as an Aid to An Garda 
Síochána. (Unpublished dissertation.)  The Institute of Public Administration. Dublin. August 1999.  Pages 39-40.   
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however monitoring is not constant due to staff restrictions. Instead the cameras are viewed at peak 
times.312 
 
The third major and arguably more extensive public CCTV system was that on O’Connell Street in Dublin 
and this location was the main focus of Kavanagh’s study. The reign of this system took in the Store 
Street Garda District with the Garda Public Office in O’Connell Street being the monitoring centre. 
Kavanagh undertook an economic analysis of the impact of this CCTV system on crime in the area by 
way of an eighteen month ‘before and after’ assessment.313 
 
In 1999, Kavanagh explained that plans for the introduction of CCTV in Cork City based out of Anglesea 
Street Garda Station were advanced. In October 2001, Cork had five public CCTV cameras. By May 2002, 
Cork City centre CCTV system was officially launched with a total of twenty-nine cameras by June 
2002.314 The cameras are strategically located, often at street junctions with the capacity to be panned 
in different directions in accordance with peak times for different activities. The Department of Justice 
invested approximately €500,000, while the Cork Business Association also put up significant funding in 
support of the installation. According to Sergeant Michael O’Donoghue, Crime Prevention Officer in 
Anglesea Street Garda Station, the twenty-nine monitors are not constantly viewed, even though the 
control room is constantly staffed. During the day, the CCTV system becomes most useful when the 
Station’s control room receives a call. The appropriate screen is summoned upon to assess whether the 
call is genuine and what resources should be deployed to deal with the incident, if any. At particularly 
busy times in the city centre, for example at night and during the lead-up to Christmas, the cameras are 
more heavily monitored. Resources are deployed in a timely fashion to diffuse troubled situations before 
they escalate and to accurately identify ‘trouble-makers’ or offenders. CCTV has proved most useful in 
Cork City centre, particularly in relation to the investigation of criminal damage, shoplifting and also 
public order offences. Footage from CCTV cameras is also a very useful tool in corroborating a complaint 
or a statement made to An Garda Síochána regarding a person’s account of events or their movements. 
As well as being a most valuable aid to the detection and investigation of crime in Cork City, the CCTV 
system provides great help in relation to traffic management. Again appropriate resources can be quickly 
deployed to disperse traffic congestion. For example, if there is an accident in the Jack Lynch Tunnel, 
CCTV cameras located there can quickly alert An Garda Síochána, who can if necessary close down the 
traffic lane involved from the Anglesea Street Headquarters. According to Sergeant O’Donoghue, the 
public seem to have received the CCTV system well. For the most part there has not appeared to be any 
significant disquiet amongst the public in relation to issues of human rights and the invasion of privacy. 
He explained that the monitoring Gardaí do not target or exclusively focus on particular individuals on a 
whim. The twenty-nine cameras take in a wide span and consequently, the monitoring staff observes 
the ‘bigger picture’, unless their attention is drawn to something untoward. Though clearly a proponent 
of CCTV as a tool to policing, Sergeant O’Donoghue is adamant that, in his own sentiment, CCTV is but 
one cog in the policing machine. It is by no means the silver bullet in the crime prevention arsenal. 
 
The CCTV systems in Dublin, Tralee and Cork City are the most established schemes in the State. As 
Kavanagh explained, by 1999 there were applications from thirty other potential locations. All of these, 
however largely come down to efforts by An Garda Síochána. More recently though, a new stage in the 
life of Ireland’s public CCTV was entered. In 2005, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform Michael 
McDowell launched the Community Based CCTV Scheme. 
 
 
 
                                                          
312 Ibid page 40.   
313 Ibid pages 40-41. 
314 Details of the Cork City centre CCTV system were furnished by Sergeant Michael O’Donoghue, Crime Prevention 
Officer of Anglesea Street Garda Station at Anglesea Street Garda Station on 28th October 2005.   
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The Emerging Trajectory of Ireland’s Public CCTV – The Community-Based CCTV Scheme. 
 
On June 15th 2005, Michael McDowell launched a grant scheme to support local communities install and 
maintain CCTV systems. In the Minister’s own words: 
 
‘This initiative will facilitate communities to press ahead with their own local CCTV system. Many 
communities are willing and eager to take a proactive approach to improving the safety and well-
being of their area in co-operation with An Garda Síochána. This scheme provides an ideal 
opportunity for communities to work with their local Gardaí and Local Authority to get the 
systems in place. CCTV has proved extremely successful in the prevention and detection of crime 
and is part of a series of measures aimed at tackling street assaults, public disorder and fear of 
crime.’315 
 
Under the Scheme, financial assistance of up to €100,000 is available from the Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform towards the capital costs of installing local community systems. Successful 
applicants under the Scheme may also avail of a top-up grant from the Department of Community, Rural 
and Gaeltacht Affairs of up to €100,000, where they have been designated as disadvantaged areas under 
the RAPID (Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development) Scheme. Pobal (formerly 
known as Area Development Management Ltd. (ADM)) manages the Community-Based CCTV Scheme 
on behalf of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.316 
 
A Project Board, comprising of representatives from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, the Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, the Department of Environment 
and Local Government, the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland, Pobal and An Garda Síochána, was 
instituted to provide oversight for the implementation of the scheme.317 In recognition of the fact that 
not all interested communities would be prepared to submit a fully-fledged application, a two-stream 
process was established. Under Stage 1, applications could be sought for a grant of up to €5,000 to allow 
those successful applicants to formulate comprehensive applications for Stage 2 funding. This second 
stage receives applications for the full scheme funding. By 20th September 2005, the closing date for the 
first round of applications, eighty-three applications had been received. On 30th December 2005, the 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform announced a package of approximately €1.5 million to 
assist communities throughout the country install their own CCTV systems. Twenty-four applicants 
received preliminary funding under Stage 1 and thirteen under Stage 2. Negotiations between Pobal and 
the relevant community groups would determine the exact grant to be awarded to that community. 
Blackpool in Cork, Clonmel, New Ross, Ballina and Tallaght received the preliminary funding in this round 
of applications, while Letterkenny, Tralee, Sligo, Waterford and Drogheda were among the thirteen to 
receive the Stage 2 Grant.318 Tuam, Ballinasloe and Athy were successful Stage 2 applicants, which were 
also designated under the RAPID Scheme and therefore will receive matching grants from the 
Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs. 
 
                                                          
315 Minister Launches Grants for Community CCTV Systems.  Progressive Democrats Press Release.  15th June 2005.  
Available at http://www.progressivedemocrats.ie/press_room/1444/ 
316 Minister Launches Grants for Community CCTV Systems.  Progressive Democrats Press Release.  15th June 2005.  
Available at http://www.progressivedemocrats.ie/press_room/1444/.  The RAPID Scheme is a targeted Government 
initiative focusing on Ireland’s forty-five most disadvantaged communities. The scheme is operated under the auspices 
of the Department of Community, Rural & Gaeltacht Affairs with Pobal (formerly ADM Ltd.) co-ordinating the 
implementation of the scheme. For further details on the scheme see http://www.pobal.ie/live/RAPID. 
317 See further Community-Based CCTV Archive at http://www.pobal.ie/live/CCTV/174.html. 
318 Brennan, M.  More Security ‘Eyes’ on Alert in Country Towns.  Irish Independent.  31st December 2005.  Also, Brennan, 
M.  ‘McDowell eyes €1.5m CCTV Roll-Out.  Irish Examiner.  31st December 2005.  
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It is envisaged that awards of financial support be made on an annual basis. The closing date for the 
second round of grants was 28th February 2007.319 In applying the local community must demonstrate 
the support of local organisations and groups, the need for a CCTV system in their area and the potential 
‘to develop, implement, operate and maintain such a system into the future.’320 The eligibility criteria in 
relation to Stage 2 applications include: 
 
1. The support of the local Divisional Officer of An Garda Síochána is forthcoming. 
2. The proposal adheres to the Code of Practice for Community-Based CCTV Systems Authorised 
under Section 38(3)(C), Garda Síochána Act 2005. 
3. The proposal adheres to the Technical Specifications for Community-Based CCTV Systems 
Authorised under Section 38(3)(C), Garda Síochána Act 2005. 
4. Evidence that the local authority has agreed to act as Data Controller must accompany the 
application and 
5. The applicant must be ‘an existing, legally registered body with an established track record in 
relation to the expenditure of public funds.’321 
 
The recent launch of the Community-Based CCTV Scheme will undoubtedly catapult Ireland firmly into 
a new age of mass surveillance and arguably sets us on course towards the maximum surveillance society 
discussed in the previous chapter. As we progress along this journey, whispers of concern regarding the 
regulation and circumscription of the powers of the potentially omnipresent watcher will surely become 
more vivid. 
 
 
The Regulation of Public CCTV in Ireland. 
 
With the advent of this largely civilian-based CCTV scheme, the level of surveillance in Ireland’s public 
spaces is set to increase rapidly and with it grow concerns regarding data protection, privacy and the 
potential for abuse of the panoptic power.322 One would think that the mass proliferation of CCTV would 
raise the issue of its regulation up the agenda; however from the experience in Britain, one can see that 
this is not necessarily the case. Benjamin Goold explains how the regulation of public CCTV in Britain is 
by and large a sidelined issue.323 Though the British central government has been a leading proponent 
in the drive towards expanding the web of public surveillance, it has to date shied away from imposing 
restraints on the use of CCTV and other surveillance technology by local authorities and the police. 
Instead it has been left to system controllers to set down limits and to define what constituted legitimate 
                                                          
319 Pobal.  Community-Based CCTV Scheme Guidelines for Application & Appraisals Process.  Department of Justice, 
Equality & Law Reform.  2006.  Page 19.  This document together with the Code of Practice for Community-Based CCTV 
Systems Authorised under Section 38(3)(C), Garda Siochana Act 2005, the Technical Specifications for Community-Based 
CCTV Systems Authorised under Section 38(3)(C), Garda Siochana Act 2005 and the application forms for both Stages 
are available at http://www.pobal.ie/live/CCTV/294.html. 
320 Pobal.  Community-Based CCTV Scheme Guidelines for Application & Appraisals Process.  Department of Justice, 
Equality & Law Reform.  2006.  Page 4.   
321 Pobal.  Community-Based CCTV Scheme Guidelines for Application & Appraisals Process.  Department of Justice, 
Equality & Law Reform.  2006.  Page 11. 
322 The Irish Council for Civil Liberties has regularly questioned the effectiveness and need for CCTV and its expansion, 
arguing that the likes of improved street lighting could achieve similar results without being as intrusive.  See further 
ICCL Questions Effectiveness of CCTV.  Irish Council for Civil Liberties Press Release.  26th June 2002.  Also, Expansion of 
CCTV Scheme Criticised.  Irish Council for Civil Liberties Press Release.  21st November 2000.  Both available at 
http://www.iccl.ie/DB_Data/issues/Privacy_10006_General.htm 
323 Goold, B.  CCTV & Policing: Public Area Surveillance and Police Practices in Britain.  Oxford University Press.  Oxford.  
2004.  Chapter 4.   
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use of such technology.324  Goold even suggests that the reluctance of central government to regulate 
CCTV has directly fuelled its fierce propagation. He expresses doubt, however, as to whether public 
surveillance will continue to expand in such an unfettered fashion. Recent changes in British data 
protection legislation and the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights may present 
a looming shadow over the legality of public CCTV.325  As it currently stands, there is little real regulation 
of public area surveillance. 
 
 Right to Privacy: 
Traditionally, a general right to privacy has not been acknowledged in English law.326 Unlike the Irish 
situation, the absence of a written constitution in Britain means legal rights, if they are to be recognised, 
are developed by analogy from existing law. This significantly hampers the emergence of ‘new’ rights. 
Similarly, English tort law has arguably been creatively interpreted in order to provide some sort of 
protection to individuals against intrusions into their private life. Yet, this falls far short of establishing a 
distinct right to privacy, which, even if it were to come into being, would have a questionable role in 
relation to surveillance in public spaces. After all, just how much of an expectation of privacy can one 
have on a public street?327 Goold discusses a number of cases involving Article 8 of European Convention 
of Human Rights, namely right to respect of privacy, to illustrate how the European Court of Human 
Rights has explored the ambit of this right and the extent to which it percolates into the public sphere. 
In Friedl v. Austria,328 the European Court of Human Rights found that Article 8 does not confine private 
life to one’s ‘inner circle’, rather ‘private life’ seeps into the outside world to an extent. However, it 
found that the taking of photographs by police of the applicant, who was involved in a public 
demonstration in Vienna, did not constitute a breach of Article 8. Goold asserts that this case may very 
well be authority in favour of the argument that the right to privacy may, in certain circumstances, be 
claimed in public spaces. In Peck v. United Kingdom,329 another case concerning Article 8, the Court 
found that not all types of public surveillance were equally acceptable and that distinctions could be 
drawn between different types of public activities and circumstances. As of yet, the right to privacy in 
Britain does not present much of a shield in the face of the virtually omnipresent panoptic power that is 
CCTV. 
 
The existence in Ireland of a written constitution arguably provides greater protection of privacy than is 
the case in Britain. The case of Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland330 recognised an individual’s right to privacy 
for the first time under the Doctrine of Unenumerated Rights.331 Further acknowledgment is paid to 
privacy by Ireland’s incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights into domestic law by 
way of the European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003. The drafting of the Privacy Bill 2006 is yet 
another significant copper fastening of the right to privacy in Irish law. This recent piece of draft 
legislation establishes a tort of violation of privacy under Section 2 and in Section 3, it sets out an 
individual’s entitlement to privacy as one ‘which is reasonable in all the circumstances having regard to 
the rights of others and to the requirements of public order, public morality and the common good.’ The 
Bill also permits a number of defences to a privacy action under Section 5, which include authorised 
                                                          
324 Goold, page 89. 
325 Ibid, page 90. 
326 Ibid, pages 90-95. 
327 Ibid, pages 91-92. 
328 Friedl v. Austria (1996) 21 EHRR 83 referred to in Goold, pages 92-94. 
329 Peck v. United Kingdom (2003) ECHR Application No. 44647/98 referred to in Goold, pages 94-95.  The applicant in 
this case argued that the release of CCTV footage of his attempted suicide and subsequent arrest to the local media by 
Brentwood County Council interfered with his Article 8 rights. It was held that the footage was disclosed for a legitimate 
purpose, that being public safety. Goold interestingly notes that this case concerned the disclosure of CCTV footage as 
opposed to the surveillance itself or the recording of the images.  See also, Kelleher, D.  Under Surveillance.  [2006] Law 
Society Gazette.  June.  24.  Page 24. 
330 Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland.  [1988] ILRM 472. 
331 Kelleher, page 24. 
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surveillance by way of CCTV. Further evidence of the protection of privacy in Irish law is seen in an 
example proffered by Kelleher where a criminal prosecution under Section 10 of the Non-Fatal Offences 
Against the Person Act 1997 was taken in respect of a landlord in Galway, who used miniature cameras 
to secretly film his tenant’s bedroom and bathroom.332 Galway District Court sentenced the landlord to 
16 months for harassment. This offence is defined under Section 10 as arising where a person 
‘intentionally or recklessly seriously interferes with the other’s … privacy and his or her acts are such that 
a reasonable person would realise that the acts would seriously interfere with the other’s … privacy.’ This 
said, however, there was a clear and indisputable expectation of privacy held by the complainants in the 
circumstances of that particular case. There has to date been no privacy case to reach the Irish courts 
regarding an invasion of privacy by way of public area surveillance systems, so it remains to be seen to 
what extent does protection of privacy in Ireland stand up to public CCTV.333 Without doubt though, it 
is arguable that the right to privacy in Ireland enjoys much more substance than that in Britain and the 
Irish Data Protection Commissioner, while accepting the value of CCTV in the fight against crime and also 
its potential for misuse, contends that ordinary data protection rules and principles are well-equipped 
to avoid widespread infringements of the individual’s right to privacy.334 
 
 Data Protection: 
Recent changes in British data protection legislation appear, at least at a glance, to provide some 
glimmer of hope for privacy campaigners.335 Under the Data Protection Act 1998, CCTV systems 
operating in areas to which the public have open access must be registered with the Information 
Commissioner and must adhere to the general principles set down in the data protection legislation. 
Compliance with data protection principles is not particularly arduous. It requires, for example, the 
secure storage of equipment and recordings and the posting signs indicating to the public the operation 
of surveillance. The legislation does not specify how the surveillance is to be undertaken nor does it 
direct how the subject of surveillance is to be selected. Public surveillance systems are lawful under the 
Act once they are employed for a purpose in the public interest, such as crime control and public safety. 
The Act provides a very broad definition for ‘public interest’; therefore it seems there is significant scope 
to find public area surveillance lawful. 
 
Irish data protection law consists of the Data Protection Acts 1988-2003. The more recent 2003 Act, just 
as Britain’s Data Protection Act 1998, implements the EC Data Protection Directive 1998, the core 
objective of which is to foster development of the internal market.336 The protection of privacy is not its 
goal; rather privacy is shielded by it only so far as it does not hinder the nurturing of the internal market. 
This data protection legislation largely functions to regulate the processing of personal data, and 
consequently does not exercise significant influence of the operation of public CCTV. 
 
                                                          
332 Kelleher, page 24. 
333 The case of Atherton v. D.P.P. does, to an extent, look at the issue of the right to privacy in quasi-public areas. This 
case saw a dispute between neighbours about damage to a hedge spill over into the covert surveillance and recording 
of one of them on their own property. When asked to assess the admissibility of footage attained from the camera in a 
subsequent prosecution for criminal damage, the High Court took a very restrictive view of privacy. The Court found 
there to have been no breach of the right to privacy, because the images captured could have been witnessed by anyone 
standing in the window where the camera was situated and testimony from such a person would not be inadmissible. 
This was despite the fact that 70% of the surveillance covered the front of applicant’s house rather than the site of the 
alleged offence. Atherton v. D.P.P. [2005] IEHC 429. Carolan laments the High Court’s failure to fully engage with the 
concept of privacy. According to him, the rigid public/private sphere distinction employed by the High Court here 
significantly undermines the strength of the right to privacy and the Court’s approach is not in line with the expansive 
view of privacy taken in ECHR cases.  See further Carolan.  Stars of Citizen CCTV: Video Surveillance & the Right to Privacy 
in Public Places.  (2006) DULJ 326a. 
334 See further Case Study 14/96: ‘Use of Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)-Privacy Implications-Does the Data Protection 
Act apply?’ At http://www.dataprotection.ie.    
335 Goold, pages 95-98. 
336 Kelleher, page 25. 
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In relation to the specific interaction of data protection and CCTV surveillance, the Irish legislation sets 
out a number of requirements.337 One of the primary principles in Irish data protection legislation is that 
of ‘fair obtaining.’ In order to satisfy this requirement, it is necessary to inform those whose images are 
captured of the identity of the data controller and the purpose of the data processing. This can be 
achieved simply by the positioning of signs setting out the identity of the data controller and the purpose 
of the surveillance. Normally the location will inform on the identity of the controller and since security 
is the default purpose, it is common practice to have clear signs prominently displayed at all entrances 
telling merely of the presence of CCTV and including a contact number. Where CCTV is used for other 
purposes, the potential subjects must be made aware of that other purpose before the cameras are 
used for such. It also important that cameras are positioned in such a way as not to exceed their purpose. 
It would be disproportionate, for instance, for camera coverage to seep into the private property of 
another. Also, where a surveillance system is used for security purposes, while it may be acceptable for 
cameras to be positioned in publicly accessible areas, coverage of private staff areas would be excessive.   
 
Another requirement of data protection concerns storage and retention of data.  Data protection 
legislation permits the retention of data for no longer than is necessary for the purposes set out. The 
Data Commissioner recommends a twenty-eight-day cycle and discourages the taking advantage of 
newer technology, which allows for greater storage capacity and duration. The Commissioner accepts, 
however, that images may be retained for longer periods, where they speak to a specific incident that is 
being or may be investigated. Secure storage, restriction of access to authorised personnel and a log of 
such access should be maintained in relation to the stored images. 
 
In relation to access by An Garda Síochána to stored images for the purposes of a specific investigation, 
the data controller must be satisfied that a genuine investigation is being undertaken. Covert 
surveillance is permitted in limited circumstances with a view to crime prevention, detection and 
investigation. Such surveillance, according to the Data Commissioner, should be short-term and 
focussed and should either involve actual Garda involvement or an intention to so involve. The 
Commissioner however suggests that overt rather than covert surveillance would be more suited to 
crime prevention as well as being less intrusive as far as privacy is concerned. Under data protection 
legislation, security companies would be classified as data processors and their clients would be the data 
controllers. Section 16 of the Acts require such data processors to be registered with the Data Protection 
Commissioner and such processors are also required to employ suitable security measures to prevent 
unlawful processing. 
 
While reassuringly data protection legislation does provide a good general structure regarding the 
processing and storage of data gleaned from CCTV surveillance, it does not harness the operation of 
public area CCTV in terms of how the surveillance is undertaken on the ground and how the subject is 
selected for monitoring. 
 
 The Rules of Evidence: 
As with data protection legislation, the rules of evidence provide little to no guidance and structure for 
the performance of surveillance.338 Rules of evidence are concerned with the handling and storage of 
footage gleaned from surveillance cameras as opposed to how the cameras are used. With the dawn of 
the digital age, the authentication of video recordings is emerging as the main issue of debate on the 
use of video evidence. Sergeant Michael O’Donoghue, Crime Prevention Officer at Anglesea Street Garda 
                                                          
337 For further details see Data Protection & CCTV: Fair Obtaining at 
http://www.dataprotection.ie/documents/guidance/CCTV.doc.  It seems that there is little confusion as to whether 
CCTV images fall under the ambit of data protection. Section 1 of the Data Protection Act 1988 defines ‘personal data’ 
as ‘data relating to a living individual who can be identified either from the data or from the data in conjunction with 
other information in the possession of the data controller.’ 
338 Goold, pages 95-96. 
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Station, explained that the Anglesea Street system uses analogue recordings as opposed to digital.339 
The reason for this being that the original recording, as required under the rules of evidence in Ireland, 
is the videotape from an analogue system, whereas with digital recordings the original is located on the 
computer hard drive itself. CD versions of the footage are merely copies. Technological advances in 
software also breed concerns over digital tampering. The main drawback of continuing to use an 
analogue system is that the recorded footage is not of as high a quality as that viewed on the monitors 
as the incident happens. Until such time as the rules of evidence are amended to keep pace with 
technological advances, it seems analogue recordings will remain the only admissible surveillance 
recordings. Generally speaking though, CCTV footage is readily accepted as admissible evidence and 
system managers in Britain are well aware of the need to show that the footage is genuine and has not 
been tampered with. Similarly, given that the established public CCTV systems in Ireland are operated 
under the auspices of An Garda Síochána and that the Community-Based CCTV systems will be operated 
with significant input from An Garda Síochána, the rules of evidence are and will no doubt continue to 
be a featuring concern, but this concern is largely limited to the storage and handling of potential 
evidence in the prosecution of offences. 
 
Such evidentiary rules include the principle that the defence should be afforded the opportunity to 
examine evidence on the basis of fair procedure. Fennell sets out the caselaw illustrating the duty to 
preserve and the right of the defence to access and examine the material.340 Interestingly, much of the 
caselaw in this regard deals with CCTV footage. In Murphy v. D.P.P.341, it was held that the destruction 
of a car in which the alleged offences occurred was a breach of fair procedure given that the accused’s 
fingerprint expert could not examine it. It seems, although that the duty to preserve does not necessarily 
cover all CCTV recordings. In Mitchell v. D.P.P.342, it was found that the Gardaí are not obliged to retain 
all CCTV footage, however there would be situations where the Gardaí would be required to inform the 
defence of the existence of the recordings and of the intention to destroy it. The case of Braddish v. 
D.P.P.343 set out that the Gardaí have a duty to seek out as well as retain evidence pertaining to guilt or 
innocence whether it is to be relied upon by the prosecution or not. This was reiterated in Dunne v. 
D.P.P.344, where surveillance footage of the filling station which the accused allegedly robbed was not 
forthcoming. Even though the duty to seek out and preserve was again emphasised, it was found that 
the defence’s delay of 12 months in seeking the footage was fatal to their claim. The majority held that 
the test was whether there was a real risk that the accused will not receive a fair trial without the missing 
evidence. 
 
In relation to the actual use of CCTV footage as evidence, McGrath345 refers to the case of People (D.P.P.) 
v. Maguire346, in which the Court of Criminal Appeal looked at the issue of identification and the role of 
video evidence. Here Justice Barron set out three situations in which the jury may be presented with 
video footage or stills. The first is where the footage or stills are used to bolster the evidence of a witness 
at the scene – in other words, the footage or stills are used to establish whether or not the witness had 
a reasonable opportunity to make the identification. In this case the footage is used to gauge the 
credibility or reliability of the witness and not as stand-alone identification evidence. Similarly, the 
second scenario deals with witness credibility. Here, footage or stills may be used to identify the accused 
as the perpetrator by someone, who was not at the scene, but who knew the defendant. To introduce 
such evidence, it must be shown in which capacity and how well the witness knows the defendant. 
                                                          
339 Details of the Cork City centre CCTV system were furnished by Sergeant Michael O’Donoghue, Crime Prevention 
Officer of Anglesea Street Garda Station at Anglesea Street Garda Station on 28th October, 2005. 
340 Fennell.  The Law of Evidence in Ireland.  2nd Edition.  Lexis Nexis Butterworths.  Dublin 2003.  Page 177-178.   
341 Murphy v. D.P.P. [1989] I.L.R.M. 71 
342 Mitchell v. D.P.P. [2000] 2 I.L.R.M. 396. 
343 Braddish v. D.P.P. [2002] 1 I.L.R.M. 151. 
344 Dunne v. D.P.P.  Unreported, Supreme Court. April 25th, 2002. 
345 McGrath.  Evidence.  Thomson Round Hall.  Dublin.  2005.  Pages 207-208. 
346 People (D.P.P.) v. Maguire. [1995] 2 I.R. 286. 
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Justice Barron acknowledged the danger of prejudice arising out of the occupation of the witness, 
however if identification in this manner by a police officer, for example, is more prejudicial than 
probative, the footage or stills may be excluded. The final situation is where the jury themselves view 
the footage or stills and form their own view on identity. This arises where no other witnesses are 
forthcoming. In Maguire, the Court of Criminal Appeal reiterated that the standard caution in relation 
to identification evidence should be given to the jury in cases where video footage or stills are used. It 
also emphasised that in the first two situations, where witnesses were forthcoming, the trial judge 
should clarify to the jury that the footage or stills are to be used by them to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and not to draw their own conclusions on identity from it.347 
 
Healy recognises a number of concerns arising out of the use of video footage or stills.348 Primarily, he 
lists the main issues as being the quality of the image, the fact that the accused may bare merely a 
resemblance to the person captured on the footage, the possibility of the footage being manipulated 
and the extent to which the witness was exposed to the footage or stills prior to giving evidence (in other 
words how strong was the witness’s identification in itself and what did the footage bring to it.) 
Nevertheless, footage from surveillance cameras and stills extracted from them have successfully been 
used as evidence. Having said all of this though, the rules of evidence provide no real regulation of the 
actual operation of CCTV surveillance here and in Britain. Informal codes of practice go much further in 
filling this gap. 
 
 Codes of Practice:  
In Britain, the absence of formal regulation from central government has rendered informal codes of 
practice as the primary limitation on the operation of public area surveillance systems.349 Such codes of 
practice provide guidance on the daily operation of the CCTV system, detailing issues such as control 
and operation of cameras, security of and access to the system, tape handling and storage and so on. 
Unfortunately, however, as Norris and Armstrong point out, there is little consistency between the 
different codes.350 This is most likely because of the absence of any central and standardised direction 
on the content and legal status of such codes. Goold refers to a comprehensive survey of the variety of 
codes of practice for CCTV systems throughout Britain undertaken by Bulos and Sarno.351 The findings 
of this survey indicate that the majority of codes focussed on ‘operational questions’ and technical 
matters including ‘the need for proper and secure video storage, retrieval and use of tapes, with 
particular attention being paid to the way in which video material could be used for evidential purposes.’ 
Bulos and Sarno went on to assert that ‘almost as evident was the idiosyncratic and partial way in which 
other matters such as accountability, provision of information, monitoring and evaluation were 
addressed.’352 Procedures concerning the actual operation, for example ascertaining ‘suspicious 
behaviour’, subject targeting and undertaking prolonged surveillance, were rarely dealt with in detail 
and instead were left to the discretion of the operator. Privacy, ethics and accountability scarcely 
featured on the agenda of the formulators of codes of practice. Goold cautions that this survey was 
undertaken in 1995 and since that date there has been some progress towards consistency in codes of 
practice with the Home Office, among others, issuing guidelines on best practice as regards codes of 
practice for CCTV use. The most significant development however came from the Local Government 
                                                          
347 The standard identification caution is found in People (A.G.) v. Casey (No. 2) [1963] I.R. 33.  (Pages 39-40).  In general 
terms, the caution includes a warning to the jury that on occasion identification evidence has been found to be incorrect 
and that if their finding of guilty rests on identification evidence, they should be particularly careful before accepting 
such evidence and be satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt in light of all the circumstances that the identification 
evidence is correct.   
348 Healy.  Irish Laws of Evidence.  Thomson Round Hall.  Dublin.  2004.  Pages 180-183. 
349 Goold, pages 98-113. 
350 Norris & Armstrong.  The Maximum Surveillance Society:  The Rise of CCTV.  Berg.  Oxford.  1999.  Page 100. 
351 Bulos, M. & Sarno, C.  Codes of Practice & Public Closed Circuit Television Systems.  Local Government Information 
Unit.  London.  1996.  Page 17.  Cited in Goold at page 99.   
352 Bulos & Sarno, page 17.  Cited in Goold at page 99.   
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Information Unit on foot of the survey by Bulos and Sarno. In 1996, A Watching Brief: A Code of Practice 
for CCTV was published.353 This document has achieved much in the way of promoting uniformity 
amongst CCTV codes of practice. Its efforts were reinforced by the Home Office requirement that bids 
in the national CCTV Challenge Competition, which did not include at least a draft code of practice would 
fail. 
 
As regards codes of practice in Ireland, An Garda Síochána’s Declaration of Professional Values & Ethical 
Standards354 pays due consideration to the need to maintain confidentiality in all Garda matters.355 
Kavanagh asserts that this document also states that ‘the actions of members of An Garda Síochána, 
including the use of CCTV technology, must be in accordance with the basic human rights principles of 
necessity, legality, proportionality and accountability.’356 Unfortunately, due to the fact that this is an 
internal Garda document, access to it is restricted. Nevertheless, a specific code of practice has been 
drafted with respect to the code of practice for the newly launched Community-Based CCTV Scheme 
and this is readily available. Furthermore, in order to advance in the application process, it must be 
shown that the proposed system for the local community will comply with the code of practice.  This 
feature of the scheme goes a long way towards avoiding the lack of uniformity in codes of practice that 
has plagued British CCTV systems. At the outset, this code of practice aims to maintain public confidence 
and avoid improper use of the CCTV system. It sets out the legal obligations established under data 
protection legislation and proclaims that it will be kept under constant review so as to ensure it remains 
relevant and up-to-date. Perhaps note has been taken of the lessons learned in Britain. 
 
 Having a code of practice is one thing. Following and enforcing it are completely different. At least 
requiring applicants in the British national CCTV Challenge Competition to attach a draft code of practice 
at the very least is a step in the right direction. Perhaps a subsequent survey will tell whether those draft 
codes have been fully developed, employed and reviewed. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to note, as will 
be explained shortly, that Ireland’s venture into the formal regulation of CCTV includes the possibility of 
revoking authorisation to operate a community-based CCTV system for non-compliance with the terms 
and conditions of that authorisation, which would include observance of the requirements of the code 
of practice. 
 
 Garda Síochána Act 2005: 
Unlike in Britain, there has been some attempt by the Irish Government to set down parameters for 
public area surveillance. The aforementioned Community-Based CCTV Scheme operates in accordance 
with Section 38 of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. In basic terms, this Section sets out, inter alia, that the 
Garda Commissioner may authorise the installation and operation of CCTV ‘for the sole or primary 
purpose of securing public order and safety in public places by facilitating the deterrence, prevention, 
detection and prosecution of offences.’357 Section 38(3)(c) establishes the statutory basis for local 
communities to operate their own CCTV systems. The Code of Practice and Technical Specification were 
prepared by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform together with An Garda Síochána in 
accordance with this provision. Adherence to both of these documents is central to the operation of the 
Scheme and where an applicant falls short of the requirements of either document, their application will 
cease to be considered in the running for funding. Section 38(5) allows for the Government to set out 
the criteria with which those local communities must comply. Section 38(7) dictates that those 
                                                          
353 Kitchen, H.  A Watching Brief:  A Code of Practice for CCTV.  Local Government Information Unit.  London.  1996.  
Cited in Goold at page 100-101.   
354 An Garda Síochána.  Declaration of Professional Values & Ethical Standards.  Dublin.  2003. 
355 Article 7 of the Declaration of Professional Values & Ethical Standards as cited in Kavanagh, Safer Streets?  CCTV 
Management.  Communique:  An Garda Síochána a Management Journal.  September 2003.  30 at page 35.  (Kavanagh 
2003). 
356 Kavanagh (2003), page 35. 
357 Section 38(1) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. 
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authorised to operate the CCTV system by the Garda Commissioner must permit members of An Garda 
Síochána to have access to the CCTV at all times in order to supervise and control the operation of the 
CCTV system on behalf of the Garda Commissioner or to retrieve recorded data or information. Section 
38(8) allows the Garda Commissioner to issue directions with regard to installation or operation to those 
authorised to operate the CCTV system. Also under this provision, the Garda Commissioner may, with 
the consent of Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform revoke his authorisation for failure to 
comply with his issued direction or failure to adhere to the terms and conditions of the authorisation. 
On notification of this revocation, the once-authorised person must cease to operate the system under 
Section 38(9). Failure to do so is decreed to be an offence under Section 38(10) subject to a fine on 
summary conviction of up to €2,500 and/or imprisonment for up to six months. 
 
Gladly, the most recent development in Ireland’s CCTV journey, namely the Community-Based CCTV 
Scheme, enjoys a statutory footing. This is not the case in relation to the multitude of CCTV systems in 
Britain. Having touched quite generally on the issue of regulation of CCTV in Ireland and Britain, it is now 
prudent to assess the few evaluations that have been completed to ascertain the impact and 
performance of Ireland’s more established CCTV systems. 
 
 
Contemplating the Impact of Public CCTV in Ireland. 
 
To date the CCTV systems located in areas of Dublin, Tralee, Dun Laoghaire, Dundalk and Cork have been 
the subject of impact and effectiveness analysis. The Garda Research Unit based at the Garda Síochána 
College in Templemore was given the mandate of undertaking research on the effect of Garda CCTV in 
Ireland. In 2000, the first report was completed in relation to the systems in Dublin (Temple Bar and 
O’Connell Street) and Tralee.358 In the summer of 2006, the Garda Research Unit initiated further 
evaluations of public CCTV systems in Dun Laoghaire and Dundalk. In doing so, the Unit pursued a before-
and-after analysis of the crime statistics from around the 2003-2005 period to assess the impact of CCTV 
in Dundalk and Dun Laoighaire, with Drogheda and Blackrock as the respective comparable control 
zones.359 More recently, the Unit completed a study of the impact of CCTV in Cork City. While in 2001, a 
report was undertaken by Sarah Parsons on the use of CCTV by An Garda Síochána in Dublin’s North 
Inner City area.360 Unfortunately, as was the case with the recent Dun Laoghaire, Dundalk and Cork 
evaluations, this research was not accessible for inclusion in this report. While An Garda Síochána have 
been responsible for the installation and evaluation of the more established CCTV systems, the 
emergence of community-based CCTV schemes brings with it the opportunity for CCTV to be increasingly 
                                                          
358 O’Dwyer, K. & Furey, M.  CCTV in Dublin & Tralee – Preliminary Evaluation.  Research Report No. 1/00.  Garda 
Research Unit.  Templemore.  (Unpublished Report).  2000.  This report will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter.  See note 74 and the accompanying text. 
359 Eamon Lynch, Research Officer in the Garda Research Unit, Templemore explained the research mandate in relation 
to the impact of CCTV in a telephone interview on 20th July, 2006 and also 11th December, 2007. The lapse in time 
between the Tralee/Dublin evaluation in 2000 and the more recent studies of Dundalk and Dun Laoghaire was 
unavoidable. A CCTV system must be in place for over a year in order to evaluate and compare a full year’s crime data 
before and after the installation date. Given that the Dundalk and Dun Laoghaire systems became operational in 2004, 
2006 was the earliest evaluations could be undertaken. The evaluations on the Dun Laoghaire, Dundalk and Cork 
systems were not accessible for inclusion in this report. 
Lynch, E. Evaluation of CCTV in Dun Laoghaire.  Research Report No. 7/06.  Garda Research Unit.  Templemore.  
(Unpublished Report) 2006. 
Lynch, E. Evaluation of CCTV in Dundalk.  Research Report No. 8/06.  Garda Research Unit. Templemore.  (Unpublished 
Report) 2006. 
Browne, P. Evaluation of CCTV in Cork.  Research Report No. 15/07.  Garda Research Unit.  Templemore.  (Unpublished 
Report) 2007. 
360 Parsons, S.  Watching the Watchers: An Garda Síochána & CCTV in Dublin’s North City Centre.  Trinity College, Dublin. 
(Unpublished Dissertation).  2001.  This dissertation was completed with co-operation from An Garda Síochána in pursuit 
of an MSc in Applied Social Research from Trinity College, Dublin. 
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evaluated as a crime control/prevention mechanism. To this end, it is hoped that data and statistics 
collected and made available will make reference to the presence of CCTV and ideally will align with 
CCTV coverage and non-coverage in order to accurately portray the impact of CCTV.361 
 
While there are a number of evaluations, which were not accessible for the purposes of this report, for 
the time being however, there are a couple of evaluations which do shed light, though limited, on the 
impact of CCTV in Ireland to date. The first such assessment to be looked at came in 1999, when 
Kavanagh completed his economic analysis of the CCTV system on O’Connell Street in Dublin. Kavanagh 
favoured this economic approach, because at that stage there were three active CCTV systems in the 
State in Temple Bar, Tralee and O’Connell Street. Cork City centre was well on its way to becoming the 
next location for a public surveillance system with approximately thirty towns and cities all over the 
country proffering applications for consideration.362 Given that tenders for public sector funding far 
outreach the span of such finance, it is of the utmost importance that the allocation of scarce resources 
be done in a prudent and cost effective manner. Kavanagh saw the want of evaluations assessing the 
value and effectiveness of CCTV schemes as incongruous with this aspiration towards the shrewd 
distribution of sparse resources. Consequently he undertook an economic analysis of CCTV in O’Connell 
Street. This system was selected primarily because the installation and manning of CCTV required quite 
a significant investment and if it could not be economically justified in such a busy city centre area with 
a relatively high level of reported crime, then it is questionable whether it could be justified anywhere.363 
 
In relying particularly on the economic theories of Cost Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Kavanagh acknowledges the difficulties posed in applying such theories to the practical realities of 
policing activities and the use of CCTV. For example, the Cost-Benefit Analysis theory involves the 
identification of the gains and losses of a project and the expression of these in a common medium, in 
other words, the translation of the costs and benefits of a project into monetary terms in the hopes of 
selecting the most profitable and beneficial project.364 Transposing such economic theories into the 
realities of policing and the use of CCTV proves difficult in that not all ‘outputs’ are measurable, for 
instance the reduction of the fear of crime hardly has an accurate monetary value. Similarly, if one takes 
an increase in arrests as an output; it cannot be taken that all arrests do not necessarily share the same 
price tag. Drug-related arrests are plausibly worth more to society than public order arrests.365 These 
are difficulties arrived at only after addressing a fundamental underlying, and arguably insurmountable, 
weakness, which is the fact that CCTV does not operate in a vacuum. Other policing activities may blur 
the distinction between outputs attributable to CCTV itself and those due to a combination of crime 
prevention efforts or those brought about solely by those other endeavours.366 External factors, such as 
overall crime trends, are also complicating factors, as would be other non-policing activities, such as 
redevelopment or changes in social or economic activities in the area. Nevertheless, Kavanagh employs 
the Cost Effectiveness Analysis and Cost-Benefit Analysis methods of economic evaluation to ascertain 
                                                          
361 The Garda IT system, PULSE (Police Using Leading Systems Effectively), does provide crime data by street by year, 
thereby allowing for more accurate assessment of the performance of CCTV.  (Eamon Lynch, December, 11th, 2007). 
Crime statistics are more widely available in the Annual Report of An Garda Síochána, which is published on the website 
of An Garda Síochána. This data only refers to Garda Divisions. CCTV cameras are located on streets within Garda 
Districts, which themselves are within Garda Divisions. The crime statistics are published by reference to the Garda 
Divisions, therefore crime rates between CCTV-covered and non-CCTV covered areas are indistinguishable.  The Central 
Statistics Office has also begun to provide statistics on crime and offending, however again there may be the difficulty 
of aligning the data with the locations surveilled by CCTV.   
362 Kavanagh, page 11. 
363 Kavanagh, page 25. 
364 Ibid, page 17. 
365 Ibid, page 26. 
366 Ibid, page 24. 
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the merits of CCTV as an aid to An Garda Síochána; as such an approach provides ‘a structured method 
for making difficult decisions about resource allocation.’367 
 
Having identified the aim of the O’Connell Street system as being the prevention and deterrence of 
crime, the next step in Kavanagh’s economic analysis was to set out the relevant inputs and outputs. In 
overly simplistic terms, the costs of installation and operation were recognised as the inputs, while the 
reduction of crime was identified as the primary output.368 In undertaking his analysis, Kavanagh looked 
at crime data collected between January 1st 1996 and December 31st 1998. During that period, recorded 
crime levels fell. However the area covered by CCTV enjoyed one of the more significant decreases at 
23.3% with the overall Dublin Metropolitan Area Region experiencing a fall of 17.8%.369 In relation to 
detection rates, the CCTV-covered area hosted the greatest increase, being almost 9%, rising from 45% 
to 53.9%, while the total detection rate for the Dublin Metropolitan Area Region excluding the CCTV 
area increased by 0.5% from 37.5% to 38%.370 
 
With the inputs and outputs identified, the next step for Kavanagh was to translate them into the 
common medium that is money. He acknowledged the difficulty in assessing the lifespan of any such 
system, which is necessary to execute the arduous task of arriving at a monetary figure for the 
operational costs involved. This is especially so given the increasingly rapid evolution of technology. As 
a result, Kavanagh assumed a seven-year lifespan for the purposes of fixing a figure for the input.371 He 
ascertained that the bulk of the input costs was made up by the cost of operating the system and that 
78% of the total operating expenditure over those seven years could be traced back to the monitoring 
costs, thus he concluded serious consideration should be given to how the system should be monitored 
and by whom, for instance by civilian personnel or members of An Garda Síochána. Other operating 
costs would include maintenance and the provision of videotapes. 
 
The actual monetary figures affixed to these inputs are as follows:372 
1. The capital or installation costs for the O’Connell Street CCTV system were discerned to be 
£786,500. 
2. The total annual salary for manning the system came to £295,614.373  This was the actual 
expenditure for staffing the system with shifts of one, two and three Gardaí. Kavanagh put 
forward four other staffing suggestions which varied from manning the system around-the-clock 
with three members of An Garda Síochána at a total annual salary of £417,057.60 to manning it 
with three civilians at a total annual salary of £258,154. The other two scenarios involved a 
combination of civilian and Garda monitors. 
                                                          
367 Ibid, page 28. 
368 For a more comprehensive account of Kavanagh’s economic analysis of the O’Connell Street CCTV system see 
Kavanagh, Chapter 3. Kavanagh lists a number of other outputs, which include (a) the benefits of solving crime early, (b) 
improved public perceptions, (c) increased ability to target resources, (d) increased intelligence opportunities, (e) 
increased officer safety and (f) provision of a better service. These outputs were identified in a Benefits Management 
Study undertaken in the National Strategy for Police Information Systems in 1996. Kavanagh goes on to list reduction of 
the fear of crime, improved traffic flow and reduced prosecution/court costs as other recognised outputs. Of these 
outputs, some are tangible, while unfortunately others are intangible.  Pages 52-53. 
369 Kavanagh, pages 45-47. 
370 Ibid, pages 48-51.   
371 Ibid, page 52. 
372 Ibid, pages 53-56. 
373 Using the five possible staffing scenarios, Kavanagh applied the Cost Effectiveness Analysis to rank the five different 
projects in their delivery of the same output and thus find the most cost-effective manner of staffing the CCTV system. 
Given that the inputs for all five projects were identical with the exception the cost of staffing, the projects were ranked 
by reference to the staffing inputs. For a fuller discussion of this, see Kavanagh, pages 58-60. 
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3. The maintenance cost was assessed at 6% of the installation cost for the seven-year lifespan, 
being £47,190. 
4. The provision of videotapes was estimated at £2,000. 
 
To place a monetary value on the primary output – the reduction in recorded crime, Kavanagh manually 
extracted the relevant figures from the total figures given for the C District, within which the O’Connell 
Street CCTV system catchment area is located.374 Using the statistics, the cost of recorded crime, the 
cost of arson or criminal damage and the value of the property recovered by An Garda Síochána were 
calculated. By combining the costs of crime and of arson or criminal damage and then subtracting the 
value of the recovered property, the net cost of crime was calculated. The net cost of crime in the 
eighteen-month period prior to the installation of CCTV in the O’Connell Street area was £2,792,983. 
The net cost for the eighteen months following installation was £2,090,433, meaning a net saving of 
£702,550. This is assuming that CCTV was responsible for the entire reduction in crime and consequent 
saving. To factor in externalities, which may impact the efforts of CCTV in both a positive and negative 
way, Kavanagh applied the theory of sensitivity analysis.375 This is significant, as, for example, if only 60% 
rather than 100% of the reduction in the costs of crime is attributable to CCTV, the net project value (the 
net saving/reduction in crime costs less the project inputs) will be materially affected. Where the net 
project value is a negative, in other words, where the net benefits fall short of the net costs, then the 
project is undesirable. 
 
In this Cost-Benefit Analysis including the sensitivity analysis, Kavanagh concluded that the successful 
projects (which were the actual staffing arrangement, combinations of Garda and civilian staff and 
civilian staff alone) were very sensitive to the level of success attributable to the CCTV system. The 
minimum level of success or effectiveness required for a project to be successful was 87%, meaning that 
CCTV had to be responsible for 87% of the saving or reduction. While limiting the benefits or outputs of 
the system to the reduction of crime and the consequent saving for the sake of ease of measurement 
and ease of application of the Cost Effectiveness Analysis and the Cost-Benefit Analysis to CCTV on 
O’Connell Street, Kavanagh acknowledged that this ‘does not present a fair reflection of the net social 
benefit provided by CCTV systems.’376 He proceeded to advocate the pursuit of wider studies in the hopes 
of identifying other cost savings and less tangible benefits in order to bestow a more accurate indication 
of the real impact of CCTV systems.377 
 
The public coffers will never stretch to humour every whim. Limited resources must be allocated 
thoughtfully. Thus in the spirit of the guidelines proffered by the Department of Finance to appraise 
investment or capital projects, Kavanagh employed the Cost Effectiveness Analysis and the Cost-Benefit 
Analysis to use of CCTV as an aid to policing.  Cost Effectiveness Analysis permits the ranking in order of 
different means of achieving the same goal. Cost-Benefit Analysis translates the benefits and costs of 
project into monetary terms allowing for the most suitable project to be selected. Both methods 
                                                          
374 Kavanagh, page 57. 
375 Ibid, pages 61-63. 
376 Ibid, page 63. 
377 Kavanagh outlines the potential for evaluating other such benefits through the Cost-Benefit Analysis in his Chapter 
4, where he looks at four other tangible benefits. For example, he discusses the potential for savings to the Criminal 
Justice System from increased guilty pleas from offenders presented with CCTV footage arguably establishing the 
prosecution’s case against them. Unfortunately however, as Kavanagh concedes, the data required to calculate the 
impact of CCTV on guilty pleas and the resultant savings to the Criminal Justice System is not available. The other 
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CCTV and adjustments in the behaviour of the insurance market in response to a safer environment due to the presence 
of CCTV. He also refers to a number of intangible benefits such as public attitudes, the sense of safety and reduced fear 
of crime, which, while clearly being benefits, are not easily affixed with monetary values. 
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concluded that employing three civilian staff to monitor the O’Connell Street system was the most 
feasible and efficient means of operating the system. On foot of this Kavanagh suggested reviewing the 
Garda Síochána Policy Document on CCTV in terms of civilian monitoring. He also indicated that for the 
purposes of future more robust evaluations, more considered data collection and improved data 
collection mechanisms should be undertaken. This would hope to include the less tangible or heretofore 
unaccounted for costs and benefits, in order that a more holistic and comprehensive interpretation of 
the impact of CCTV might be achieved. 
 
The other significant report was undertaken by Kieran O’Dwyer and Garda Maeve Furey of the Garda 
Research Unit in Templemore.378 The objective in this 2000 report was to measure the impact of CCTV 
in Tralee, Co. Kerry and in the O’Connell Street and Temple Bar areas of Dublin City. The expected 
beneficial outcomes of the CCTV systems included increased detections, reduced crime and disorder, 
more efficient deployment of Garda resources, more efficient court processing through increased ‘guilty’ 
pleas, improved feelings of safety and security among the public. Perceived disadvantages were 
displacement of crime and fears among the public of invasion of privacy. Though O’Dwyer and Furey 
were satisfied that there was much anecdotal evidence of the worth of CCTV as a policing tool for An 
Garda Síochána, ultimately their findings could neither support nor contradict the suppositions 
regarding the aforementioned benefits of CCTV. This was said to be largely due to limitations of data 
and methodological difficulties in discerning the actual effects of CCTV shorn of any other influences.379 
 
To ascertain the impact of CCTV on crime and detection rates, O’Dwyer and Furey undertook a before-
and-after analysis in relation to all three subject areas and then attempted to discern whether any 
differences noted were attributable to the CCTV system involved. As regards O’Connell Street, the 
evaluation spanned eighteen months before and after installation, from 1996 to 1998. The Temple Bar 
area proved less straightforward. Due to the fact that prior to the installation of CCTV, this area did not 
experience much economic activity. The arrival of CCTV in Temple Bar in 1995 coincided with major 
regeneration in the area, and so it would be misleading and futile to engage in a before-and-after 
analysis. Instead a data for the post-CCTV 1996-1998 period underwent a comparative analysis. Data 
collected during two eight month periods either side of the installation of Tralee’s twenty-four cameras 
from January to August in 1998 and 1999 were examined.380 
 
While differences between before and after figures may seem obvious, those differences are not 
necessarily, in their entirety or otherwise, attributable to CCTV. Any effect that CCTV may have will not 
emerge in a vacuum; therefore this preliminary study took into account other influences of crime rates. 
The general crime trend was used as a backdrop to distinguish effects which may be realistically 
accredited to CCTV from those carried along in the current of the overall crime trend. Specific Garda 
operations along the lines of Operation Clean Streets, which targeted street drug-dealing and other 
developments in the relevant areas such as the significant urban regeneration occurring in Temple Bar, 
which coincided with the installation of CCTV, were also considered.381 To further assist in the isolation 
of the real CCTV effect, a comparative analysis was undertaken between CCTV-covered areas and 
adjacent and non-adjacent similar areas, which were not covered by CCTV. This endeavour would also 
go some way towards ascertaining whether geographical displacement or a diffusion of benefits had 
occurred.382 
 
                                                          
378 O’Dwyer & Furey.  CCTV in Dublin & Tralee – Preliminary Evaluation.  Garda Research Unit.  Research Report No.1/00.  
(Unpublished.)  2000. 
379 Ibid, page 3. 
380 Ibid, page 7. 
381 Ibid, pages 6-7.   
382 Ibid, page 7. 
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Another significant step in deducing the impact of CCTV on crime levels and detections is distinguishing 
between different types of crime. Some crimes are more susceptible to deterrence than others. For 
example, personal violence is usually relatively spontaneous and public order offences are generally 
associated with alcohol consumption. The motivations or triggers for these types of offending are rarely 
influenced by the presence of a deterrent, be it a member of An Garda Síochána in proximity or a 
monitored CCTV camera. In relation to analysing crime data, O’Dwyer and Furey explained that they 
experienced delays and difficulties in accessing complete and precise information in an appropriate 
format. More often than not, the catchment area of the CCTV cameras did not coincide with the district 
boundaries of the data collected. As a result, any findings will lack precision. For example, the possible 
effect of three of the thirty-five cameras in the O’Connell Street area fell within the adjacent area’s data. 
Consequently, the impact of the O’Connell Street CCTV system would more than likely be understated.383 
 
From the data examined in relation to the O’Connell Street CCTV system, the following findings were 
made:384 
1. The overall level of indictable crime in the CCTV-covered area fell substantially in the period after 
installation. However, the general crime trend showed a decline prior to the introduction of CCTV 
anyway. The level of decline enjoyed by the CCTV-covered area was slightly more than the Dublin 
average, but slightly less than the neighbouring district. 
2. Again in comparison to the control areas, the CCTV-covered area performed better in relation to 
offences against the person and pickpocketing, but not as well with regard to larcenies and 
muggings. 
3. Data showed that the CCTV-covered area enjoyed favourable findings in relation to some non-
indictable offences, such as disorderly conduct and vehicle-related offences. However these 
positive findings did not extend to public intoxication, criminal damage and assault. The 
optimistic response to such mixed findings would be that increases were due to elevations in 
detection rates, while reductions were brought about through the deterrent effect of CCTV. 
4. Data analysis did not suggest displacement, although local Garda intelligence did accept some 
geographical displacement did occur. 
5. The overall detection rate was seen to increase by 21%. The neighbouring ‘U’ District performed 
better, but the CCTV-covered area excelled in relation to mugging and pickpocketing detections. 
 
According to the Temple Bar findings:385  
1. In comparison to the comparator and control areas, the CCTV-covered area performed well as 
regards robbery (-56%) and muggings (-37%), but not so in relation to pickpocketing (-11%). In 
relation to indictable offences as a whole, the CCTV-covered area performed on par. 
2. Detection rates were greater than the control area, but did not experience any change following 
the introduction of CCTV. 
 
The Tralee findings revealed: 386 
1. An increase of 14% in indictable crime after CCTV was installed in the town as compared to the 
pre-CCTV situation.  
                                                          
383 Ibid, pages 7-8. 
384 Ibid, pages 10-16. 
385 Ibid, page 17-18. 
386 Ibid, page 18-19. 
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2. An increase in overall detections of 14%.  Criminal damage detections increased by 46%. 
However larcenies from vehicles decreased by 5%. 
3. Local intelligence suggested some displacement from Tralee to Killarney especially in relation to 
burglaries. 
 
Given that the data concerned small numbers of offences, caution should be invoked when drawing 
conclusions from apparently significant changes. 
 
An awareness of the presence of CCTV in an area can have very different effects on public perceptions, 
with fears for privacy and civil liberties on the one hand and reassurance and increased feelings of safety 
and security on the other.387 A survey of public perceptions after the installation of CCTV was undertaken 
in July 1999 to uncover the public’s response to CCTV. No comparative survey was completed prior to 
the installation. Because the business community is called on to contribute towards and support CCTV 
schemes around the country, a survey was also commissioned to ascertain its perception of CCTV. Both 
surveys undertaken by Irish Marketing Surveys in all three evaluated areas showed high levels of support 
for CCTV with 85% of public respondents thinking it is ‘an excellent or good idea’ and 84% of the business 
community surveyed. 10% of the public thought it is ‘fairly good idea’ and 11% of the business 
community. 
 
Some other findings were as follows: 388 
1. There was also a predominant belief that it deters crime – 89% of public respondents and 67% 
of the business community. 
2. 54% of public respondents felt the same about the safety and security of the area with CCTV as 
they did before CCTV was introduced. This is understandable given that the majority of 
respondents from both the business community and the general public were not particularly 
concerned with or affected by crime prior to the installation of CCTV. However, 73% of the 
business community felt safer with the presence of CCTV. 
3. Most (78% of public respondents and 90% of the business community) were of the opinion that 
more funding should be made available for CCTV projects in areas with high crime levels. 
However when asked about expenditure priorities, there was a strong preference towards 
increasing Garda presence on the streets. 
4. The business community seemed not to be overly enthusiastic about being called upon for 
financial support. 55% said they would not be prepared to contribute financially and with merely 
27% saying they would. 
5. A significantly greater number considered crime rates to have increased or remained unchanged 
since the introduction of CCTV, than believed it to have decreased. 
6. Most were aware of the presence of CCTV in the area, but a considerable number were not. 80% 
of the public took no notice of public signs regarding CCTV. 
7. The majority (two-thirds of the public) gave no thought to threats to their privacy posed by CCTV, 
while 6% of the public and 12% of the business community strongly agreed that CCTV interfered 
with personal privacy. 
 
Other benefits for which there was supporting anecdotal evidence, but no definitive data, include the 
more effective and the more accurate allocation of Garda resources. False alarms are weeded out and 
                                                          
387 Ibid, page 9.  
388 Ibid, pages 24-26.  643 members of the public and 97 members of the business community responded to the survey. 
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Garda intervention is tailored and timely. Offenders confronted with videoed evidence of them 
committing crime are more likely to enter guilty pleas, thereby accelerating their processing by the 
Criminal Justice System and saving the cost of a contested trial. Unfortunately, empirical data in support 
to the anecdotal evidence in favour of CCTV resulting in such benefits was not at hand for this 
preliminary report. 
 
O’Dwyer and Furey found that ‘the picture regarding the impact of CCTV in crime levels in unconvincing, 
at least based on the partial aggregate data available.’389 Difficulties with the available information 
prevented a robust evaluation in this case, consequently they recommended a repeat evaluation 
equipped with a greater variety of more extensive data. For future reference, O’Dwyer and Furey make 
a number of recommendations in relation to subsequent evaluations.390 Prior to the establishment of 
new schemes, they advocate the compiling of more specific information, including detailed pre-CCTV 
data, precise data on offences and crime and by reference to CCTV/non-CCTV borders, information on 
the costs of crime and prosecutions, details of the use of CCTV footage as evidence and surveys of the 
general public and business community before and after the installation. They also recommend a well-
publicised Code of Practice & Ethics to allay fears and concerns regarding privacy. 
 
All in all, even though the findings appear disappointing, they are not altogether out of line with the 
plethora of mixed results from the British evaluations. One significant and most interesting way in which 
Ireland’s public CCTV was found to differ from that in Britain was in the attitude of Garda managers 
towards the publicity of CCTV.391 Rather than the high profile use of CCTV, which may have the effect of 
displacing offenders, An Garda Síochána seems to opt for discreet use of CCTV evidence to catch, convict 
and remove offenders from circulation. This is a complete departure from the recommendations of the 
Home Office in the United Kingdom, which, as was discussed in the previous chapter, advocates 
maximising publicity surrounding CCTV successes in the hopes of optimising its deterrent effect. 
O’Dwyer and Furey accept, however, that this latter approach may be appropriate in areas suffering 
from high rates of offending and fear of crime and also perhaps at the initial stages of CCTV installation. 
 
Despite not being able to draw any definitive conclusions regarding the impact of CCTV in relation to 
crime prevention, O’Dwyer and Furey recognise the significance of CCTV to monitor police actions. This 
is important from the point of view of Garda management, but also as a tool to safeguard individual 
rights and to protect Gardaí from false accusations.392 The data available to O’Dwyer and Furey was not 
sufficient to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of the three most established public CCTV systems 
in Ireland. Anecdotal suppositions can be drawn, but nothing more substantial. Perhaps future 
evaluative attempt will have more in-depth and specific information at hand. Until such time as the 
studies initiated by the Garda Research Unit in the summer of 2006 have been completed, it will remain 
to be seen whether the lessons of Kavanagh and O’Dwyer and Furey will be taken on board. No doubt 
those findings will be the eagerly awaited but the question is ‘at what point will they be accessible?’ 
 
 
Conclusion. 
 
While Britain may be the most surveilled society in the world, Ireland, though its venture into the arena 
of public surveillance could be said to be in its infancy, is arguably on its way to catching up. The story 
of Ireland’s widespread public area surveillance systems began with a policy document from the 
commissioner of An Garda Síochána in the mid-1990s. Since then, CCTV systems have sprung up in town 
and city centres throughout the country. To date, An Garda Síochána can be credited with being the 
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391 Ibid, page 37. 
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driving force behind the initial spread. However in recognition of the considerable desire among 
community groups and out of frustration at the slow pace of the development of the Garda CCTV 
network,393 Michael McDowell, then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform announced the 
launch of the Community-Based CCTV Scheme in June 2005. No doubt this will add a new dimension to 
the character of CCTV surveillance in Ireland. 
 
It can only be hoped that, in light of the assessments that have been completed, sufficient data will be 
accumulated and proper resources allocated to evaluate the impact of the forthcoming CCTV systems, 
particularly on crime. There have been indications that Ireland’s public CCTV has produced 
disappointingly mixed results similar to those in Britain. However, as Kavanagh and O’Dwyer and Furey 
point out, not all the effects of CCTV are tangible and those that are ascertainable are often cloaked by 
inadequate and imprecise data. With the dawn of this new age for Irish public area surveillance, it is 
hoped that a determined drive to monitor the performance of CCTV will follow suit. 
 
When asked for his thoughts on the impact of this recent development in Ireland’s public CCTV story, 
Eamon Lynch, the Research Officer, who evaluated CCTV in Dun Laoghaire and Dundalk surmised that, 
given the lessons learned in Britain, the impact will initially be relatively impressive.394 With time, 
however, this will lessen because the areas to which CCTV will first be deployed will be those areas in 
which it will have the greatest impact. These areas will be most in need and will likely benefit most from 
the presence of CCTV. The more CCTV systems that operate, the more their potential to significantly 
affect crime rates will wane. Eventually as community CCTV systems percolate more and more 
throughout the country, they will eventually percolate to locations that do not suffer from particularly 
high rates of crime susceptible to the effects of CCTV. CCTV will not continue to make such a relatively 
impressive and sustained impact. 
 
As regards the oft-forgotten issue of regulation, it seems Ireland has at least the seeds for more 
significant controls of public area surveillance. With a recognised right to privacy, a new Privacy Bill and 
a uniform code of practice in the works, together with some form of formal regulation under the Garda 
Síochána Act 2005, Ireland appears to be on better footing than Britain as regards controlling the use of 
CCTV surveillance. It will only be when cases come before the courts that the force of these restraints 
will be realised. 
 
  
                                                          
393 Brennan, M.  More security ‘Eyes’ on Alert in Country Towns.  Irish Independent.  31st December, 2006. Also, Brennan, 
M.  ‘McDowell eyes €1.5m CCTV Roll-Out.  Irish Examiner.  31st December, 2005. 
394 Based on a telephone interview with Eamon Lynch, Research Officer in the Garda Research Unit in Templemore on 
20th July, 2006. 
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Chapter 6: 
 
Conclusions & Recommendations. 
 
 
Introduction. 
 
Whether warranted or not, by the end of the Twentieth Century, CCTV had become a fact of everyday 
life and there are no indications that this is about to change. Go to buy a pint of milk or fill your car with 
petrol and more often than not that supermarket or filling station will be displaying signs alerting you to 
the fact that you are being surveilled. For most people, while it may fan their feelings of safety and 
security, it is of no real consequence for them personally or so it would seem. They go about their 
everyday business, largely unaffected by the prospect that someone, somewhere may be watching their 
every move.395 However, for the alleged targets of this surveillance, namely offenders and potential 
offenders, it may well be significant. CCTV is arguably the form of crime prevention that most 
prominently springs to mind. Previous chapters explored the emergence of the phenomenon of 
surveillance and in particular CCTV as a crime control mechanism, tracing from its theoretical 
underpinnings through to its evaluated effects and up to its future trajectory. 
 
 
The Theoretical Underpinnings. 
 
Originally, the criminal was seen as an aberration; anomalous in the face of all law-abiding members of 
society. Nowadays however, crime is as normal and commonplace as taxation and any other of life’s 
discomforts. 
 
Over the centuries, multiple theories have abounded as to why people commit crimes. This 
preoccupation with trying to pinpoint the driving force behind criminality has led to the birth of 
criminology. It was hoped that by identifying the triggers for offending, it would be possible to eliminate 
crime. When classicism and neo-classicism failed to free society of criminality, favour turned towards 
alternative theories of offending and positivism was born. While classicist theory viewed the individual 
as a rational thinker in control of his path, positivism doubted such control. It determined that human 
behaviour is attributable to forces beyond the control of the individual. By ascertaining these forces, be 
they internal or external to the individual, it would be possible to rehabilitate and remedy them and 
consequently eliminate crime. 
 
Classicists and positivists made little inroad in ridding society of crime. As a result, environmental 
criminology took hold and pulled the focus back from the individual. It took in the wider perspective of 
the individual within the spatio-temporal situation and advocated altering this situation so as to deter 
criminality. This provided a much more holistic view of offending. Unfortunately, however it lacked a 
strong theoretical basis linking the practical potential of an environmental approach to the decision-
making process of a potential offender. The new criminologies of everyday life stepped into the breach.  
                                                          
395 Or not watching. It should be noted that not everyone is selected for surveillance. In fact most people are not watched 
and of those that are a much smaller number again are actually the subject of police deployment. Goold studied six 
CCTV monitoring centres for eighteen months in 1998 and 1999 recording 376 cases where subjects were targeted for 
surveillance. Only 7 police deployments resulted from the 376 surveillances. This indicates that the level of CCTV 
monitoring and detections is likely to be very low.  See further Goold B.J. CCTV and Policing: Public Area Surveillance 
and Police Practice in Britain.  Clarendon Studies in Criminology, Oxford.  Oxford University Press.  2004.  In particular 
pages 141-166. 
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Rational choice theory and routine activity theory are the primary components of this recent wave in 
criminology. These theories work from the premise that where a willing offender converges with a 
suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian a crime will occur. Rather than looking at the 
individual or the environment, rational choice theory and routine activity theory look at the convergence 
of the two. These theories, when combined with the theory of situational crime prevention set the 
backdrop for the emergence and mass proliferation of CCTV. 
 
 
The Realisation of Theories. 
 
Centuries of theorising without any practical effectiveness rendered a state of pessimism. Nothing 
seemed to work. Despite its efforts, the State failed to banish crime. With time, the inevitability of crime 
was accepted; however its intensity was not accepted as inevitable. Focus then turned to controlling 
crime and minimizing the impact that it has on society. While previously the responsibility for the crime 
predicament rested squarely on the shoulders of the State, now it has been diffused throughout society 
as a whole. Individuals, local communities and others contribute to containing the crime problem.396 
Situational crime prevention, with its theoretical underpinnings in rational choice theory and routine 
activity theory, effectively facilitates this new approach. 
 
Crime prevention as a concept possesses no universal or standard definition. Situational crime 
prevention has been acknowledged as one of the most recognized crime prevention strategies. This form 
of crime prevention seeks to thwart the incidence of crime by reducing the opportunity to offend and 
increasing the risks associated with offending. This practical approach complements the rational choice 
and routine activity theories. Under rational choice theory, the potential offender undertakes a cost-
benefit analysis of offending. Routine activity theory propounds that crime rates correspond to the 
convergence of a willing offender, a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Situational 
crime prevention advocates practical and targeted measures to alter the criminogenic environment and 
promote processes of informal social control. It concentrates on the interaction between the offence 
and the situation and seeks to alter the situation, in the hopes of defusing the opportunity to offend and 
increasing the prospects of detection. In doing so, situational crime prevention aims to manipulate the 
potential offenders rational decision-making process by increasing the effort required to successfully 
offend, increasing the risk of being apprehended and reducing the awards of offending. 
 
Situational crime prevention gives physical form to routine activity and rational choice theories. 
Surveillance and in particular, CCTV have emerged as arguably, the most predominant form of situational 
crime prevention. 
 
 
Panoptic Power and the Rise of Surveillance. 
 
The diffusion of responsibility for crime control between the State and its citizenry brought about an 
increased level of consciousness of crime among the public. Now that the buck no longer rested with 
the State, individuals took more heed of crime and impact it could have on them and they on it. With 
the realisation that crime would never ultimately be defeated; a risk society began to emerge with the 
assessment and management of risk at its core. Mass surveillance rose to become a prominent 
intervention that feeds into and feeds off this risk society. As well as facilitating the assessment of risks 
through the accumulation of information on potential trouble-makers, surveillance also contributes to 
the management of risks. The capacity of surveillance as a social control mechanism is arguably most 
                                                          
396 Arguably, this may be as it should be. O Síochán defines a crime, “the crime is the public wrong, affecting the welfare, 
security and interests of the community at large…” (his emphasis).  O Síochán, P. Criminal Law of Ireland.  8th Ed. 
Foilsiuchaindle. Dublin. 1988. 
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vividly seen in Bentham’s Panopticon, which exemplified how constant observation reinforced by the 
threat of coercion would secure conformity. Though this architectural idea was never realised, its 
underlying principles have seeped into the outside world with CCTV being its modern embodiment. 
 
With its panoptic capacity, CCTV fits comfortably into the modern risk society. Its incredible proliferation 
has also been fuelled by the emergence of the stranger society. The decentralisation of responsibility 
for crime control has increased awareness in society of the threats posed by ‘others’. In an attempt to 
shield themselves from crime, individuals and communities have opted to batten down the hatches to 
keep malefactors out. Gated residential communities, private security and CCTV are a number of the 
symptoms of this fortress mentality. Arguably, they also contribute to their own necessity by 
encouraging the heightening of suspicion and distrust of others. In a relatively short period of time, the 
consequent pervasiveness of CCTV has brought us into an age of mass surveillance, which will 
predictably metamorphose into maximum surveillance given the recent interaction between CCTV, 
digitalisation and complementary software. 
 
 
The British Experience. 
 
Britain is acknowledged to be the most surveilled society in the world. Its road to this throne began as 
far back as the 1970s and with the passage of time, its pace has only quickened. Unfortunately, the rate 
of CCTV proliferation was not equally matched with the evaluation of established systems. Indeed, 
evidence-based satisfaction that CCTV is the appropriate tool for the task has never seemed to be a 
prerequisite for the spread of CCTV throughout public spaces. This is not to say however, that the need 
to evaluate existing systems is not on the crime prevention agenda. On the contrary, it has been realised 
that there is a pressing need to assess the impact of CCTV. 
 
For the most part, evaluations of CCTV systems have garnered mixed findings.  Initial efforts to ascertain 
the impact of CCTV on crime involved the simple question ‘does CCTV work?’ Experience showed there 
was no consistent answer to this overly simplistic question. It was soon realised that greater instruction 
could be gleaned from rephrasing the research question along the lines of ‘how does CCTV work when 
it does work?’ This would enable crime prevention practitioners and policy makers to ascertain in which 
circumstances CCTV would operate most effectively and efficiently to prevent crime. It is hoped that in 
the future, this lesson will inspire the well-considered and targeted employment of CCTV rather than 
thoughtless blanket coverage. 
 
 
CCTV in Ireland. 
 
Public area surveillance in the form of CCTV reached Irish shores some two decades after it took hold in 
Britain. Since then, we have witnessed a rapid increase in the level of CCTV surveillance of Irish streets. 
Tralee, Dublin and Cork host some of the most established and extensive systems in this jurisdiction. To 
date An Garda Síochána has been responsible for the spread of public CCTV in Ireland. However limited 
resources meant that the roll-out of CCTV systems had slowed. This was all set to change, however with 
the launch by Michael McDowell, then Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform of a Community-
Based CCTV Scheme whereby funding would be provided to facilitate local communities installing their 
own systems. The recipients of the first round of funding were announced at the end of 2005. This is a 
most significant development in the Irish CCTV story and will no doubt lead to a dramatic increase in the 
level of public area surveillance in the coming years. 
 
Despite the pervasiveness of CCTV on British streets and the seemingly unequalled rate of 
intensification, Britain has not instituted any level of formal regulation to control the use of CCTV 
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surveillance. Data protection and the rules of evidence, for example, provide limited guidance, which 
predominantly concerns the use of footage. As regards regulation, Ireland has arguably been in a better 
position from the start. The presence of a written constitution, which hosts the unenumerated right to 
privacy, combined with the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights in to domestic 
law, has meant that the use of CCTV must take account of an individual’s rights. Data protection and the 
rules of evidence also provide some limitation. The recent initiation of community-based CCTV was 
accompanied by formal regulation in the form of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. Together with the 
proposals laid out in the Privacy Bill 2006, this seems to indicate that CCTV in Ireland is not so much an 
unfettered exercise of surveillant power as it can be said to be in Britain. For the time being however, 
we await activity in the courts to determine the actual effectiveness of what regulation we do have. 
 
Thankfully, Ireland has not suffered the same problem as that which previously plagued Britain, namely 
the relative absence of CCTV evaluations. To date, the Garda Research Unit of An Garda Síochána has 
evaluated six of the nine established Garda CCTV systems.397 Other studies have been completed with 
the co-operation of An Garda Síochána.398 Given the presence of ‘operational material’ in these 
evaluations, access to them has been limited or restricted. However what has been learned from those 
that are accessible, is that Irish CCTV displays similar mixed results to those in British studies. While this 
seems most disappointing, it must be said that the availability of insufficient and imprecise data has 
hindered accurate analyses. It can only be hoped that, with the arrival of the new community-based 
CCTV systems, further evaluations will be undertaken incorporating the lessons learned in those that 
have been completed. In the coming years, it will be most interesting to see how the Irish CCTV story 
progresses. For the time being, however, below are some general recommendations offered in light of 
what has been seen to date. 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
1.  CCTV is not a panacea for the predicament of crime control and should not be treated as such. 
Generally speaking, it seems to operate most effectively in relation to vehicle related offences in car 
parks. Not all offences are susceptible to the deterrent effect of CCTV. For example, where excess of 
alcohol is involved, an individual’s inhibitions will be removed and more often than not with those go 
the influence CCTV might have had on their behaviour. To avoid disappointment and disillusionment in 
CCTV, it should not be presented as a silver bullet in the arsenal against crime. 
 
2.  Serious consideration should be given when selecting the areas to which CCTV is deployed.  
Rather than undertaking a mass roll-out of CCTV systems merely because it is the in vogue situational 
crime prevention measure, locations and situations should be carefully selected to efficiently maximise 
                                                          
397 Those locations evaluated by the Garda Research Unit are Temple Bar/Grafton Street, Dublin (2000); O’Connell 
Street, Dublin (2000); Tralee (2000); Dun Laoghaire (2006); Dundalk (2006) and Cork (2008). 
O’Dwyer, K. & Furey, M.  CCTV in Dublin & Tralee – Preliminary Evaluation.  Research Report No. 1/00.  Garda Research 
Unit.  Templemore.  (Unpublished Report).  2000. 
Lynch, E. Evaluation of CCTV in Dun Laoghaire.  Research Report No. 7/06.  Garda Research Unit.  Templemore.  
(Unpublished Report) 2006. 
Lynch, E. Evaluation of CCTV in Dundalk.  Research Report No. 8/06.  Garda Research Unit. Templemore.  (Unpublished 
Report) 2006. 
Browne, P. Evaluation of CCTV in Cork.  Research Report No. 15/07.  Garda Research Unit.  Templemore.  (Unpublished 
Report) 2007. 
398 Kavanagh, D. Towards Economic Evaluation of Closed Circuit Television in Public Places as an Aid to An Garda 
Síochána. The Institute of Public Administration, Dublin.  (Unpublished Dissertation).  1999. 
Parsons, S.  Watching the Watchers:  An Garda Síochána & CCTV in Dublin’s North City Centre.  Trinity College, Dublin. 
(Unpublished Dissertation).  2001. 
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the preventative impact of CCTV. It should be determined whether CCTV is best suited to the 
circumstances or whether an alternative crime prevention measure would be more appropriate. 
 
3.  The impact of existing CCTV systems should be assessed and reviewed in such a manner as to inform 
on best practice for the future deployment of CCTV. 
Instead of asking the simple question of ‘does CCTV work?’ evaluations should strive to discover the 
circumstances in which CCTV works best and exactly how it works in those circumstances. Compiling a 
body of assessments based on the context-mechanism-output (Tilley) method would prove most useful 
in the attempt to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of CCTV as a crime prevention strategy.  
 
4.  In undertaking evaluations of CCTV systems, it should be determined what exactly constitutes 
success. 
Even though CCTV is largely spoken of as a crime prevention strategy which operates by deterrence, it 
does possess other talents. As can be seen with the Anglesea Street system, An Garda Síochána can 
quickly assess a situation and deploy appropriate resources to defuse an incident. Valuable time is not 
wasted, as CCTV allows Gardaí to weed out hoax calls in CCTV-covered areas and again time is not lost, 
when CCTV permits Gardaí to quickly intervene before an incident escalates. It has also shown to be 
must useful as an investigatory tool and for the purposes of traffic control. Prosecutions may be 
processed more speedily by way of convincing CCTV footage evidence and guilty pleas. This undoubtedly 
results in savings to the Criminal Justice System. The effective and efficient allocation of Garda resources 
and greater efficiency in the operation of the Criminal Justice System are but two examples of how CCTV 
can succeed apart from acting as a deterrent to crime. Others include increased clearance rates, reduced 
fear of crime, increased economic activity in and around the covered area and increased detection. 
 
5.  Appropriate data should be collected to investigate whether CCTV succeeds in achieving the 
identified objectives. 
The method of evaluation and the collection of data should be tailored to assess whether the objectives 
of CCTV installation have been met. Data used should go beyond mere crime rates to gain a fuller 
impression of CCTV’s effect. For example, the costs involved in prosecutions and the number of guilty 
pleas entered because of the use of CCTV footage should be gathered to ascertain the performance of 
CCTV in this regard. CCTV should be assessed in terms of its objectives and data of the correct nature 
and type is necessary for this task. 
 
6.  Data should be assembled in a timely fashion in such a way as to shed light on the way in which 
CCTV operates. 
Before and after analyses are most helpful when ascertaining the difference in crime rates after the 
installation of CCTV. In order for an accurate impression to be given of the impact of CCTV in an area, a 
bank of data should be collected in regard to the periods prior to the installation. Proper and comparable 
control areas should be selected and sufficient data collected in relation to those. Also, if at all possible 
the boundaries of the data should correspond with the boundaries between CCTV and non-CCTV areas. 
This would go far in distinguishing between the effect of the CCTV system and that brought about by 
other factors. It would also prove useful in relation to assessing the extent, if any, or displacement and 
diffusion of benefits. The data should be of a quality and level of detail sufficient to undertake a robust 
evaluation of how CCTV impacts. This should become easier in the coming years with the integration of 
Court Services, Garda and Central Statistics Office data and IT systems.399 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
399 Based on a telephone interview with Eamon Lynch, Research Officer with the Garda Research Unit on 11th December, 
2007. 
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7.  The type of data assembled should be of a nature appropriate to ascertain the tangible and less 
tangible effects of CCTV. 
Differences in incidences of crime may be determined by comparing annual crime rates, but interviews 
and surveys are potential tools to shed light on whether there has been displacement or diffusion and 
of what type and whether CCTV has effected a reduction in fear of crime or whether is it seen as an 
excessive invasion of privacy. This could only offer a more comprehensive and realistic impression of the 
impact of CCTV. 
 
8.  With the introduction of the Community-Based CCTV Scheme, the opportunity should be taken to 
audit the impact of CCTV in accordance with the methodology lessons learned in previous evaluations. 
Data of an appropriate nature and level of precision should be assembled from now on with a view to 
auditing the newer systems as they come on line and begin operating. In this way, it can be determined 
whether the Community-Based System merits extension and how best to do that. Ideally, following a 
sufficient number of localised studies, a meta-analysis would be undertaken on a national level to 
instruct on the best practice of CCTV deployment. 
 
9.  Any codes of practice used should be of a uniform standard and should be reviewed periodically to 
ensure they remain relevant. 
Such codes should deal with how the CCTV is to be operated as a system and as a crime prevention 
measure. In other words, as well as the technical and operational specifications, codes of practice should 
direct, for example, how subjects are to be selected for surveillance. 
 
10. Training and guidelines should be issued to those operating CCTV systems. 
To avoid discriminatory targeting, what constitutes ‘suspicious behaviour’ should be explored and 
should not be left to the absolute discretion of the monitor. 
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